An enforced cooperation : understanding scientific assessments in adversarial polities through Quebec shale gas policymaking, 2010-2014 by Harvey, Alexandre
Université de Montréal
An Enforced Cooperation: Understanding Scientific Assessments in
Adversarial Polities through Quebec Shale Gas Policymaking, 2010-2014
Par Alexandre Harvey
Département de Science politique, Faculté des Arts et des Sciences
Mémoire présenté en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise ès sciences
en Science politique
Avril 2016
© Alexandre Harvey, 2016
Résumé
Les biotechnologies, le réchauffement climatique, les ressources naturelles et la gestion des écosystèmes
sont tous représentatifs de la “nouvelle politique de la nature” (Hajer 2003), un terme englobant les enjeux
marqués par  une grande incertitude scientifique et  un encadrement  réglementaire inadapté aux nouvelles
réalités, suscitant de fait un conflit politique hors du commun. Dans l'espoir de diminuer ces tensions et de
générer un savoir consensuel, de nombreux gouvernements se tournent vers des institutions scientifiques ad
hoc pour documenter l'élaboration des politiques et répondre aux préoccupations des partie-prenantes. Mais
ces évaluations scientifiques permettent-elles réellement de créer une compréhension commune partagée par
ces  acteurs  politiques  polarisés?  Alors  que  l'on  pourrait  croire  que  celles-ci  génèrent  un  climat
d'apprentissage  collectif  rassembleur,  un  environnement  politique  conflictuel  rend  l'apprentissage  entre
opposant extrêmement improbable. Ainsi, cette recherche documente le potentiel conciliateur des évaluation
scientifique  en  utilisant  le  cas  des  gaz  de  schiste  québécois  (2010-2014).  Ce  faisant,  elle  mobilise  la
littérature  sur  les  dimensions  politiques  du  savoir  et  de  la  science  afin  de  conceptualiser  le  rôle  des
évaluations scientifiques au sein d'une théorie de la médiation scientifique (scientific brokerage). Une analyse
de réseau (SNA) des 5751 références contenues dans les documents déposés par 268 organisations participant
aux consultations publiques de 2010 et 2014 constitue le corps de la démonstration empirique. Précisément, il
y  est  démontré  comment  un  médiateur  scientifique  peut  rediriger  le  flux  d'information  afin  de  contrer
l'incompatibilité  entre  apprentissage  collectif  et  conflit  politique.  L'argument  mobilise  les  mécanismes
cognitifs  traditionnellement  présents  dans  la  théorie  des  médiateurs  de  politique  (policy  broker),  mais
introduit aussi les jeux de pouvoir fondamentaux à la circulation de la connaissance entre acteurs politiques.
Mots clés : médiation, évaluation scientifique, apprentissage collectif, élaboration des politiques publiques,
conflit politique, analyse de réseau, sous-système, Exponential Random Graph Model
Summary
Biotechnology, climate change, natural resources, and ecosystem management are all representative of
the  “new  politics  of  nature”  (Hajer 2003),  a  term  encompassing  policy  issues  with  high  scientific
uncertainties, unadapted regulatory regimes, and acute political conflict. In the hope of diminishing these
tensions  and  generating  a  consensual  understanding,  several  governments  mandated  ad  hoc scientific
institutions  to  document  policymaking  and  answer  stakeholder’s  concerns.  But  do  those  scientific
assessments really help to generate a shared understanding between otherwise polarized policy actors? While
it would be possible that these create inclusive collective learning dynamics, policy learning has been shown
as  being  extremely  unlikely  among  competing  policy  actors.  Accordingly,  this  research  documents  the
conciliatory power of scientific assessments using the Quebec shale gas policymaking case (2010–2014). In
doing  so,  it  mobilizes  the  literature  stressing  the  political  nature  of  science  to  conceptualize  scientific
assessment in light of a scientific brokerage theory. Empirically, the research uses Social Network Analysis to
unravel the collective learning dynamics found in two information networks built from the 5751 references
found  in  the  advocacy  and  technical  documents  published  by  268  organizations  during  two  public
consultations.  Precisely,  findings demonstrate  that  scientific  brokerage  can  redirect  information  flows  to
counteract the divide between collective learning and political conflict. The argument mobilizes cognitive
mechanisms  traditionally  found  in  policy  brokerage  theory,  but  also  introduces  often  forgotten  power
interplays prominent in policy-related knowledge diffusion.
Keywords:  brokerage,  scientific  assessment,  collective  learning,  policymaking,  policy,  political  conflict,
social network analysis, subsystem, Exponential Random Graph Model
Table of Contents
List of Figures..........................................................................................................................................v
List of Tables...........................................................................................................................................vi
List of Abbreviations.............................................................................................................................vii
Introduction.............................................................................................................................................1
I - An Important Inquiry...................................................................................................................................2
II - The Study in Theoretical Perspectives........................................................................................................4
III - Methodological Strategy...........................................................................................................................6
IV - Structure of the Thesis...............................................................................................................................8
Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework.......................................................................................................9
I - Understanding Policy-oriented Knowledge..................................................................................................9
Political Knowledge.....................................................................................................................................................10
A Review of Collective Learning..................................................................................................................................12
An Integrated Picture of Collective Learning..............................................................................................................21
II – A Network-based Approach to Collective Learning.................................................................................22
Coalitions and belief systems.......................................................................................................................................23
Other Actors..................................................................................................................................................................24
Expected Dynamics of Adversarial Subsystems...........................................................................................................26
III – Brokering a Crisis Recovery...................................................................................................................29
Delineating the Broker: A Definition............................................................................................................................29
How Brokerage Improves Policy Networks: The Functions........................................................................................32
How Brokers Reach Structural Holes: Acquiring Influence........................................................................................39
A Hypothesis.................................................................................................................................................................46
IV - Summary.................................................................................................................................................46
Chapter 2: Case and Methodology......................................................................................................48
I - The politics of shale gas.............................................................................................................................49
Scientific Controversies................................................................................................................................................49
From Science to Quebec Politics..................................................................................................................................53
From Events to Research Design..................................................................................................................................59
i
II – Data..........................................................................................................................................................60
Relational Data: From References to Collaborative Dynamics...................................................................................61
III - Analytical Strategy: A Dual Investigation................................................................................................64
A Macro-Order Analysis...............................................................................................................................................64
A Micro Order of Analysis............................................................................................................................................69
IV - Conclusion..............................................................................................................................................73
Chapter 3: Results and Discussion......................................................................................................75
I - Improved Collective Learning....................................................................................................................75
II – Influential Brokerage...............................................................................................................................78
An Explanation: The Collaborative Core Thesis..........................................................................................................84
Inferential Modelling....................................................................................................................................................88
III - Discussion: Strengthening Brokerage Theory..........................................................................................92
Explaining the Collaborative Core...............................................................................................................................93
A Better Definition of Policy Brokers...........................................................................................................................95
The State of Information in Adversarial Policymaking................................................................................................97
IV - Conclusion..............................................................................................................................................99
Concluding Remarks...........................................................................................................................100
I - Addressing Limits and Their Consequences.............................................................................................101
Capturing Collective Learning...................................................................................................................................101
Network Construction.................................................................................................................................................103
ERGM Degeneracy.....................................................................................................................................................104
External Validity.........................................................................................................................................................105
II - Few Words on a Brokerage Research Agenda.........................................................................................106
Appendix A: SNA Statistics Details...................................................................................................108
Reciprocity...................................................................................................................................................108
Burt's constraint............................................................................................................................................108
Hubs and Authorities Algorithm...................................................................................................................109
Similarity Matrices.......................................................................................................................................109
Louvain algorithm........................................................................................................................................110
Closeness......................................................................................................................................................111
Local transitivity...........................................................................................................................................111
ii
Exponential Random Graph Model...............................................................................................................111
Appendix B: Degeneracy and Goodness of-Fit.................................................................................112
MCMC Behaviour........................................................................................................................................112
Goodness-of-fit.............................................................................................................................................119
Appendix C: R codes...........................................................................................................................123
Bibliography........................................................................................................................................130
iii
List of Figures
Figure 1.1: A Comprehensive Framework of Collective Learning.........................................................14
Figure 1.2: Structural Holes of Policy Network......................................................................................34
Figure 1.3: Models of Trust-building......................................................................................................37
Figure 1.4: Structural Advantages of Brokers for Information Circulation............................................38
Figure 1.5: The Framework Applied to Information Networks and Scientific Brokerage......................44
Figure 2.1: Horizontal Fracturing and Shale Gas Extraction..................................................................51
Figure 2.2: Montly Coverage of Shale Gas in the Province of Quebec, 2010-14...................................54
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Policy Preferences........................................................................................56
Figure 2.4: Brokerage Types...................................................................................................................70
Figure 2.6: The Relation Between Authority Score, Hub score, and Brokerage....................................71
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Normalized Authority in 2011 and 2014......................................................77
Figure 3.2: Brokerage Count in 2011 and 2014......................................................................................79
Figure 3.3: Authority and Hub Scores.....................................................................................................82
Figure 3.4: Distribution of Organizational Affiliation by Information Community...............................83
Figure 3.5: Cumulative Authority of Information Sources by Community............................................87
Figure 4.1: MCMC Estimation Behaviour [1/3]...................................................................................113
Figure 4.2: MCMC Estimation Behaviour [2/3]...................................................................................114
Figure 4.3: MCMC Estimation Behaviour [3/3]...................................................................................115
Figure 5.1: In-degree Goodness-of-fit...................................................................................................119
Figure 5.2: Out-degree Goodness-of-fit................................................................................................120
Figure 5.3: Shared-partners Goodness-of-fit.........................................................................................121
Figure 5.4: Minimum Geodesic Distance Goodness-of-Fit..................................................................122
iv
List of Tables
Table I: Summary of the Macro-order Instruments.................................................................................69
Table II: Summary of the Micro-order Instruments................................................................................73
Table III: Summary of Collective Learning Dynamics...........................................................................76
Table IV: Collective Learning Dynamics in Assessment and Advocacy Subnetworks..........................85
Table V: ERGM Results..........................................................................................................................89
Table VI: Typical Cases Facilitating ERGM Interpretation....................................................................91
Table VII: General Estimation Information..........................................................................................116
Table VIII: Descriptive Statistics for Each Variable.............................................................................116
Table IX: Cross-correlation...................................................................................................................117
Table X: Auto-correlation......................................................................................................................118
v
List of Abbreviations
ACF                                                                                                        Advocacy Coalition Framework
BAPE                                                                              Bureau d'audience publique sur l'environnment
EES                                                                                            Évaluation environnementale stratégique
ERGM                                                                                                 Exponential Random Graph Model
IPCC                                                                                     Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
SNA                                                                                                                     Social Network Analysis
vi
Introduction
Climate  change  mitigation,  biotechnology,  and  ecosystem  management  are  all
representative of the “new politics of nature” (Hajer 2003). Characterized by an increasing
complexity,  they  regularly  exhibit  an  important  degree  of  technicality,  ambiguity,  and
uncertainty. Their scope goes well beyond the human one and possesses a multidimensional
nature.  Such  peculiarities  often  lead  to  a  broad  range  of  individuals  to  involve  in  the
policymaking process, each of them having their own—and most of the time incompatible—
set of political preferences, worldviews, and interests. Those actors respective expertise are
diverse and range from a user-gathered local knowledge to an impressive amount of scientific
sophistication in a delimited field of inquiry. As a consequence, post-materialist issues such as
those  noted  above are  frequently entangled with acute  political  contention resulting  from
competing interests.
From  a  governmental  point  of  view,  the  new  politics  of  nature  poses  important
challenges to good management. The significant amount of complexity induces legitimacy
and  analytical  capacity  concerns,  which  in  turn  push  governments  toward  a  broader
articulation  of  governance  to  achieve  efficient  problem  solving.  Such  articulation  of
governance, however, falls outside traditional policymaking institutions. Indeed, issues of the
new politics of nature transcend existing structures of governance and occur through what
Hajer called the “institutional void”: 
“established institutional arrangements often lack the powers to deliver the required or
requested  policy  results  on  their  own  [and,  accordingly,  policymaking takes]  part  in
transnational, polycentric networks of governance in which power is dispersed” (2003,
175).
In  the  absence  of  agreed  rules,  the  polity  becomes  mostly  informal  and  emerges  as  a
consequence  of  deliberative  policymaking  instead  of  constraining  it.  Understood
simultaneously, the interaction between (1) the need for a decentralized form of governance
(2)  high  potential  for  political  conflict,  and  (3)  deliberative  and  poorly  institutionalized
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political arenas poses crucial political challenges to contemporary societies.
To grasp those challenges, numerous societies rely on broad, open, and deliberative
scientific  assessments  to  document  the  issue at  hand and give  political  actors  a  common
understanding of a given phenomenon. However,  insights from the new politics of nature
suggest the probabilities of success are rather thin. As explained with greater details in the
theoretical part of this research, political conflict, deliberation, and genuine collective learning
make poor associates. Strong policy-related beliefs induce political confrontations, which in
turn  activate  cognitive  defence  mechanisms further  limiting  the  potential  for  constructive
dialogue. Hence, understanding the processes by which societal debates become polarized and
means  of  mitigating  such  outcome  rises  as  a  pressing  and  necessary  research  agenda.
Assessing  how information  is  created,  how it  circulates  across  policy  actors,  and  why a
particular argument is rejected or welcomed into an individual’s cognitive system constitutes
a significant contribution to the new politics of nature. Specifically, this research contributes
to this research agenda by investigating the capacity of scientific assessments to diminish
political conflict:
Can scientific assessments create a shared understanding between
political actors operating in adversarial policymaking?
I - An Important Inquiry
While  one  should  acknowledge  that  the  authority  of  science  and  expertise  in
policymaking  has  been  severely  criticized  in  the  literature  to  the  point  where  some
practitioners developed their own skepticism about their validity (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998),
reasons are strong to believe that scientific knowledge remains central to policymaking and
still holds a firm intellectual leverage and legitimacy-building potential. From an empirical
perspective, science is frequently invoked on pragmatic grounds as the predominant technique
to reduce uncertainty. Shale gas, which constitutes the empirical foundation of this research,
remarkably illustrates such phenomenon. Heavily concerned by the environmental, social, and
2
health-related problems emanating from hydraulic fracturing, environmental and local groups
around the globe mobilized against the industry, fuelling controversy over the soundness of
extracting the resource. In the hope of increasing knowledge about hydraulic fracturing and
managing the rising animosity, many jurisdictions sponsored scientific assessments to guide
their policymaking process  (e.g. Advanced Resources International 2013; British Columbia
Ministry  of  Health 2014;  Bureau  d’audiences  publiques  sur  l’environnement 2014;  U.K.
Geological Survey 2015; U.S. EPA 2015; U.S. Geological Survey 2015). To be sure, whether
or  nor  these  operations  succeeded  in  generating  collective  learning  and  rallying  political
actors around a common policy stance is a matter of empirical investigations. Yet, from a new
politics of nature perspective, success appears unlikely, and the absence of formal institutions
to structure the policymaking process presumably increases the prominence of knowledge,
arguments,  and  persuasion  as  political  tools.  Accordingly,  “to  better  understand  policy
processes is thus to understand how scientific and technical explanations are integrated into
(or deflected from) belief systems, used in political debates and negotiations, and integrated
with other forms of knowledge, especially local knowledge” (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, 187).
This  research understands scientific  assessments  as  the processes  by which an  open,
transparent institution reviews the state knowledge, orders further scientific studies, and draws
conclusions from an amalgam of scientific disciplines. From the outset, those institutions are
constructed for  the  explicit  purpose  of  policy-oriented  learning and possess  high salience
among policy actors. These peculiarities make them a particularly interesting object to study
collective learning in adversarial policymaking, yet assessments remain under-investigated.
As Nilsson argues: 
“there  are  relatively  few empirical  studies  on  how assessments  are  used  in  national
policymaking.  There  is  a  need  for  longitudinal  research  on  how  assessments’
recommendations,  arguments,  and underlying premises link to the evolution of  public
policies  and their  underlying  arguments,  as  well  as  key  actors’ policy  positions  and
underlying belief systems.” (2005, 228).
In line with this reasoning, Sabatier (1987) suggested that such professional forums could
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facilitate collective learning and diminish the chances of policy stalemate. However, empirical
investigations of this hypothesis remain scarce (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014), and understanding
exactly how assessments could create a shared understanding in context of extreme political
conflict continues to be an unresolved question.
II - The Study in Theoretical Perspectives
Unfortunately, the under-investigation of the phenomenon is all the more problematic
given that conciliation of ideas is a normatively appealing ideal. As Ansell & Gash wrote:
“The term” collaborative governance” promises a sweet reward. It seems to promise that
if we govern collaboratively, we may avoid the high costs of adversarial policy making,
expand democratic participation, and even restore rationality to public management. A
number  of  the  studies  reviewed  here  have  pointed  toward the  value  of  collaborative
strategies:  bitter  adversaries  have  sometimes  learned  to  engage  in  productive
discussions;  public  managers  have  developed  more  fruitful  relationships  with
stakeholders; and sophisticated forms of collective learning and problem solving have
been developed.”(2008, 561)
Indeed,  apart  from collective learning,  collaborative governance has been linked to  better
management of complex and ambiguous ecological systems, reducing uncertainty, building a
stronger  knowledge  base,  aggregating  diverse  perspectives,  taking  into  account  social,
political and ethical values, enhancing democratic legitimacy, transparency, efficiency, and
social  acceptability,  adapting  policy  to  the  local  context,  and  empowering  marginalized
groups  (Griffiths 2000;  Jacobs,  Luoma,  and  Taylor 2003;  Reed  et  al.  2006;  Rogers 2006;
Steyaert and Jiggins 2007). In their meta-analysis of 137 case studies, Ansell and Gash (2008)
identified nine independent variables contributing to these outcomes: the forum is formal,
consensus-driven, involves in-person dialogues, is initiated by a public agency, participants
include non-state  actors,  participants  engage directly  in  policymaking and are not  merely
consulted, organic leaders create brokerage and shuttle diplomacy and, lastly, achieving small
intermediate gains to build commitment and satisfaction is possible.
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In spite of its efforts to explain how collaborative policymaking emerges, this literature
faces  severe  criticisms,  to  the  point  where it  appears  unadapted to  investigate  with great
details the present inquiry, especially when it comes to explaining the failure of collaborative
institutions or the nature of political interplays. Among the recognized problems, dealing with
ubiquitous power relationships is the most obvious one. Indeed, research on knowledge in
policymaking convincingly demonstrated how increased technical and analytical knowledge
does  not  necessarily  lead  to  compromises  and  new  understandings.  In  fact,  articulation
between  science  and  politics  is  highly  contextual  and  variable,  but  even  in  participative
institutions,  power  remains  a  fundamental  part  of  social  relations  (Adams 2004;
Griffiths 2000; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; van Kerkhoff and Lebel 2006; Pielke 2007; Pielke
Jr. 2004; Weiss 1979). Moreover, the approach “has been challenged for failing to produce the
objective empirical and normative standards implied by its scientific aspirations” (DeLeon
and Varda 2009,  59).  Finally,  one  can  note  the  imperfect  adequacy between collaborative
institutions as conceptualized by the literature and the assessments as defined above. Indeed,
assessments do not correspond to cooperative arenas of policymaking  per se;  they do not
involve face-to-face dialogues,  are  expert-based processes,  have  most  of  the  time a mere
consultative function, and their scope is often too large to implement efficiently deliberative
democracy’s prescriptions (Parkinson 2003).
Consequently,  this  research  leaves  deliberative  democracy aside,  and instead  tries  to
minimize  the  limitations  mentioned  above  by  concentrating  on  the  more  power-oriented
policy  network  literature  (e.g.  Heikkila  and  Gerlak 2013;  Ingold 2011;  Ingold  and
Varone 2011; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014; Weible 2008). In doing so, it rejects the view upon
which information floats in a disembodied, freely available “knowledge reservoir”. Not only
is knowledge indistinguishable from its political vehicle, but it is also more-or-less complex,
redundant, coherent, fragmented, and more. As a results, this research argues that the general
state of knowledge can be outlined and differentiated across subsystems, but also that the
natural flow of information in adversarial networks can be mapped, both theoretically and
methodologically.  The  advantage  of  doing  so  is  that  scientific  assessments  can  be
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conceptualized as an element within the broader information network: a scientific brokers, i.e.
an  actor  dedicated  to  the  integration  of  competing  viewpoints  and  multiple  scientific
disciplines in the hope of producing compromising policymaking (Ingold and Varone 2011).
Seeing assessments as such yielded fruitful understandings: the exact mechanisms by which
they can distort  antagonistic  flows of  information to  foster  greater  collective learning are
exposed in Chapter 1, along with the network-wide benefits resulting from such activity.
III - Methodological Strategy
The study takes a quantitative, case-based approach to test the hypothesis on scientific
brokerage. Namely, Social Network Analysis (SNA) is used to measure information flows.
The data  come from the Quebec shale  gas subsystem, which constitutes  an ideal  case to
materialize the new politics of nature. Indeed, a 5-year, highly adversarial debate occurred
between 2010 and 2015. The object of contention was whether or not shale gas should be
exploited in the province, a subject encompassing an important level of technical uncertainty,
possessing  multiple  dimensions,  being  the  concern  of  several  scientific  disciplines,  and
involving a plurality of political groups advocating for incompatible outcomes. But aside from
being a good representation of the new politics of nature, what makes it a remarkable case to
study the problem is that the societal debate took place in an open and deliberation-oriented
institution—the  Bureau  d’audience  publique  sur  l’environnment (BAPE)—and  occurred
twice, once before and once after a scientific assessment—the Évaluation environnementale
stratégique  (EES). As the consultations were separated by a broad, highly salient scientific
assessment,  the  design  makes  it  possible  to  grasp  the  effect  of  scientific  brokerage  by
comparing the state of collective learning before and after it occurred.
Reasons are strong to believe the case represents a robust test for scientific brokerage. As
Ingold and Varone argue, “it would be very beneficial to expand the empirical basis by also
considering negative cases. […] explaining both change and stability (despite intense policy
brokerage) within an integrated theoretical framework is still a major challenge” (2011, 22).
As stated earlier, it is assumed that whether scientific brokerage succeeded or failed to sustain
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a shared understanding is a matter of empirical investigations. What is interesting about the
Quebec  case  is  that  it  directly  answers  Ingold  and  Varone’s  argument.  If  brokerage  can,
indeed,  induce  collective  learning  despite  a  high  level  of  contention,  then  it  should  be
observable in the selected settings. Alternatively, if failure is observed, then the comparative
mapping of information flows should make it easier to assess why brokerage was inefficient.
Admittedly, operationalizing such vague concepts as information flows and collective
learning  appears  like  a  sizeable  challenge  (Bennett  and  Howlett 1992).  While  numerous
studies investigated the phenomenon using qualitative approaches (e.g. Béland 2006; Frantz
and Sato 2005; Frey 2010; Harrison 2001, 2002; Nilsson 2005; Vifell and Sjögren 2011), the
methodological strategy used in this research takes an innovative stance and assumes that the
references  contained  in  policy  documents—in-text  references,  citations,  footnotes,  and
bibliography—are  reliable  demonstrations  of  external  influence  on  an  actor’s  rationale
(McNutt 2012;  Shwed  and  Bearman 2010).  Accordingly,  the  5751  references  found  in
technical  and advocacy documents  published by 268 policy  actors  during  the  two public
consultations  were  transformed  into  relational  matrices  exploitable  by  Social  Network
Analysis (SNA).
SNA is  a  statistical technique  aimed at  studying the  links  (relations)  between nodes
(actors). In political science terms, this means that SNA “offers a means of addressing one of
the holy grails of the social sciences: effectively analyzing the interdependence and flows of
influence among individuals, groups, and institutions” (Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011, 145).
Amidst the advantages of the approach, one can note the possibility to study, visually and
quantitatively,  important  aspects  of social  organizations that  are  not captured by study of
actors’ attributes.  Moreover,  the  model  has  a  capacity  to  extract  relational  data  from the
systemic level,  for  instance the density  of interactions,  the existence of  communities,  the
equivalent position of two or more actors, the structural divisions between subgroups, etc. In
addition,  SNA can  provide  fruitful  information  at  the  individual  level,  for  example  by
documenting the proximity between two actors, central or peripheral positions in the network,
the dependencies upon others to reach a particular individual, etc. (Knoke and Yang 2008;
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Scott 2013; Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011). For the purpose of this study, SNA allowed to
measure collective learning and scientific brokerage, but also to assess whether or not these
observations were statistically reliable from an inferential point of view.
IV - Structure of the Thesis
The first chapter provides the theoretical foundations of the analysis and develops a
hypothesis regarding the capacity of scientific assessment to sustain collective learning. Case,
method, and data justifications are provided in the first part of Chapter 2, followed by an
explanation of the analytical strategy. The third chapter presents the empirical results along
with  a  discussion  engaging  brokerage  theory.  An  appraisal  of  this  study’s  limits  and
suggestions about further investigations anchor the concluding section.
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework
This chapter lays the foundations needed to understand how scientific assessments can
create a shared understanding between policy actors. Three main objectives drive its structure:
(1)  describe  the  role  of  knowledge  in  the  policymaking  process  (2)  understand  how
knowledge is constructed, gathered, transformed and assimilated by actors, and (3) predict
how scientific brokerage may alter such information flows. 
I - Understanding Policy-oriented Knowledge
Giving an exact definition of knowledge is a daunting task, but the first step toward its
completion is to acknowledge the existence of a “plurality of expertise, with ideas coming
from  a  wide  variety  of  sources,  including  think  tanks  (Abelson 2007;  Lindquist 1993),
consultants  (Spears 2007),  academics  (Borins 2003;  Cohn 2007),  and  advocacy  groups
(Stritch 2007)” (McNutt 2012, 17). It is usual to see science being promoted as one of the
purest  representations  of  knowledge,  mostly  because  of  its  collective  responsibility  for
progress  (Oreskes 2004)  and  objectives  of  generalization,  causality  demonstration,  and
empirical validation (Rogers 2006). Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that science, at
least  with  regard  to  policymaking,  shares  many  attributes  of  the  common.  Its  authority
emerges from a socially  accepted claim of rationality,  but like all  forms of knowledge,  a
palatable truth ultimately relies on an intellectual consensus among similar actors based on a
shared  methodology  and  a  communal  set  of  social,  historical,  economic,  political,  and
epistemological attributes (Oreskes 2004).
Policy-oriented  knowledge  is  frequently  widespread,  heterogeneous,  and  divided
between several policy actors, each of them having their own perspective regarding (1) the
seriousness of various dimensions of the problem (2) the importance of its causes, and (3) the
potential  benefits of the solution they advocate for.  Taken as a whole,  these three objects
represent  the  core  of  policy-oriented  knowledge.  This  knowledge  may  be  more  or  less
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intellectually demanding, ranging between what is known [e.g. gravity], what is complicated
but  knowable  [e.g.  car engineering],  what  is  unknowable  but  partly  predictable  [e.g.
meteorology],  and what  is  completely chaotic  [e.g.  the behaviour  of  a  double  pendulum]
(Steyaert and Jiggins 2007). The difference between the known and the chaotic lies within the
ability of experts to make better predictions than non-experts. In most modern policy issues,
the level of complexity is such that even the most erudite are no more useful than a basic
statistical model to predict outcomes (Hird 2005). In light of these limitations, many scholars
argued for a withdrawal from expert-based policymaking in favour of a deliberative turn and
an  empowerment  of  marginalized  groups  (e.g.  Albæk 1995;  Gibbons  et  al.  1994;
Rogers 2006).  Such  a  transition,  however,  has  been  criticized  for  its  negligence  of  a
ubiquitous element of knowledge relationships: its political nature (Griffiths 2000).
Political Knowledge
The concept  of  political  knowledge encompasses  many different  ideas.  For  instance,
Stehr (2005) talks about knowledge as an object of regulation, about “attempts to channel the
social  role  of  knowledge,  to  generate  rules  and  enforce  sanctions  […],  to  affix  certain
attributes […], and—likely the most controversial strategy—to restrict the application of new
knowledge and technical artifacts.”  More relevant for this study is the idea that information
constitutes  a  powerful  political  resource  to  promote  policy  preferences  (Bennett  and
Howlett 1992). An improvement of knowledge about ecosystems, for example, might increase
the awareness among policy actors of their interdependencies and transform their relationship
(Steyaert  and  Jiggins 2007).  Similarly,  a  government  delegating  decision-making  to  an
apolitical  and knowledge-oriented  institution  may  in  fact  abdicate  a  portion  of  its  policy
capacity, as even apparently meaningless technical decisions often have significant political
implications (Vifell and Sjögren 2011).
The value of information as a political resource is increased when policymaking occurs
through  what  Hajer  (2003)  named  the  “institutional  void”.  In  the  absence  of  established
structures,  the  elaboration  takes  a  discursive  turn;  exchanges  between  actors  involve
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viewpoints, persuasions, arguments, but also a negotiation about the rule of the game and who
ought to govern the policymaking process. Such a deliberative process exacerbates the already
extensive role of argumentation in shaping power relations:
“[because]  decision-making  processes  are  rooted  in  language  and  based  on
argumentation and discussion, they can never be entirely arbitrary and can never be fully
explained by saying that a single actor or coalition of actors determines the form and
content of the decision-making process. Arguments are always subject to certain rules
and procedures; and the content of the arguments must refer to, and be integrated with, a
wider set of concept formations, which in a concrete historical situation cannot be freely
selected by the actors themselves” (Albæk 1995, 90).
While  strongly  institutionalized  structures  have  the  necessary  “rules  and  procedures”  to
determine  insiders  and  frame  their  interactions,  the  institutional  void  creates  a  porous
policymaking environment  open to  a  plurality  of  expertise  competing  with  each other  to
establish norms of governance (Frey 2010; Grundmann 2007). Sources may fight over which
type of knowledge should be considered relevant  (science,  practitioners’ experience,  user-
based  information,  etc.),  its  object  (effectiveness,  political  acceptability,  or  costs  of
recommendations), interpretation of shared information, or the political settings surrounding
the debate (closed vs open subsystems, pluralism vs corporatism, collaborative vs expert-
based institutions, etc.). This battle is not superficial or purely motivated by a willingness to
dominate  the  process,  but  rather  results  from deep  intellectual  divides.  As  knowledge  is
seldom  a  pure  accumulation  of  neutral  facts,  but  more  frequently  produced  to  answer
ambiguous criteria and issues, prior professional, emotional, intellectual, and psychological
assets  inevitably  alter  the  meaning  attributed  to  knowledge  and the  related  behaviours  it
sustains  (Vifell  and  Sjögren 2011).  The  point  here  is  that  the  institutional  void  opens
policymaking to a wide variety of more or less compatible expertizes competing to establish
their  influence,  a  phenomenon  which  in  turn  increases  the  likelihood  of  knowledge
politicization.
A prominent  step  toward  a  better  comprehension  of  knowledge  politicization  is  to
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delineate what it is not. Practitioners frequently describe the connection between science and
policymaking as being “linear” (Pielke Jr. 2004). At the core of this conception is the idea
that:
“technological development is the prime driver of progress and enlightenment; that non-
scientific belief systems are based on popular ignorance and superstition; that advances
in scientific knowledge inevitably reduce uncertainty; and that increased absorption of
science leads to convergence in social understanding and public policy” (Jasanoff and
Wynne 1998, 4)
Scholars  have shown that  the  mere  existence of  such function  is  utterly  dubious,  for  the
alignment  of  necessary  conditions  is  highly  unlikely  (Weiss 1979),  and  the  conceptual
coherence of the model appears questionable (Albæk 1995). Most importantly, the model has
been criticized for disregarding the possibility that knowledge acts as a political instrument
(Hoppe 1999).
By opposition, models acknowledging knowledge politicization (e.g. Weible 2008) point
toward  two major  components.  Firstly,  knowledge can  become an  arm of  persuasion,  an
instrument  to  convince  and  gather  political  capital.  Second,  actors  embedded  within
conflicting relations tend to increase their skepticism about novel information and diminish
their willingness to listen to competing ideas. Taken as a whole, the phenomenon produces
political  settings  in  which  information  is  more  instrumental  than  enlightening.  In  such a
context,  the predicted advantages of  deliberative democracy,  notably fostering learning to
improve  policy  outputs,  seem  thoroughly  implausible.  But  what  exactly  are  the  factors
stimulating collective learning?
A Review of Collective Learning
For  Bennett  and  Howlett  (1992),  policy  learning  is  a  complex,  multi-faceted
phenomenon by which perceptions about the what, who, how, and why dimensions of a policy
are  transformed  (see  also  Hall 1993;  Sabatier 1987).  More  precisely,  learning  may  be
understood  as  an  “enduring  alterations  of  […]  behavioural  intentions  that  result  from
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experience and which are concerned with the attainment or revision of the precepts of the
belief system of individuals […]” (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, 42–56). Even if the concept of
learning  has  been  extended  to  programs,  instruments,  organizations,  and  collectivities,
learning remains purely limited to individuals; only the interplays between these actors can
give  the  concept  its  social  resonance  and  lead  to  political  consequences  (Gerlak  and
Heikkila 2011; P. A. Sabatier and Zafonte 2001).
The exact means by which learning becomes collective are complex, but the literature
converges  toward  a  three-stage  phenomenon,  as  summarized  in  Figure 1.1  (Gerlak  and
Heikkila 2011; Heikkila and Gerlak 2013; Nilsson 2005; Wolman and Page 2002). Firstly, an
individual  must  acquire  novel  information  from  others,  for  example  by  assimilating
experiences, new ideas, or concepts. The stage implies a receiver, a producer and a sender of
information  who  exchange  information  through  an  at  least  semi-structured  sustainable
network. In other words, it entails a supply, a demand, and an activity linking both (Craft and
Howlett 2012). Information acquisition is, however, insufficient to sustain learning, which can
only be achieved through a second stage: translation. Translation represents the consolidation
of novel knowledge into an individual’s beliefs. It is a latent process strongly affected by
cognitive assets, frames, problem definition, perception of validity and accurateness, as well
as  institutional,  historical,  cultural,  and political  settings  (Wolman and Page 2002).  When
successfully  implemented,  gaining  new understandings  of  cause-effect  relations  of  policy
problems  and  how  to  resolve  them  can  foster  behavioural  changes  pertaining  to  goals,
strategies, or activities. 
Translating this alteration of thoughts into a social phenomenon is only possible if the
third  phase  of  collective  learning—dissemination—is  fulfilled,  which  may  bolster
convergence of subsystems’ actors. When policy actors share similar ideas about an issue, the
increased agreement makes it easier to move beyond the status quo and revise procedures or
policies.  This  is  not  to  say  that  dissemination  of  ideas  always  leads  to  convergence  of
opinions. Indeed, diffusion of knowledge does not guarantee persuasion, and the encounter of
prior beliefs with novel information may lead to four types of responses at the individual
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level: (1) opinion shifting [complete change of opinion] (2) opinion softening [relaxation of
policy preferences]  (3)  position-taking  [from neutral  to  partial],  or  (4)  opinion  hardening
[reinforcement of policy preferences] (Montpetit  and Lachapelle 2015; unpublished paper).
Of those, only the first three are compatible with the ideals of deliberative democracy. 
Figure 1.1: A Comprehensive Framework of Collective Learning1
Collectively, policy actors may not share a common response to a given information, for
knowledge may be prevented from circulating freely or may have a differentiated influence on
actors’ rationale.  For  instance,  a  subgroup  may  temper  its  preferences  while  the  other
strengthens them, in  which case one cannot  talk about  beneficial  collective learning.  The
1 Taken in Heikkila and Gerlak (2013)
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picture is even worst if both sides strengthen their position. Thus, whether diffusion of ideas
occurs at the subsystem level, is limited to subgroups, or leads to a polarization of actors has
serious consequences for policymaking. As shown in Figure 1.1, empirical investigations of
the phenomenon identified four broad categories of variables affecting the occurrence of each
of  these outcomes:  (1)  exogenous events  (2) the technological  and functional  domain (3)
structural  factors,  and  (4)  social  relationships  (Gerlak  and  Heikkila 2011;  Heikkila  and
Gerlak 2013).
1. Exogenous Events
The  first  category  pertains  to  external  events,  of  which  macroeconomic  crises  and
political turnovers are conceivably the most prominent examples (Gerlak and Heikkila 2011).
Obviously,  listing exhaustively the possibilities and explaining how each of them impacts
policy networks lies well beyond the scope of this research. Rather, the important point is to
bear in mind that policy network can be relatively stable units over time (Larsen, Vrangbæk,
and Traulsen 2006; Meijerink 2005; Paul A. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999; Zafonte
and  Sabatier 2004).  Hence,  exogenous  factors  may  sometimes  be  necessary  to  challenge
established dynamics:
“More broadly, these constraints on learning may be because rapid social, economic, or
physical  changes  in  the  environment  can  threaten  the  stability  of  an  institutional
arrangement (Ostrom, 2005, p. 272) and in so doing may weaken some of the structural
features or social dynamics that might support  learning.  However,  such changes also
could  positively  alter  structural  features,  social  dynamics,  or  technological  and
functional domains in ways that allow them to be more conducive to learning” (Heikkila
and Gerlak 2013, 500).
From a theoretical perspective, exogenous impacts have, therefore, the power to dispute the
status quo. Nevertheless, events erupt on a contingent basis and are hardly predictable, casting
some doubts on their usefulness to model typical patterns of collective learning.
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2. Technological and Functional Domain
The second set of variables possesses stability similar to exogenous events,  although
with greater predictability. The technological and functional domain relates to the attributes of
the policy and polity at hand. By delineating the levels of ambiguity, uncertainty, availability,
transparency, and reliability of information:
“the technological and functional domain can determine the type of information that a
collective group will be interested in learning, seek out, or have access to, as well as how
frequently  and  easily  information  can  be  shared,  therefore  shaping  the  acquisition,
translation, and dissemination phases of the learning process” (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013,
497). 
This hypothesis has been empirically corroborated by numerous scholars. For instance, a
given ecological system with high level of uncertainty, bad quality of data and low availability
of information is expected to limit agreement between competing coalitions (Jenkins-Smith et
al.  2014).  Silva  and  Jenkins-Smith  (2007)  found  an  association  between  variations  in
scientists’ recommendation of the precautionary principle and the ambiguity of the problem.
In Hird’s study (2005) of U.S. state legislators, the political environment had positive and
significant  effects  on  legislators’  perception  of  their  source,  even  controlling  for  their
cognitive assets. In further support of those results, Harrison (2002) demonstrated how the
political structures caused an alteration in the use of scientific information about the pulp and
paper  industry  pollution  in  the  U.S.,  Canada,  and  Sweden.  Frantz  and  Sato  (2005)
documented how domestic contexts affected the perception and usage of knowledge about
leprosy in Japan and the U.S. Along the same lines, Grundmann (2007) showed how the
national media impaired the transmission of IPCC’s conclusions in Germany and the U.S. 
The influence of functional and technological domain is, then, thoroughly documented.
But just like exogenous events, the technological and functional domains of a policy are not
expected to fluctuate intensely over a short period. As a consequence, trying to explain short-
to mid-term collective learning with technological innovations, scientific enlightenment, or
major alterations of political structures is unlikely to yield interesting theoretical predictions.
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3. Structural Factors
The third category of variables corresponds to what Heikkila and Gerlak (2013, 494)
defined “in terms of how the functions, tasks, or responsibilities in a group are organized and
coordinated”.  Unlike  social  relationships,  structural  factors  do  not  encompass  dynamic
relational  dimensions,  for  instance  cognitive  heuristics  affecting  the  perception  of
trustworthiness,  but  rather  express  the  organization  of  a  network  resulting  from  the
aggregation  of  its  members.  Counter-intuitively,  structure  is  not  solely  the  attribute  of
organizations or institutions, but also applies to knowledge. Information, far from floating
randomly in a disembodied, indefinite reservoir, is rather organized in a structure reflecting its
complexity, redundancy, compatibility, fragmentation, and more. Accordingly, for each policy
network, a corresponding information network delimits the state, range, and potential uses of
available knowledge.
The  most  basic  structural  attribute  of  information  networks  relates  to  the  type  of
knowledge available, i.e. the supply side. Contemporary “advisory capacity” is on the edge of
being  chaotic:  it  is  dispersed,  fluid,  pluralist,  and  polycentric.  Policy-relevant  knowledge
combines technical expertise and political preferences, can be reactive or anticipatory, and
comes  from  multiple  sources  addressing  a  broad  range  of  decision-makers  (Craft  and
Howlett 2012). Such a striking diversity has been empirically observed by Hird (2005) in his
previously  mentioned  study  of  state  legislators,  who  listed  their  information  sources  in
descending order of relevance: constituents, nonpartisan legislative staff, fellow legislators,
community organizations, legislative leaders, special committees, lobbyists, university-based
research,  executive  agencies,  national  organizations,  think  tanks,  partisan  legislative  staff,
governors,  media,  political  parties,  and  the  Internet.  Similarly,  Wolman  and  Page  (2002)
observed  that,  for  local  officials,  perception  of  relevance  varied  considerably  between
information  channels  (in  descending  order):  informal  conversation  with  fellow  officials,
governmental  publications,  good-practice  guides,  practitioner  journals,  conferences,  study
tours, newsletters, electronic information, conversation with researchers, academic journals,
17
and conversation with councillors.
From a cognitive perspective, the duplication of information sources and channels poses
prominent  challenges  to  collective  learning.  Indeed,  it  has  been  shown  that  information
availability and consistency, as well as its perceived validity, quality, and usefulness were all
positively  correlated  with  the  translation  of  external  knowledge  into  internal  beliefs
(Frey 2010).  When  sources  and  media  are  overabundant,  the  multiplication  of  messages
brings  considerable  noise  into  the  information  network  and  increases  the  chances  of
contradictory  signals.  Workman,  Jones,  and  Jochim  (2009)  clarified  the  phenomenon  by
differentiating overlapping from cumulative information. Whereas socially independent actors
may  increase  the  overall  supply  of  information  by  providing  non-repetitive  and
complementary knowledge, a multiplication of interconnections between sources—as when a
common political cause pushes them to join the same policy network—is likely to expand
redundancy to a point where the system becomes maladapted and “relevant information [is]
drowned out by the echo” (2009, 85). Thus, the more salient the issue, the more numerous the
sources will be, enhancing probabilities to observe a confused and oversupplied information
network.  In  such  a  case,  distinguishing  the  relevant  knowledge  from irrelevant  pollution
becomes a cumbersome task, especially considering the bounded rationality of organizations
(Korfmacher  and  Koontz 2003;  Nilsson 2005;  Workman,  Jones,  and  Jochim 2009)  and
individuals (Béland 2006; Gowda 1999; Weyland 2009).
In addition to the quantity and diversity of information present in a network, the structure
of  information  flows  may affect  probabilities  of  generating  collective  learning.  Basically,
information  networks  must  constantly  handle  the  tension  between  the  range  of  available
information and the efficiency of its management. Indeed, a centralized structure facilitates
information acquisition and diffusion to the cost of inclusion, inasmuch as a decentralized
structure yields better inclusiveness but harder management. To use the words of Heikkila and
Gerlak (2013, 495–6):
“With  a  more  integrated  or  centralized  structure,  learning  could  potentially  be
compromised if it insulates actors and leads to fewer opportunities to acquire diverse and
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new sources of information. However, with a more integrated structure, actors may have
more opportunities to acquire information within a group and in the disseminate phase of
learning  to  distribute  information  quickly  and  adopt  new  learning  products.  This  is
because the decision-making costs in a centralized context may be lower, or the structure
may be designed such that a relatively smaller proportion of the actors in a group are
needed for learning to be disseminated“.
4. Social Relationships
Akin  to  structural  characteristics,  social  relationships  bestow  important  explanatory
power.  What  is  understood  by  social  relationships  is  mostly  the  influence  of  cognitive
attributes in building a perception of trustworthiness, relevance, and leadership among policy
actors. Such perceptions, in turn, enhance social connections, willingness to cooperate, and
propensity to listen to. With regards to scientific assessments, some contemporary political
actors developed what could be defined as an active cognitive suspicion against scientific
information  and  claims  of  rationality.  Hoppe  (1999)  called  the  phenomenon  the
“epistemological transformation of society”:
“That social scientists shape the world they study by the way they define the problem has
come to be accepted not only by social scientists but by sophisticated political actors as
well. They are aware that researchers’ assumptions, theories, and choice of variables can
have large effects on the answer they find. This new understanding throws into doubt the
accommodation  [with  political  and administrative  practice]  that  earlier  generations  of
social scientists had negotiated” (Weiss 1991; cited in Hoppe 1999).
A complementary literature suggests,  however,  that  most individuals  have a  more limited
awareness and remain mostly affected by passive cognitive attributes such as thinking styles,
interpretative  frames,  belief  systems,  ideologies,  professional  paradigms,  worldviews,
scientific perspectives, and so on. Among the numerous examples of such processes, Béland
(2006) identifies the heuristic of availability. Affected by existing ideological commitments
and institutional legacies, the heuristic of availability is a cognitive shortcut giving higher
saliency  to  easily  attainable  concepts.  Weyland  (2009)  adds  to  the  list  the  heuristic  of
representativeness—which leads to an overstatement of the benefits associated with a policy
—and the heuristic of anchorage—which translates strong preferences for minimal adaptation
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of initial policy. More importantly, he demonstrates in his study of pension and health reforms
in  Latin  America  how these  cognitive  mechanisms  affect  even  the  most  sophisticated  of
policy actors.
Moreover,  prior attitudes have an important  role to  play in  the assimilation of novel
information. Recognition of a policy problem has been demonstrated as being dependent upon
the  reception  of  (1)  a  persuasive  information—which  implies  credible  messenger,  high
saliency, and efficient framing—that is different from the existing mental representation of the
social or physical environment, and (2) a negative valence, i.e. a negative emotional reaction
associated with this information (Munro and Ditto 1997; Oxley, Vedlitz, and Wood 2014). The
combination of cognitive heuristics with prior attitudes “explain[s] how one and the same
dynamic—whether affect, availability, biased assimilation, source credibility, or others—can,
nevertheless, produce diametrically opposed risk perceptions in different people and indeed
intense  forms  of  polarization  across  groups  of  persons.”  (Kahan,  Jenkins‐Smith,  and
Braman 2011, 149). Illustrative of such processes, studies showed that the interaction between
worldviews  (Wildavsky 1987)  and  framing  of  risks  affects  the  perception  of  scientific
consensus  (Kahan, Jenkins‐Smith, and Braman 2011) as well as the perceived credibility of
the source (Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014). In addition, some results further add
that social and cultural similarity as well as the level of involvement in the policy-process
significantly affect the transfer of tacit and formal information (Lee and Meene 2012).
More subtle influences are also at play,  as even professional affiliation and scientific
fields of inquiry have been shown to influence risk perception. As Barke and Jenkins-Smith
(1993, 432) wrote:
“Even where the scientific evidence is relatively rich, beliefs and judgments like those
listed above can play a substantial role in giving context to these risks. Perhaps even
more importantly, where uncertainty remains a large factor these beliefs and judgments
may serve to plug the gaps in the data, filling in the unknowns with prior beliefs. For
these reasons, the broader belief systems of scientists are likely to be of considerable
importance”.
To  be  sure,  heuristics,  prior  attitudes,  and  worldviews  can  have  huge  consequences  for
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scientific assessments. Indeed, Nilsson (2005) found that scientific assessments were subject
to  strong  manipulation  of  analytical  scope  by  governments  in  an  effort  to  bolster  their
preferences. He also found that assessments were strongly affected by framing effects from
their own analysts’ professional paradigms, biases, and beliefs. As a corollary, one should
expect advocacy organizations to adopt a similar, strategic behaviour when interacting with
the assessment.
An Integrated Picture of Collective Learning
Collective learning has been shown to involve two dimensions, the first one being the
translation  of  novel  information  into  one’s  beliefs,  and  the  second  one  pertaining  to  the
diffusion  of  those  updated  beliefs  across  the  network.  Moreover,  knowledge  diffusion  is
constrained by (1) relatively fixed exogenous events and functional characteristics and (2)
more fluid structures of information networks and cognitive attributes of their members. In
order to apply those results to the problem, one should recall that the new politics of nature
involves a multidimensional character, high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity, as well as
low-information accessibility. Equally important, the institutional void gives further strength
to cognitive processes and information networks. Under the assumption of interest dissension,
the  active  involvement  of  multiple  stakeholders  will  increase  exponentially  sources  and
mediums  of  information,  each  of  which  communicates  its  own  preferences.  A plausible
outcome for information networks is the appearance of an oversupply of knowledge leading to
redundancies and drowning effects. Making things worst, information is expected to circulate
with great difficulties within the network, as active and passive cognitive processes enhance
mistrust  and  skepticism  regarding  unfamiliar  frames,  expertise,  worldviews,  and—more
broadly—unshared  physical  or  cultural  attributes.  Ultimately,  adversarial  networks  appear
constrained within a vicious cycle of intellectual isolation and social mistrust.
A priori, the presence of a scientific broker dedicated to conciliation may diminish most
of the negative effects associated with oversupply, bounded rationality, cognitive heuristics,
and inefficient structures of information flows (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013), provided that he
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can bridge between isolated actors, clean redundant information, facilitate the acquisition and
diffusion phases of collective learning by centralizing knowledge repositories, and stimulate
trust-building by bringing adversaries together.  From a theoretical point of view, scientific
brokerage has a fundamental role to play in adversarial networks by promoting collective
learning  in  the  short-  to  mid-term.  However,  and  as  will  be  shown in  the  final  section,
brokerage  remains  a  blurred  concept  despite  the  existence  of  numerous  theoretical  and
empirical insights, and would benefit from theoretical refinements. But before delving further
into scientific brokerage, the next section mobilizes the policy network literature to give an
empirical and network-grounded resonance to the collective learning framework explained
above.
II – A Network-based Approach to Collective Learning
Networks represent an interesting way of making relational concepts such as collective
learning easier to investigate empirically. From a mathematical point of view, a network is a
mere representation of nodes linked together by ties of various intensities (Ward, Stovel, and
Sacks 2011). When it comes to information network, nodes represent policy actors, and ties
between  them  flows  of  information  (Workman,  Jones,  and  Jochim 2009).  But  before
addressing  information  networks  with  greater  details,  one  should  first  consider  its
foundations: policy network.
A useful conceptualization of policy networks can be found in the Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF) (Jenkins-Smith  et  al.  2014;  Sabatier  and Jenkins-Smith 1993,  1999),  a
model which translates interpersonal interactions into a structural unit called the subsystem.
The subsystem is composed of a set of actors involved over a common issue delimited in time
and space for at least a fairly long period. Actors are aggregated into more or less adversarial
coalitions, each of which possesses its own set of policy preferences and political resources—
legal authority, public opinion, information, mobilizable troops, financial resources, skillful
leadership, and more (Weible 2007). In addition, similarity of policy preferences, called the
belief system, is assumed to incite actors to maintain non-trivial degree of coordination and to
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have  an  important  role  to  play  in  inter-coalition  interactions  as  well  as  policy  change
(Fischer 2014; Sabatier 1987). This emphasis on belief systems makes the framework well-
adapted to study the research’s question, just like the fact that 57% of empirical applications
reported between 1987 and 2013 regarded environmental issues (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014),
including shale gas (Cook 2014). 
In order to grasp the political environment in which scientific brokerage operates, the
next section lists the range of policy actors expected in a subsystem, followed by an overview
of the dynamics expected in adversarial policymaking.
Coalitions and belief systems
The ACF understands coalitions as being the prime units of analysis within a network.
Those  encompass  a  broad  range  of  actors,  from  university  scientists  to  environmentally
engaged citizens, all of which possesses preferences more or less similar to the average of the
group. Of course,  the macro-political  context is  acknowledged to have an influence upon
coalition’s behaviour (Kriesi, Adam, and Jochum 2006), yet a greater emphasis is laid upon an
endogenous element: the belief system.
A belief system is composed of three hierarchical orders of thoughts. The first of them
pertains to deep core beliefs, which can be conceptualized in light of the four worldviews
developed  by  cultural  theory  (Jenkins-Smith  et  al.  2014;  Ripberger  et  al.  2014;
Wildavsky 1987). Worldviews are assumed to be the most basic and stable component of a
personality and to have considerable leverage on subsequent and more specific thoughts. The
second order,  named policy core beliefs,  relates to perceptions about  the severity,  causes,
attributes,  solutions,  as  well  as  preferred  distribution  of  power  and  authority  within  the
policymaking process (Weible 2007). The third and most superficial order concerns secondary
beliefs. That is, preferences about the calibration of instruments used to resolve the problem.
In addition to being intuitive, this framework is very similar to the three orders of policy-
oriented cognition suggested by Hall (1993), and is supported by studies of environmental
psychology  (Henry  and  Dietz 2012).  Moreover,  the  decreasing  resistance  to  change  is
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coherent  with  bounded  rationality,  stability  of  prior  attitudes,  and  cognitive  heuristics  of
availability, anchorage, and representativeness developed in the first section of this chapter.
Belief systems are useful to delineate the cognitive aspects of social relations. Indeed, the
similarity of beliefs between individuals is considered the most important catalyst of grouping
behaviours  (Sabatier 1987).  This  hypothesis  has  been  confirmed  by  a  number  of  studies
(Weible 2005), which further added that (1) belief similarity had a stronger correlation with
identification  of  allies  and coordination  with  them than  with  transmission  of  information
(Weible  and  Sabatier 2005)  (2)  perceived  influence  had  a  positive  impact  on  an  actor’s
willingness  to  coordinate  with  another  one,  but  only  when  belief  systems  were  similar
(Henry 2011) (3) policy core and instrumental beliefs were more influential than deep beliefs
with regard to coalition formation (Ingold 2011),  and (4) beliefs kept their  influence even
when controlling for strategic, political considerations (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004).
Additionally,  belief  systems’  decreasing  resistance  to  change  has  fundamental
consequences for collective learning. While communication between individuals may alter
their beliefs and policy preferences, such an outcome is more plausible for secondary than for
policy core beliefs, and more likely for policy core than for deep core beliefs. To the extent
that  coalitions  are  constructed  around  more  important  and  more  stable  attitudes,  cross-
coalition  learning  is  unlikely  when the  cognitive  distance  between their  respective  belief
systems is too prominent (Weible 2008).
Other Actors
Throughout theoretical improvements, some scholars argued that the ACF could gain
leverage by acknowledging the presence of actors with an exceptional role inside a subsystem
(e.g. Christopoulos and Ingold 2014; Ellison and Newmark 2010; Meijerink 2005). Generally
speaking,  coalitions  may  not  always  be  the  most  relevant  unit  of  analysis.  Because
asymmetric distributions of power are unavoidable even inside horizontal structures such as
policy networks, some individuals may use their political resources to exert more influence
than others. For instance, Ellison and Newmark (2010) explicitly recognized that the ACF
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failed to show how public agencies frequently operate at the core of coalitions and dominate
subsystem interactions  by  virtue  of  their  expertise,  professionalism,  constituency support,
esprit-de-corps, and else. Besides, some actors may possess different incentives to involve in
the process rather than promoting their preferences. Ingold and Varone (2011, 5) give a most
useful illustration of this situation:
Administrative  agencies  when  they  do  not  have  a  specific  mission  or  mandate  in  a
subsystem, which would make them belong to a coalition—typically defend more neutral
positions (according to the Weberian ideal-type of rational-legal bureaucracy) and do not
have  strong  belief  systems.  Located  between  conflicting  coalitions  in  the  policy
subsystem, they therefore have the opportunity to assume a mediating role which may
increase  their  own  political  power  and  policy  influence  (through  additional  budget
assignments, new implementation competencies, etc.).
The literature points toward three types of exceptional actors, all having particular beliefs and
incentives: epistemic communities, policy entrepreneurs, and policy brokers.
1. Epistemic Communities
Members of epistemic communities may have various degree of affiliation with existing
coalitions or even form a coalition of their own, yet four main features differentiate them from
classic actors:
“(1)  Shared  set  of  normative  and  principled  beliefs,  which  provide  a  value-based
rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which
are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of
problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple
linkages between internally  possible  policy  actions  and desired outcomes;  (3)  shared
notions of validity—that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and
validating  knowledge  in  the  domain  of  their  expertise;  and  (4)  a  common  policy
enterprise—that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which
their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human
welfare will be enhanced as a consequence” (Haas 1992, 3).
Figuratively,  an epistemic community could be a  group of  scientists  or  experts  operating
within a similar field of inquiry who developed a common policy position regarding an issue,
but who at the same time gives at least as much importance to the scientific method as to the
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obtained results.  Such  scientists  would  change  their  policy  core  beliefs  more  easily  than
traditional actors if a demonstration they consider valid shows they are misguided. Hence,
epistemic communities theoretically have a higher degree of sophistication and a reduced—
but not absent—dependency upon prior attitudes than coalitions. When extrapolated to the
structural level, the preceding implies that a subsystem dominated by an epistemic community
should  engage  in  collective  learning  processes  more  easily  than  if  it  was  controlled  by
traditional coalitions.
2. Entrepreneurs and Brokers
But how do epistemic communities dominate policymaking? For  Zito (2001, 598–9),
“the epistemic community concept  may not encompass the entire  entrepreneurial  effort  at
work […]; [yet]  the ACF explanation of actors outside the immediate coalition may offer
greater clarification [emphasis added].” On this point, the policy entrepreneur and the broker
are  theoretically  interesting  to  explain  how  resources  of  all  sorts—including  epistemic
communities—have influence upon the policymaking process. While further distinctions will
be made in the final section of this chapter, one should note at this point that both operate with
distinct logic and interests: whereas entrepreneurs try to exploit resources to achieve their
policy preferences, brokerage activities are dedicated to seeking stability and avoiding hurting
stalemate (Christopoulos and Ingold 2014).
Expected Dynamics of Adversarial Subsystems
When it  comes to political  conflict,  subsystems can be outlined as being (1) unitary,
where  a  single  coalition  dominates  the  process  and  disagreement  remains  low  (2)
collaborative,  where  two  coalitions  compete  but  nevertheless  talk  to  each  other,  or  (3)
adversarial,  which  describes  a  state  of  complete  antagonism  induced  by  a  strong
incompatibility of belief systems. In theory, one should expect cross-coalition learning to be
highest in collaborative subsystem, mostly because the existence of a permanent threat gives
the necessary incentives to seek out for novel information and the gap between belief systems
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is not so large as to generate mistrust (Weible 2008). By opposition, acute political conflict
diminishes  trust  between  actors,  which  in  turn  are  more  likely  to  converge  into  distinct
coalitions, reject arguments incompatible with their beliefs, and restrict their interactions to
alter egos sharing similar expertise, professional affiliation, or policy preferences (Weible and
Sabatier 2005).
Investigations of the phenomenon suggest that empirical knowledge is seldom the object
of  collective  learning,  even  in  collaborative  settings,  and  that  “scientific  certainty  and
collaborative management are not surefire strategies for limiting the influence of normative
beliefs in steering the direction of a policy subsystem” (Weible and Sabatier 2009, 207-8). In
accordance with this argument,  it  has been observed that scientists were significantly less
likely to be identified as opponents or allies in collaborative subsystem than in adversarial
ones. This suggests that political conflict increases experts’ embeddedness within coalitions,
losing by the same token a part of their legitimacy associated with their ability to work toward
the  common  good  (Parkinson,  2003;  Weible,  Pattison,  and  Sabatier 2010).  Interestingly,
studies showed how a minimal number of experts can nevertheless operate outside coalitions
(Ingold and Gschwend 2014). Those actors generally display increased advocacy and advising
activities (Frank et al. 2012) and possess a higher potential to positively influence collective
learning  (Larsen,  Vrangbæk,  and  Traulsen 2006),  possibly  by  acting  as  entrepreneurs  or
brokers.
Another  important  dynamic  pertains  to  the  multiplication  of  political  perspectives.
Adversarial  debates  are  often  correlated  with  important  media  saliency.  As  a  result,  the
saliency pushes more actors to involve in the policymaking process, which in turn brings
confusion in the information network by increasing the number of different fields of expertise
represented  (Culpepper 2011).  Sarewitz  (2004,  386)  summarizes  the  phenomenon  in  the
following terms:
“nature itself—the reality out there—is sufficiently rich and complex to support a science
enterprise  of  enormous  methodological,  disciplinary,  and  institutional  diversity.  […]
science,  in  doing its  job well,  presents  this  richness,  through a proliferation of  facts
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assembled via a variety of disciplinary lenses, in ways that can legitimately support, and
are  causally  indistinguishable  from,  a  range  of  competing,  value-based  political
positions. […] from this perspective,  scientific uncertainty,  which so often occupies a
central place in environmental controversies, can be understood not as a lack of scientific
understanding but as the lack of coherence among competing scientific understandings”.
The  argument  is  coherent  with  Barke  and  Jenkins-Smith’s  findings  (1993,  437),  which
showed that professional affiliations, fields of inquiry, belief systems, and aversion to risks
caused substantial variations in risk perception among experts. Similar results were achieved
by Silva and Jenkins-Smith (2007) with respect to policy recommendations. As Barke and
Jenkins-Smith  concluded:  “implicit  differences  are  likely  to  exacerbate  conflict  over
potentially risky policies as patterns of beliefs and value judgments become conflated with
‘scientific’ findings”.  In  this  respect,  Montpetit  (2011,  520–1) showed  how  scientists  in
context of adversarial debate are not only as likely to have internal disagreement as other
groups, but even have necessary incentives to emphasize scientific uncertainty and, therefore,
promote dissension. As he concluded:
“if the exclusionary processes associated with the production of knowledge sometimes
provide the illusion of a scientific consensus upon which policymakers can rely, reliance
on  this  knowledge  by  policymakers  increases  error  cost  to  a  level  that  encourages
scientific contestation. Scientific disagreement and eventually political divisions are the
most likely outcomes of such a dynamic.”
Thus, the ACF points toward three hypotheses with regard to adversarial environment:
(1)  actors  interpret  critically  novel  knowledge  and  are  unlikely  to  accept  information
incompatible with their beliefs; (2) scientists may be active in subsystems, but they are likely
to drop out or be instrumentalized; (3) issues of the new politics of nature bring ambiguities,
scientific uncertainty, and an institutional void limiting collective learning (Jenkins-Smith et
al. 2014; Sabatier 1987; Sabatier and Zafonte 2001). At first sight, the combination of biases
in  production  and  interpretation  of  knowledge  with  ubiquitous  uncertainty,  legitimacy
downfalls,  instrumentalization  of  science,  and clustering  of  individuals  around competing
belief systems casts  serious doubts on the plausibility of collective learning in adversarial
environment.  Nevertheless,  scientific  brokerage  might  constitute  an  important  way  of
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avoiding such a dead-end.
III – Brokering a Crisis Recovery
This section constitutes the core of the theoretical framework. As such, it assesses studies
on knowledge diffusion and policy brokerage to develop a hypothesis regarding the collective
learning potential of scientific brokerage. Briefly explained, the argument is that a scientific
broker possesses sufficient capital and abilities to bridge between divisions in the information
network and activate the three processes of collective learning, even if his influence is limited
to a subset of individuals. The following lines answer three important questions underlying
this line of reasoning: (1) Who is the broker? (2) What are the expected effects of brokerage
on information networks?  (3)  How can he reach the position of influence required to have
those effects?
Delineating the Broker: A Definition
When it comes to brokerage, the most basic question relates to the exact definition of
brokerage:  who  is  the  broker?  The  idea  that  forums  of  discussion  represent  a  form  of
brokerage has been an early proposition of the ACF (Sabatier 1987). While the idea has been,
to  some  extent,  empirically  supported  (Elliott  and  Schlaepfer 2001),  explanations  of  the
mechanisms  behind  the  process  remain  unsatisfactory.  In  the  case  studied  by  Eliott  and
Schlaepfer, the inquiry did not go much further than to conclude: “The forum in this case was
the FSC working group which met both criteria in the hypothesis and clearly played a vital
role in policy learning. The chairman of the working group appears to have played a key role
as a ‘policy broker’ (2001, 658).” Larsen, Vrangbæk, and Traulsen (2006) further added that
some scientists  may  be  central  to  conflict  mitigation  by  framing  an  issue  in  a  technical
manner.  Meijerink  (2005),  for  its  part,  found  that  epistemic  communities  can  play  a
substantial role in learning, especially when they operate in close relations with a coalition
and are able to diffuse what they learned. These studies give an interesting preliminary view
of brokerage, but the picture continues to be partial. As a matter of facts, those studies assume
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that scientists are the most common actors doing brokerage, but this assumption goes against
what  has  been  observed  in  adversarial  subsystems.  Moreover,  they  rely  on  an  a  priori
identification of brokers based on their professional affiliations instead of using a functional
definition.  Lastly,  they  confirm  the  ACF’s  hypotheses  without  clearly  identifying  the
mechanisms linking brokerage and conflict  reduction.  Hence,  numerous questions remain:
Who is  the broker? What  is  his  role  in  the subsystem? And how does  he  foster  conflict
reduction and collective learning?
Within  ACF’s  hypotheses,  the  broker  is  defined  as  an  individual  whose  “principal
concern is to keep the level of conflict within acceptable limits and to help the parties reach
some ‘reasonable’ solution (Ingold 2011, 439).” The first logical step toward a definition of
brokerage is then to recognize that a policy broker is not an entrepreneur. Unfortunately, this
basic distinction has not always been done. Zito (2001) illustrated this confusion by providing
a  list  of  the  expected  entrepreneurial  behaviours  which  encompassed  setting  the  policy
agenda, popularizing the issue and solutions, building support and legitimacy for particular
positions,  cajoling  other  actors  to  support  their  causes,  fostering  legitimacy to the  cause,
defecting  external  opposition,  and  forming  resistance  against  the  status  quo  supporters—
which are all expected from policy entrepreneurs—, but further added to the list inventing
solutions that overcome political  hurdles,  brokering deals,  building exchange relationships
with other participants, and building a win-win collective goods process, all of which should
be expected from conflict reduction activities and not from preference promotion. One should
then  clarify  the  distinction:  whereas  entrepreneurs  seek  to  reduce  the  scope  of  choices
available to policy-makers, the brokers seek to expand them by finding new compromises
linking  divergent  positions;  whereas  the  entrepreneurs  advocate  strategically  for  their
preferences, the brokers take a more facilitative approach and are less interested in lobbying
than in communicating more complex aspects of policies (Koski 2010).
If objectives at the core of entrepreneurship and brokerage diverge, the same cannot be
said for the means used to achieve them: both have an interest in building their social capital,
i.e. enhancing their influence by expanding the number and quality of their social relations.
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Social  capital  has  been identified  as  a  key  political  asset  leading to  increased  control  of
information  flows,  which  can  in  turn  facilitate  transmission—or blockage—of knowledge
between political actors unaware of each other and allow the identification of advocacy or
advisory opportunities (Frank et al. 2012). Entrepreneurs and brokers, however, do not use
their social capital in the same way. Entrepreneurs seek influence and resources; they exploit
the political resource in an active, if not aggressive way. They instrumentalize their network to
(1) favour  their  preferences (2) enhance their  knowledge of the policymaking process (3)
identify quickly new opportunities, and (4) understand the ideas, motives, and concerns of
others to respond strategically (Mintrom and Norman 2009). Brokers, on the contrary, seek to
create  stability  within  the  subsystem  by  (1)  linking  competing  coalitions  together  (2)
generating exchanges of information (3) promoting conciliatory policy solutions (4) using
social  capital  to infuse trust  in the process and position themselves as mediators,  and (5)
communicating  interests,  difficulties,  and  best  practices  from  one  group  to  the  other
(Burt 2004;  Christopoulos  and Ingold 2014).  As strategic  agents,  entrepreneurs  are  a  self-
interested  individuals  who  may  achieve  personal  gain  by  hiding  knowledge  to  their
adversaries,  focusing  their  efforts  on  the  most  influential  policymakers,  and  exploiting
dependencies of weak actors. To the other end of the spectrum, policy brokers need to be open
toward every actors,  even the weakest and most  dependent  of them, to generate the trust
needed to sustain legitimacy and truly enhance knowledge diffusion. Two entrepreneurs may
compete with each other and create a zero-sum game, whereas two brokers should promote
more efficiently the conciliation of actors. 
Building  social  capital  is  costly,  implying  that  it  requires  a  minimal  number  of
incentives. For policy entrepreneurs, strong belief systems motivate them to engage in capital-
building activities. The case of brokerage is not as straightforward, as brokers are agents with
a moderate  to  non-existent  belief  system (Ingold and Varone 2011).  This being so,  Burt’s
study (2004) showed that having a strong social capital within an organization led to more
creative  ideas,  better  salaries,  better  job evaluations,  and faster  career  progression.  Those
results  suggest  that  building  social  capital  could  be  in  itself  rewarding,  at  least  from  a
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professional perspective. Regarding organizations, they might find the necessary incentives
within  their  organizational  mission,  as  when  governmental  authorities  have  a  conflict-
reduction mandate, or when members of a group, for instance political parties, are internally
divided over their  belief  systems and conflict  avoidance becomes an integral part  of self-
preservation  (Ingold  and  Varone 2011).  Additionally,  the  brokers  may  be  normatively
appealed by ideals of deliberation and engage in conflict mitigation activities for the sake of
democracy.
How Brokerage Improves Policy Networks: The Functions
From  a  structural  perspective,  the  fundamental  role  of  policy  brokers  is  to  bridge
between divisions in the subsystem, namely competing coalitions in adversarial environment.
Because  coalitions  theoretically  favour  outcomes  closest  to  their  belief  system,  accepting
moderate positions advocated by the broker should be expected solely in context of a policy
stalemate, i.e. when both coalitions have access to about equivalent veto points to block each
other  and  status  quo becomes  the  only  possible  outcome (Ingold 2011;  Ingold  and
Varone 2011).
However, institutional veto points might be very scarce, if not completely absent, from
issues operating within an institutional void. As Ingold and Varone (2011, 21) noted: “It is still
an open question as to how policy brokers are likely to act in a political system which does
not offer several institutionalized veto points. We might assume that policy brokers would
have little influence on the policy output in such case”. Nevertheless, the lack of institutions
does  not  directly  imply  the  absence  of  structures;  informal  power  relations  may  induce
structural divisions in a network, named structural holes, which create positions of influence
akin to veto points. Interestingly, identifying structural holes is only possible by being aware
of  the  whole  network,  a  common  asset  of  policy  brokers  and  entrepreneurs.  Hence,
entrepreneurs may take advantage of these structural holes to block competing coalitions, but
the  broker  may  also  use  them to  reach  an  advantageous  policymaking  seat  by  means  of
reputation. In theory, doing so would allow him to influence positively the whole network and
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produce an outcome similar to what would have occurred under stalemate conditions.
Structural Holes: The Informal Fractures Inherent to Social Networks
It has been mentioned above that veto points and institutions were not the sole producers
of political structure; informal relations also induce divisions between subsets of individuals.
In  network  terminology,  those  social  fractures  have  been  named  structural  holes.  As
Figure 1.2 illustrates, they describe the absence of relations between two groups of actors.
Because “actors  are situated in  communication flows, which constitute an informal  social
structure that differs from the formal institutions which shape official  conduct”, structural
holes  can  alter  the  stream of  information,  stop  the  diffusion  of  shared  frames,  diminish
innovation, and sustain intellectual isolation leading to self-reinforcement of ideas, political
views, and policy beliefs  (Considine and Lewis 2007, 593).  For Burt (2004), this does not
imply  that  groups  are  unaware  of  each  other,  but  rather  that  “behaviour,  opinion,  and
information,  broadly  conceived,  are  more  homogeneous within  than  between groups […]
people focus on activities inside their own group, which creates holes in the information flow
between  groups,  or  more  simply,  structural  holes.”  (Burt 2004,  353).  For  policymaking
activities, the consequences of structural holes may be a misconception of the nature of the
problem, poor policy design, and inefficient implementation.
Structural  holes  should  be  especially  present  within  institutional  voids  or  nascent
subsystems, mostly because confusion and instability  is  expected to be higher (Jones and
Jenkins-Smith 2009). Sporadic participations of actors from diverse policy sectors can bring
considerable confusion the first time an issue rises to the public agenda, but the formation of a
set of dedicated and stable actors should occur as time goes by (Zafonte and Sabatier 2004).
Because political involvement occurs mostly among individuals whose social network share a
single mindset (Mutz 2002), coalition formation, beliefs, and political involvement all emerge
in a process of mutual-reinforcement. Over time, actors with a strong belief system will seek a
single-minded social network, which further encourages political involvement and facilitates
information-seeking.  On  the  contrary,  actors  with  moderate  beliefs  will  diminish  their
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participation in light of the contradictory signals they receive from their  divided partners.
Over time, moderate actors will drop out, those with strong preferences will build coalitions
to enhance coordination and information-sharing, and each communities will converge toward
its  own language,  preferences,  and methodological  norms. At the end of the process,  one
should expect the subsystem to look like Figure 1.2: structured in few subgroups of strongly
connected actors, one for each coalition, with structural holes separating them.
Figure 1.2: Structural Holes of Policy Network2
The Political Resource Behind Structural Holes
The notion of structural hole has been developed above and applied to the subsystem, yet
2 Taken from Burt (2004). If Robert was absent from this example, structural holes would insulate cluster A from
B, B from C, and C from A. While Robert and James have about an equivalent number of social relations, Robert
possesses more social capital than James: Robert is able to bridge across structural holes, but James is embedded
within a subset of very similar and already linked individuals.
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the question of why structural holes matter for the broker remains open. The complex answer
can be summarized as follows: an individual occupying a structural hole may manage the
whole network by influencing its isolated subgroups. Occupying a structural hole gives access
to  a  greater  diversity  of  information,  increases  the  control  over  information  flows,  helps
generate  innovative  ideas  by  bridging  separate  worlds  and  exploiting  never-seen-before
opportunities,  and  makes  possible  the  diffusion  of  preferences  in  the  whole  network
(Burt 2004). From a network-level perspective, the critical advantages emanating from the
presence  of  a  broker  spanning  multiple  structural  holes  are  three-fold:  governance
improvements, trust-building, and, more importantly, knowledge transmission.
1. Governance Consolidation
For Provan and Kenis (2008), networks are a mode of governance in the same way as
markets  or  governmental  regulation,  yet  with  greater  dependencies  upon  interpersonal
relations.  Network-based  governance  is  especially  adapted  to  multi-stakeholder  contexts,
multidimensional issues,  highly conflicting political  objects,  as well  as challenging policy
designs  and  implementations.  For  goal-directed  networks  such  as  those  dedicated  to
policymaking, a minimal presence of authority and coordination is  fundamental  to ensure
mutually supporting actions, proceed to conflict resolution, and secure efficient uses of scarce
resources. In other words, governance of broad and complex networks is sometime dependent
upon the presence of an actor with network-level knowledge and capacities.
Figuratively,  a decentralized network with a high density of social  interactions helps
mitigate dissension among members, but makes coordination almost impossible. To the other
extreme of the spectrum, a network composed of subgroups and structural holes may make
coordination  easier  within  these  groups,  yet  conflicting  relations  and  counterproductive
activities may surface. Brokerage lies, to varying degrees, between both ends; subgroups of
actors can still coordinate among themselves, but structural holes no longer obstruct network
management. As the broker gains influence by spanning between multiple structural holes, he
strengthens  his  policy  capacity.  He  may  then  use  his  peculiar  position  to  improve  the
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policymaking process: detect information, affect behaviours, shape network outcomes, reduce
transaction costs, manipulate political resources, and build collaboration-oriented institutions
(Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; McNutt 2012).
2. Trust-building
By doing  shuttle  diplomacy  between  adversaries,  the  broker  may  ease  tensions  and
initiate  trust-building  dynamics  (Ansell  and  Gash 2008).  For  instance,  providing  linkages
between otherwise separated actors enhances the social capital prominent in the collaborative
governance literature:
“Discursive  democracy  is  often  operationalized  as  a  form  of  social  capital,  defined
structurally as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual
acquaintance  and  recognition”  (Bourdieu,  1997,  p. 46)  and  is  referred  to  here  as
“bridging social capital” (DeLeon and Varda 2009, 62).
Conceptually,  brokerage  can  be  divided  between  two  complementary  forms  (Carpenter,
Esterling, and Lazer 2004). As Figure 1.3 shows, the facilitator effect describes a phenomenon
by which the broker provides a common frame of reference to competing coalitions to initiate
discussions. The second effect, called the transitivity model, relies on explicit trust-building to
operate. That is, because coalition A trusts the broker who himself trusts coalition B, A is
likely to increase its trust for B. What is interesting about these models is that both have been
shown  to  have  significant  influence  on  information  diffusion  among  actors,  but  more
importantly that cumulating transitivity and facilitation effects had by far the most meaningful
contribution,  even  when  preferences  and  organizational  affiliations  were  controlled  for
(Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004).
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Figure 1.3: Models of Trust-building3
3. Knowledge improvements
The  last  benefit  emanating  from  structural  holes  reduction  pertains  to  knowledge
creation. As Albæk (1995, 92) explains it:
“Much  research—and  at  least  the  most  original  research—does  not  produce  new
knowledge in the empirically verified sense, but deals rather with the reorganization and
reformulation of the structures of knowledge. This, rather than empirical testing, is what
Nobel Laureates are best known for.” 
By  bridging  between  formerly  separated  clusters  of  knowledge,  the  broker  provides  the
necessary foundation for knowledge generation. He may use his structural advantage to create
a cohesive narrative, a “culturally clumsy policy solution” linking different worldviews and
having  greater  conflict-avoidance  potential  than  former  propositions  (Jenkins-Smith  et  al.
2014). Knowledge-based advantages, however, are not limited to production. Koski (2010), in
his study of LEED certification diffusion across U.S. cities, demonstrated how a broker (1)
linked a policy to a broader set of societal values (2) developed a common policy vocabulary
facilitating exchanges between actors (3) produced a reference policy to begin discussions (4)
3 Adapted from Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer (2004)
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acted as a diffusion hub, and (5) built the necessary infrastructure for autonomous information
transmission.
Figure 1.4: Structural Advantages of Brokers for Information Circulation
Figure 1.4 gives a schematic view of how brokerage enhances information transmission.
In network 1, individuals are strongly connected with one another and information acquisition
is faster and easier: each actor has access to three information sources. Nevertheless, members
of coalition A cannot obtain coalition B’s knowledge and information redundancy is frequent,
assuming that the three sources possess similar information. In short, knowledge circulation is
inefficient.  By  contrast,  network 2  uses  about  the  same  number  of  links,  but  they  are
strategically distributed around the broker. As a result, the four actors that were previously
excluded  are  now  available  as  information  sources.  Moreover,  the  structure  minimizes
information  redundancy and allows  coalitions  to  learn  from the  whole  set  of  actors.  The
management of information at the network-level is made easier: the broker may act as a “one-
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stop shop” for information seekers, identify holes in the knowledge repository, and launch
further investigations to fill them.
How Brokers Reach Structural Holes: Acquiring Influence
Unfortunately, advantages associated with brokered information networks come at a cost;
peripheral actors become highly dependent upon the good faith of central ones to promote
their  interests  and cannot  double-check what  they are told,  as  shown in  Figure 1.4.  As a
consequence, achieving efficient knowledge diffusion requires at least one of two conditions:
(1) coercive influence from the broker or (2) an amount of trust that may not be obtained
overnight (Scholz, Berardo, and Kile 2008). While the correlation between trust and reaching
structural holes is easily understood, the case of “coercive influence” requires more subtle
explanations. Shortly expressed,  the idea is that brokers can take advantage of coalitions’
weaknesses to occupy a structural hole, which should allow him to lead the policymaking
process toward greater collaboration. The following sections describe the role of trust before
giving more information about the weaknesses argument.
Trust
At this point of the analysis, all the necessary foundations have been laid to understand
how trust  affects cognition,  which in turn affects  whether an individual will  learn from a
fellow’s arguments or strategically instrumentalize them. Without trust, accepting a brokered
proposition instead of searching for first-hand information is highly implausible (Carpenter,
Esterling, and Lazer 2004). Predicting which types of actors are more likely to trust a broker
is rather hard, but studies about collaborative governance suggest that prior collaborations and
experiences with multistakeholder institutions ease trust-building processes, just like cultural
similarities  and  perceived  capacities  to  perform well  (Ansell  and Gash 2008;  Gerlak  and
Heikkila 2011;  Heikkila  and  Gerlak 2005;  Lee  and  van  de  Meene 2012;  Steyaert  and
Jiggins 2007). Hence, the more alike, familiar, and favourable an individual is with regard to a
broker, the more he is likely to incorporate the brokered picture.
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Dependencies
The interplay between trust and cognitive obstructions to learning pushed many studies
to  express  serious  doubts  about  the  probabilities  of  observing  a  shared  understanding  of
policy-relevant  information  in  adversarial  subsystems  (Heikkila  and  Gerlak 2013;
Ingold 2011;  Ingold  and  Gschwend 2014;  Parkinson 2003;  Sarewitz 2004;  Weible 2008;
Weible and Sabatier 2009). Interestingly,  the possibility that conciliation be forced upon a
subsystem is not explicitly recognized by the literature, yet numerous analyses support such
counter-intuitive dynamic. Shortly depicted, three types of dependencies may constrain actors
—or  even  coalitions—to  rely  on  policy  brokerage:  bounded policy  capacity,  constraining
social image, and collective action issues. This suggests by the same token that brokers may
achieve considerable collaborative improvements despite widespread skepticism.
1. Bounded Policy Capacity
The first set of constraints has been introduced by Weible and Sabatier (2005) to explain
cross-coalition  interactions  and  pertains  to  the  capacity  of  coalitions  to  promote  their
preferences efficiently. Because individuals are likely to distrust people with a different belief
system,  they  should  not  collaborate  with  adversaries  unless  facing  important  levels  of
dependencies. In other words, an organization with limited capacities must rely on another
one to achieve its  goals, whether because the latter  holds an important structural position
[functional  dependency],  or  because  it  possesses  valuable  political  resources
[resource dependency]. Hypothetically, the more the actor is constrained by dependencies, the
more cross-coalition relationships he is likely to set up. In their account of California marine
protected areas, Weible and Sabatier distinguished between ally networks (mere identification
of  allies),  coordination  networks  (cohesion  of  actions),  as  well  as  information  networks
(gathering information). They convincingly showed that dependencies for identifying allies
are  almost  non-existent,  yet  more  constraining  regarding  coordination  behaviours.  More
importantly,  knowledge  gathering  activities  are  the  most  constrained  of  activities,  mostly
because information seeking is long, costly, may require considerable scientific sophistication,
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and is often affected by an asymmetric distribution of knowledge. Hence, actors with tiny
resources to devote to information seeking, low incentives to do so, or a limited knowledge
processing capacity should be dependent upon the broker to gain relevant information easily.
Structurally, the presence of numerous structural holes—common in novel subsystems of the
new politics of nature—exacerbates the phenomenon.
2. Constraining Social Image
Interestingly, belief systems themselves induce some form of dependencies. Montpetit
(2012, 624-5) distinguished between purposive and material beliefs, the former involving “a
proposition  calling  for  immediate  sacrifices,  notably  from the  belief  holders,  in  view of
producing  long-term diffused  benefits”,  and  the  latter  requiring  “immediate  concentrated
benefits  for  the  sake  of  longer-term diffused  benefits”.  Purposive  belief  holders  may  be
criticized for their  lack of consistency if  they moderate their  arguments and acknowledge
some  claims  of  competing  interests  as  being  legitimate.  On  the  contrary,  material  belief
holders may be judged for their selfishness and foster suspicion if they refuse to incorporate
elements of social well-being in their proposals. Of course, actors with material beliefs would
be  better  off  by  maximizing  concentrated  interests,  just  like  some  purposive  individuals
possibly think reaching objectives would be easier by working with authorities considered
illegitimate by their counterparts. But in both cases, their social image compels them to avoid
such behaviour in order to keep a minimal amount of legitimacy. This dynamic has important
implications for brokerage. For material coalitions, listening to a broker promoting a moderate
and comprehensive policy stance represents the most efficient way of gaining the coveted
legitimacy. On the other hand, purposive coalitions have no interest in being moderate, and
accepting the broker’s arguments is by no means necessary.
3. Collective Action Issues
Compatible with the dependencies thesis is the idea promoted by Berardo and Scholz
(2010) whereby a broker will have more influence when policy actors face coordination rather
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than defection problems. On the one hand, the main challenges facing a coalition dealing with
high  collective  benefits  and  low  individual  advantages  to  defect  are  to  ensure  shared
understandings and planned efforts. On the other hand, some issues might yield interesting
collective gains but even higher returns for betraying individuals,  in  which case ensuring
compliance and mutual monitoring become the main concerns. For contentions such as those
operating within an institutional void, the most pressing concern of coalitions is expected to
be bridging between structural holes to construct a strong argumentative defense rather than
preventing  actors  from shifting  coalitions—an unlikely  behaviour  considering  the  relative
stability of belief systems.
A critical reader might argue, however, that coalitions should prefer to rely on a partial
policy entrepreneur instead of a neutral broker bounding competing coalitions, and he would
be right to some extent. However, the influencse of brokerage on coalitions with coordination
issues  remains  plausible  when time is  taken into account.  For  Scholz,  Berardo,  and Kile
(2008), “the importance of degree and centrality [i.e. network-level brokerage] is most likely
in  dynamic,  relatively  unstructured  policymaking  arenas,  and  becomes  increasingly  less
applicable in arenas with more stable interorganizational relationships”. Carpenter, Esterling,
and Lazer’s study (2004) supports such interpretation by showing how brokerage does not
necessarily  structure  information  flows  in  a  hierarchical  manner,  but  also  increases  the
probabilities of communication across network members. Considering that (1) building and
maintaining linkages between individuals is a costly activity that is unlikely to be undertaken
without valid reasons (Scholz, Berardo, and Kile 2008), and that (2) coalitions operating in
nascent subsystems may be considerably restricted by structural holes (Jones and Jenkins-
Smith 2009),  reliance  on  a  centralized  broker  offers  an  easy  way of  identifying,  sharing,
gathering, and structuring information for coalitions, at least until they fully understand the
attributes of the subsystem and structure themselves around policy entrepreneurs.
Understanding How Trust and Dependencies Affect Subsystems
In summary,  trust,  policy capacity,  belief  systems, and collective action problems all
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affect the influence a broker is likely to exert on a given policy actors. But how does this
influence on people translate into influence on networks?
Figure 1.5  illustrates  the  process  in  a  hypothetical  subsystem  presumed  to  be  new,
bipartisan,  and  adversarial.  Each  circle  corresponds  to  an  actor,  with  the  central  B
corresponding to the broker. Actors on the left-hand side of the broker correspond to the
purposive coalition and initially strongly opposed the policy as shown by their red colour. On
the  right-hand  side,  blue  circles  represent  the  material  coalition  which  initially  strongly
supported the policy. Blue and red circles underneath the broker illustrate diverse scientists,
named epistemic communities, who timidly joined the debate. Lines represent a directed or
reciprocated exchange of information between two actors. Sharp lines within material and
purposive  coalitions  existed  before  the  appearance  of  an  influential  broker  and remained
intact  during the whole example.  Dashed lines result  from brokerage activities.  Ratios  of
information are coarse and idealized measure of policy preferences; they give the ratio of
opposing to supportive information sources influencing a coalition’s rationale.
As the Figure shows, coalitions are isolated from each other at T0; they are aware of each
other,  but their  cognitive heuristics and lack of trust  prompt suspicion to the point where
collective learning becomes impossible. The T0 distribution line depicts the resulting pattern
of polarization: as three actors are on the right-end of the spectrum (1.00) and two others on
the left-end (0.00), the average policy position of the subsystem is 0.60 and the ideological
distance between the mean and actors’ position ranges between 0.40 and 0.60.
Hereafter, imagine a government-mandated scientific broker enters the scene. He collects
the whole set of information and even launches further investigations to fill knowledge gaps,
as illustrated by the four circles above him. The broker ensures an accessible and complete
summary of network-wide knowledge for individuals willing to listen to him. But how do
coalitions perceive him? On the one hand, the purposive coalition remains highly doubtful
and  decides  to  reject  the  brokered  picture.  Indeed,  their  peculiar  beliefs  make  the
acknowledgement of competing views unnecessary to sustain legitimacy; they are familiar
with a very specific picture of the problem—their “purpose”—and feel gathering information 
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Figure 1.5: The Framework Applied to Information Networks and Scientific Brokerage
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outside  their  field  of  expertise  is  unnecessary.  Purposive  coalitions  have  the  necessary
incentives  to  critically  assess  broker-sponsored  investigations,  relying  on  their  cognitive
heuristics to cherry-pick favourable studies. Moreover, as purposive coalitions do not need to
engage with their  adversaries to build legitimacy, they have limited imperatives regarding
coordination with external  actors,  i.e.  collective action problems. Depending on the exact
maturity of organizations, they may already rely on internal structures of coordination and
knowledge diffusion, which further limits the dependency upon brokerage. After collecting
information sources compatible with their belief system, inertia leaves them on the left end of
the preferences spectrum.
On the contrary, material coalitions must build a dialogue with external actors to sustain
public legitimacy, fostering collective action problems related to knowledge gathering and
information  diffusion  among  previously  unrelated  organizations.  To  engage  this  broader
debate,  the  coalition  may,  moreover,  have  to  deal  with  never-seen-before  expertise  and
unfamiliar field of inquiry, enhancing the attractiveness of the broker as a single-access point
of relevant knowledge. As is the case with petroleum, agribusiness, and financial industries,
the material coalition potentially has among its members individuals who have had previous
relations  with  governmental  authorities,  in  which  case  their  acquaintance  of  official
institutions and the perceived trustworthiness of state-mandated brokers further increase. The
resulting portrait  is  a  coalition which,  on the one hand,  has incentives to  incorporate  the
brokered knowledge repository and,  on the other,  does not  a priori completely reject  the
broker’s legitimacy. As a consequence, it does not abandon its former sources of information,
but nevertheless embraces the whole set of information made available through the broker,
producing an information ratio of 8:7 at T1.
Lastly, the behaviour of epistemic communities is harder to predict. On the one hand,
they  do  not  possess  special  needs  for  acknowledging  competing  views,  but  they  should
neither have an aversion to it. Their scientific training gives them considerable sophistication
within their field of inquiry, but also a capacity to manage complementary knowledge. As
truth-seeking entities, scientific brokerage should constitute an easy way for them to have a
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general  and useful  overview of  relevant  knowledge,  providing that  the  approach used  to
gather and assess information is considered compatible with their methodological norms. For
the purpose of the present example, it is assumed that they espouse brokerage and adopt a
policy stance reflecting the whole network, i.e. a ratio of 8:7.
At T1, the average of the subsystem is now 0.36 and the distance from the mean is 0.10
for  epistemic  communities  and  the  material  coalition.  Importantly,  the  distance  from the
average for the purposive coalition diminished by 0.24 despite its immobility and is now 0.36.
The general portrait is that all actors, even those strongly opposed to brokerage activities, are
closer to each other at T1 than at T0; information is therefore better shared than before.
A Hypothesis
To  be  sure,  this  idealized  example  roughly  portraits  the  intricacies  of  a  real-world
scenario. Real-world brokerage may have limited influence on both coalitions; information
communities may be more numerous; the broker may exhibit important biases in his general
account of information; he may forget important information sources; actors may drop-out of
the subsystem; coalition membership may change; and even more unpredictable events may
occur. While the exact probabilities of brokering a rallying policy are impossible to predict
considering the plethora of independent variables identified in the first part of this chapter,
what this exercise clearly illustrates is that, in context of adversarial policymaking, even the
slightest influence of a broker on one coalition can improve the probabilities of observing an
understanding  shared  by  the  whole  set  of  actors.  Formally,  this  proposition  can  be
summarized by the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: The presence of a broker in an adversarial structure of governance
increases the probabilities of observing a shared understanding of policy-relevant
information between policy actors.
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IV - Summary
To  shortly  outline  the  argument  developed  in  this  chapter,  one  should  recall  that
knowledge  is  political  by  nature.  Power  relations  underlying  information  flows  are  best
understood  using  ACF’s  assessment  of  policy  networks:  competing  coalitions  structure
themselves according to their  belief  similarities,  are more easily influenced by favourable
knowledge, and critically reject hostile information.  When the difference between the two
belief  systems  is  too  important,  political  contention  makes  cross-coalition  learning
implausible and intellectual confinement becomes the dominant dynamic.  However,  it  has
been  shown  that  brokerage  possessed  an  important,  yet  asymmetric,  potential  to  sustain
collective  learning  and  create  a  shared  understanding  within  adversarial  subsystems. An
empirical investigation of the hypothesis is designed in the following chapter and tested in
Chapter 3.
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Chapter 2: Case and Methodology
As  chapter 1  showed,  understanding  the  role  of  scientific  brokerage  in  adversarial
policymaking constitutes a complex theoretical enterprise. The empirical challenge is at least
as  prominent,  and  a  careful  methodological  design  should  reflect  the  intricacies  of  the
problem. As such, this research takes advantage of events occurring in the Province of Quebec
between 2010 and 2014. To summarize briefly the case, the province discovered in 2007 that
shale gas rested underneath its bedrock formations. As hydraulic fracturing, the process by
which natural  gas can be extracted from bedrock formations,  is  loaded with considerable
scientific,  environmental,  social,  and  health-related  controversies,  an  extensive  political
quarrel over the exploitation of the resource followed. To respond to the rising opposition, the
government  mandated  an  independent  institution—the  Bureau  d’audience  publique  sur
l’environnement  (BAPE)—to conduct province-wide consultations between 2010 and 2011.
Following the recommendations of the consultation agency, the government launched in 2012
an Évaluation environnementale stratégique (EES), a science-based institution which had the
mandate  to  assess  existing  peer-reviewed  papers  and  document  missing  information  by
financing novel scientific investigations. Following the scientific assessment, a second public
consultation occurred in 2014. From a methodological point of view, the EES appeared like a
faithful representation of the policy broker described in the preceding chapter. Moreover, two
consultations make it possible to appraise the state of the subsystem before and after scientific
brokerage activities.
The following chapter begins by describing the scientific controversies behind shale gas
and how these translated into Quebec policymaking. It then explains how documents and
memoirs  presented  to  the  consultation  agency  were  converted  into  quantitative  data
representing the status of the information network in 2011 and 2014. Furthermore, the two
statistical tools used to investigate the phenomenon—Social Network Analysis (SNA) and the
Exponential  Random  Graph  Model  (ERGM)—are  introduced  along  with  the  analytical
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strategy  and  the  operationalization  of  the  dependent  variable:  collaborative  dynamics  in
information networks.
I - The politics of shale gas
For many columnists of the energy sector, the emergence of shale gas exploitation is an
utter economic and technological revolution. Originally developed as a commercially viable
enterprise by a small  petroleum producer of Texas in 1993, horizontal  fracturing of shale
formations  rapidly  spread  across  the  globe.  The  U.S.  Energy  Information  Administration
(2015) evaluated that 46 countries share 8,576.6 trillion cubic feets of shale gas. In the U.S.
alone, the 567 trillion cubic feets technically recoverable represent 22 years of energy supply
(Helmholtz  Center  Potsdam 2016).  As  Figure 2.1  shows,  shale  gas  extraction  requires
hydraulic fracturing, a process using pressured water mixed with sand and various chemicals
to fissure bedrock formations and allow the natural gas to escape (BAPE 2011: 29–35).
Scientific Controversies
While  being  an  important  phenomenon,  the  process  is  not  free  from  scientific
controversies.  Foremost,  financial  benefits  of  the  industry  advanced  by some economists
(Considine, Watson, and Blumsack 2010; IHS Global Insight 2009) have been questioned by
others.  They  argued  that  their  methodology  lacks  theoretical  justification,  has  unrealistic
assumptions,  and  neglects  environmental  and  social  costs  (Barth 2013;  Kinnaman 2011).
Moreover, some researchers described the relation between shale gas and the economy as a
form of “resource curse”: negative impacts of the energy burst are more important than the
positive  effects  of  the  boom,  inducing  long-term  systemic  poverty  in  communities  with
former  resource-intensive  industries  (Barth 2013).  Others  pointed  to  the  numerous
uncertainties in the global-value-chain of shale gas that might threaten long-term investments
(Stevens 2010).  Overall,  commercial  viability  of some sites appears ambiguous and likely
depends on the technical ability to target the “sweet spot” of shale formations, i.e. the exact
location  maximizing  resource  removal  (Weijermars 2013).  Lastly,  the  existence  of  an
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employment cap in the energy sector might limit economic benefits when the economy will
have recovered from the 2008 crisis (Kinnaman 2011).
Economics left aside, another important controversy concerns the impact of shale gas
extraction on greenhouse gases. On the whole, natural gas emits fewer carbon dioxide (CO2)
than coal and petroleum, hence constituting an interesting bridge toward low-carbon future
(Wang, Ryan, and Anthony 2011). However, alternative interpretations argued that shale gas
development might undercut markets for sustainable energies and contribute to the lock-in of
carbon-intensive infrastructures (Council of Canadian Academies 2014). The investigations of
Howarth,  Santoro,  and Ingraffea  (2011),  Caulton  et  al.  (2014),  and  Osborn  et  al.  (2011)
showed a strong correlation between hydraulic fracturing and methane emissions (CH4). They
further added that methane leakages of few wells might raise the GHG emissions of shale gas
up to 20% above coal level on a 20 years scale, and could be twice as damaging over 100
years.  Those  studies  have  been  criticized  by  Davies  (2011)  and Cathles  et  al.  (2012)  on
various points:  small  non-random samples of geologically different areas,  absence of pre-
fracturing data, unproven causality, overestimation of fugitive emissions, under-evaluation of
green  technologies,  comparison  of  coal  and  shale  gas  on  heat  rather  than  electricity
generation, and time scales that do not capture the contrast between long persistence of CO2
and the short one of CH4. Building on those criticisms, other studies affirmed that system-
wide leakages were unlikely to be large enough to negate climate benefits of coal-to-natural-
gas  substitution,  and  a  1% discharge  rate—about  1/2  to  2/3  below current  level—would
ensure the benefits (Bradbury et al. 2013; Brandt et al. 2014). Whether this level is achievable
remains a matter of controversies. 
Because  fracturing  fluids  are  mostly  composed  of  water  mixed  with  chemicals,  the
questions of water consumption and waste management quickly rose to the scientific agenda.
Multiple sources of contamination have been identified,  such as transportation spills,  well
casing leaks, leaks through fractured rocks, drilling site discharges, construction of pipelines
and roads, reduced stream flows, and wastewater disposal (Entrekin et al. 2011; Rozell and
Reaven 2012), but causal demonstration remains contentious. Water pollution pathways
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Figure 2.1: Horizontal Fracturing and Shale Gas Extraction4
4 Taken in Helmholtz Center Potsdam (2016)
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fluctuate  between  contaminants,  are  compelled  by  local  geology,  and  can  hardly  be
generalized (Council of Canadian Academies 2014). Assessments of risks is highly dependent
upon various natural parameters (e.g. Rutqvist 2015). Even when the pollutants and the site
were  similar,  different  methodologies  yielded  different  results.  For  instance,  Jiang  et  al.
(2013) documented an effective treatment  of water  flowbacks,  but  alternative analyses  of
flowbacks themselves showed cross-contamination of seawater, fresh water, saline shallow
groundwater, and infected fluids (Haluszczak, Rose, and Kump 2013; Vengosh et al. 2013).
By opposition, Warner et al.  (2013) did not find evidence of contamination, as the spatial
distribution of saline groundwater was not correlated with the location of shale gas wells.
Applying similar spatial correlation techniques to drinking water, other examinations pointed
toward strong correlation between well proximity and methane, ethane, and propane pollution
(Jackson  et  al.  2013;  U.S.  EPA 2011).  While  some  studies  concluded  that  surface  water
contamination was unlikely to cause harm if proper precautionary management practices were
followed (Council of Canadian Academies 2014; U.S. EPA 2015; Vidic et al. 2013), others
identified  stray  gas  contamination  of  surface  water  in  areas  of  intensive  shale  gas
development, along with accumulation of radium isotopes in disposal sites (Vengosh et al.
2014).  It  should be noted,  however,  that studies documenting limited risks also expressed
concerns about deficient scientific fundings, exponential expansion of commercial activities,
possible long-term bioaccumulation, lack of data before, during, and after the phenomenon,
industry  opacity  regarding  chemicals  used,  and  difficulty  to  monitor  and  assess  in-depth
aquifers (Council of Canadian Academies 2014; U.S. EPA 2015; Vidic et al. 2013).
In  addition  to  environmental  impacts,  numerous  studies  documented  health-related
problems  associated  with  shale  gas  exploitation.  Neurological  degradation  and  increased
cancer hazards, greater presence of physical stressors with negative psychological influence
on communities, and expanded occupational risks such as industrial accidents, truck traffic,
air impurity, noise pollution, and exposure to toxic chemicals are all among the identified
dangers  (Adgate,  Goldstein,  and  McKenzie 2014;  Council  of  Canadian  Academies 2014;
McKenzie et al. 2012). Yet, lack of data and measurement problems again hampered causal
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demonstrations  and  induced  scientific  disputes  (Adgate,  Goldstein,  and  McKenzie 2014;
Bamberger and Oswald 2012; Steinzor, Subra, and Sumi 2013). Similarly, studies on wildlife
impact found threshold effects when assessing the influence of well proximity on cardiac and
neural defects of birds, but also noted a negative correlation between well proximity, preterm
births, and underweight nativity (McKenzie et al. 2014).
On the whole, it  makes no doubt that shale gas represents a strong case of scientific
controversy. Divergent methodological approaches, different units of analysis, incompatible
assumptions,  incomparable  time  scopes,  lack  of  reliable  data,  persistent  uncertainties,
complexity  of  ecological  systems,  threshold  effects,  statistical  moderation  and mediation,
challenging  causal  demonstrations,  and  low generalization  potential  invigorate  incoherent
interpretations  of  the  state  of  science  and  stimulate  misunderstandings  that  expand  well
beyond the frontiers of academia.
From Science to Quebec Politics
Without surprises, policymaking in diverse countries have strongly echoed the experts’
disagreement developed in the last section. In light of the controversies and the increasingly
important  public  suspicion,  numerous  Canadian  and  American  jurisdictions  adopted
temporary moratoriums or permanent bans on the extraction of the resource. According to a
review of various newspapers and advocacy websites (e.g. Baddour 2015; Keep Tap Water
Safe 2012; Petro Global  News 2013;  Protect  Limestone Coast 2015;  The Economist 2013;
The  Huffington  Post 2016),  those  jurisdictions  include  California,  New Brunswick,  Nova
Scotia, New York, Maryland, Vermont, and major cities in California, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Hawaii, New Mexico and Texas. At the international level, Scotland, Wales, Germany, France,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Catalonia, Cantabria, Navarra, and La
Rioja  (Spain),  Fribourg  and  Vaud  (Switzerland),  and  Victoria  (Australia)  all  adopted
moratorium on hydraulic fracturing of shale gas. Surveys of public opinion documented non-
trivial polarization of policy preferences. Boudet et al. (2014) found for instance that about
20% of Americans strongly opposed to the exploitation, 22% strongly supported it, and 58%
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did not know. The University of Michigan (2013) aggregated 38 national American polls and
concluded that the public opinion was divided about equally on the matter, with low political
awareness, republican affiliation, male gender, and limited education increasing support for
the industry.
Figure 2.2: Montly Coverage of Shale Gas in the Province of Quebec, 2010-145
5*Month 0 correspond to January  2010.  The tone  equals  the  sum of  positive  arguments  minus the sum of
negative arguments in an article. Arguments could either be positive, negative, both, or absent for each of the
following categories: national economy, investment, local economy, tax revenue, energy costs, energy security,
environment, greenhouse gases, water, soil, air, earthquakes, sustainable energy, wastewater, landscape, health,
drinking  water,  local  communities,  mortgages,  rent,  security  of  extraction,  occupational  hazards,  regulatory
capacity of  government,  legislation,  experts'  reliability,  uncertainty,  industrial  secret,  and  other  jurisdictions'
experiences.  In  addition,  residual  categories  were  added  to  include  other  arguments  about  economy,
environment, governance, human interests, and health.
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The Province of Quebec does not differ much from the general portrait depicted above.
Shale gas reached the province in 2007. Three years and 31 wells later, the initially non-
existent concerns turned into a massive and province-wide public contention, mobilizing an
impressive number of citizens, experts, scientists, state officials, MLAs, environmentalists,
industrialists, and media to discuss whether exploitation was economically, environmentally,
and socially worth it. While this research is not a qualitative case study per se, it nevertheless
acknowledges  the  importance  to  contextualize.  Accordingly,  the following  subsection
summarizes those events, from the appearance on the public agenda in 2010 to the definitive
adoption of the moratorium in late 2014. Information comes from various media as well as a
review of the province’s legal gazette  (Gouvernement du Québec 2016). The description of
events is supplemented by an online survey of 84 organizations or experts who participated in
the  provincial  public  consultations  and  a  content  analysis  of  1327  newspaper  articles
published on the matter between 2010 and 2014 (Montpetit  and Lachapelle,  unpublished;
Montpetit, Lachapelle, and Harvey 2016)6.
Between 2007 and early 2010, the issue of hydraulic fracturing gathered very limited
attention in the province. The government regulated the industry to some extent in January
2010,  but  the  statutes  were  not  different  from  conventional  resources  and  were  latterly
considered by many as strongly permissive: to respect the “state of the art” with regard to
security,  to  comply  with  a  minimal  distance  of  200  metres  from groundwater  catchment
stations, to lease exploitation zones to the government, and to provide a 10% deposit in case
of abandonment of activities (Gouvernement du Québec 2010). As Figure 2.2 shows, the issue
remained technical at this point, and mostly positive articles were published on the matter
between January and July 2010. However, local and environmental groups strongly mobilized
6.  The survey and the content  analysis are not the primary sources  of  data used in  this research and were
gathered for complementary projects. 141 organizations or individual experts were contacted for the survey and
84 questionnaires were completed (response rate of 60%). Media articles come form four newspapers (La Presse,
Le Devoir, Le Soleil, The Gazette) and were coded by two coders (mean inter-coder reliability alpha = 0.8).
Articles published between 2010 and 2014 were selected using  “fracking”, “hydraulic fracturing” and “shale
gas” as keywords. The search resulted in 1680 articles, of which 1327 were considered to have shale gas as their
main topic by the coders.
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against the industry in light of social, health, and environmental risks (Dufour, Bherer, and
Rothmayr 2012). They started asking for a moratorium in July 2010, followed by opposition
parties,  local  governments,  and  a  storm-like  critical  media  coverage  (Côté 2010;
Shields 2010).
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Policy Preferences7
7*Figure 2.3  represents  the  kernel  density  of  shale  gas  perceptions,  as  reported  by  98  organizations  who
participated in the BAPE consultation process and the 39 respondents from British-Columbia who participated in
similar  processes.  The  gap  between  the  number  of  respondents  reflects  the  saliency  of  the  issue  in  both
provinces.  The measure equals  the sum of perceived positive impacts minus the sum of negative perceived
impacts. Respondents were asked to qualify each of the potential problems and whether they agreed that the
suggested benefit was real. Both measures were on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (not a problem / strongly
disagree)  to  4 (Severe problem /  strongly agree).  Problems included disposing of  waste water,  violation of
indigenous  rights,  earthquakes,  traffic,  noise,  and  light  nuisance,  conflict  between  landowners  and  their
neighbours,  air  pollution,  public  opposition,  drinking  water  contamination,  insufficient  regulatory  capacity,
inadequate public consultations, mortgage instability, and loss of agricultural lands. Potential benefits included
mitigation of  climate  change,  benefits  to  local  landowners,  energy independence,  decrease of  energy  costs,
increase of provincial revenues, job creations, and bridge toward renewable energy sources.
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In response to  the rising opposition,  the government  announced the end of  the free-
mining regime, a first-come, first-served structure of claims allocation, and replaced it by a
permit  based-system.  At  the  same  moment,  it  mandated  the  independent  Bureau  des
audiences publiques sur l’environnement (BAPE) to conduct province-wide consultations and
document the exploitation in light of sustainable development principles (BAPE 2011). Far
from being apolitical, the debate became increasingly adversarial. Signs of social polarization
included the emergence of a pro-gas lobby to defend the industry, publicly held criticisms of
existing regulation by the Commissaire au développement durable, and a 200,000 signatures
petition  against  the  industry  deposed  to  the  National  Assembly  of  Quebec  (La  Presse
Canadienne 2011b; Radio-Canada 2010; Shields 2010b). Public opinion polls conducted by
Montpetit  and  Lachapelle  (2013)  revealed  that  about  70%  of  Quebecers  rebutted  the
exploitation in 2012. As Figure 2.3 shows, the proportion was similar among stakeholders.
Interestingly,  there  are  considerably  more  strongly  opposing  individuals  than  strongly
supporting  ones,  yet  the  distribution  of  policy  preferences  appears  normally  shaped  and
centred on a moderately negative position when compared with the polarized picture given by
British-Columbia.  Thus,  the consensus against  shale  gas exploitation appeared stronger in
Quebec than in BC, where the opinion was divided about equally on the issue. The contention
was not, however, softened as a consequence of this consensus-like distribution. On the one
hand, the supporters of extraction, mostly government officials and the industry, were less
numerous, but more influential. On the other, some policy actors held policy preferences that
were considerably more extreme than what was found in BC, as shown by the proportion of
actors falling below -30 on the axis.
In February 2011, the BAPE published its first report. After noticing that sparse scientific
knowledge impinged definitive conclusions, it recommended (1) the creation of a permanent
local consultation mechanism acknowledging subsidiarity principles (2) the adoption of the
precautionary principle, sustainable development standards, and a single window approach
centralized  around the Environmental  department,  and (3)  the  composition of  a  scientific
assessment  gathering  existing  knowledge  and  investigating  missing  information
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(BAPE 2011).  The  government  responded  to  the  report  by  launching  the  Évaluation
environnementale stratégique  (EES) to assess scientific  evidences along with a temporary
moratorium on commercial fracturing (Comité d’évaluation environnementale stratégique sur
le gaz de schiste 2014).
After  the  provincial  ballot  of  2012,  the  first  opposition  party,  the  Parti  Québécois,
formed a minority government. Consistent with its prior opposition to the industry, the newly
elected government increased royalties, widened the mandate of the EES to include social and
environmental issues, and answered legitimacy concerns by assigning the management of the
EES to the independent BAPE instead of the Natural Resources Department (Chailleux 2015;
La  Presse  Canadienne 2011a;  Shields  2013).  The  EES  took  two  years  to  complete  its
assessment and mainly concluded that (1) the adoption of the precautionary principle was
warranted (2) aquifers  could support the industry’s needs (3) air  pollution mitigation was
possible, but in all cases GHG were likely to increase (4) risks resulting from chemicals in
fracturing brines were manageable, but risks of long-term bioaccumulation existed, and (5)
scientific investigation should be continued to answer remaining knowledge gaps  (Comité
d’évaluation environnementale stratégique sur le gaz de schiste 2014).
In response to the assessment, the PQ government mandated the BAPE in February 2014
to conduct a second province-wide public consultation. Their second report was published in
November  2014,  and  concluded  that,  in  light  of  the  geographic  proximity  between
repositories and the population, the shale gas industry might generate important depreciative
impacts  on local  communities,  including air  pollution,  noise,  traffic,  mortgage  instability,
landscape  degradation,  health-related  problems,  environmental  pollution,  aquifer
contamination,  GHG,  forest  erosion,  negative  economic  side-effects,  and  increased
occupational risks. While it acknowledged that mitigation methods existed and were used by
the industry, it also stressed the impossibility to completely eliminate those risks. Overall, the
BAPE argued that costs exceeded benefits (BAPE 2014). Meanwhile, the Parti québécois lost
power and the  Parti  libéral formed a  new majority  government,  but  despite  the political
turnover,  the  government  extended  indefinitely  the  moratorium,  at  least  until  economic
58
profitability and social licence were acquired (Fortier 2014).
From Events to Research Design
From  a  methodological  point  of  view,  the  Quebec  case  provides  an  interesting
opportunity to assess the impact of scientific brokerage on adversarial information networks.
On the one hand, the two independent consultations make it possible to compare the state of
the information network in 2011 and 2014. On the other,  the EES represents of the most
faithful real-world illustrations of a scientific broker.
Readers unfamiliar with those institutions should note that the BAPE is an independent
advisory agency created in 1978 with two missions: (1) document environmental and social
implications of major industrial projects and (2) gather and answer stakeholders'  concerns
through  public  hearings.  In  doing  so,  the  BAPE  facilitates  access  to  policy-relevant
information, allows the expression of conflicting views, and produces recommendations to the
government  that,  most  of  the  time,  are  taken  into  account  (Gauthier  and  Simard 2007).
Consultations  are  strongly  institutionalized.  They  are  open  to  the  entire  population  and
include  multiple  dimensions  of  the  project  under  investigation,  but  mostly  focus  on
environmental  impacts.  Ministries,  public  agencies,  and  individual  experts  provide  initial
information about the project and answer participants’ questions during the whole process,
avoiding  pronouncing  their  preferences  until  the  end  of  the  consultations.  Gauthier  and
Simard (2007) observed that those consultations led to direct and indirect learning for many
attendees, even if some strategic agreements between promoters and the public sometimes
occurred before, during, or after consultations to avoid, prepare, or repair the debate. For the
purpose of the present inquiry, the BAPE should be understood as an institution governed by
strong deliberative principles:  clarity,  accessibility,  and brevity of  information,  credibility,
impartiality and independence of the consultative process,  procedural equity,  fairness, and
flexibility,  all-encompassing  conception  of  ecological  concerns,  and  in-depth  analysis
(BAPE 2009, 2015; Gauthier and Simard 2011).
Regarding the Évaluation environnementale stratégique (ÉES), this ad hoc independent
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process  compiled  existing  peer-review articles  and contracted  out  69  scientific  studies  to
individual  experts  from  universities,  public  agencies,  ministries,  or  consulting  firms.  Its
knowledge  gathering  activities  correspond  to  the  theoretical  expectations  depicted  in
Chapter 1. Authors cited by the EES include 44 administrations, 31 peer-reviewed articles, 35
general  scientific  institutions,  2  professional  associations,  5  industry  representatives,  69
contracted studies, and 36 laws. In terms of expertise, those sources are divided as follows: 2
local  development,  3  management,  2  public  health,  5  physics,  1  energy,  5  hydrology,  4
sociology, 7 geochemistry, 7 political science, 9 law, 12 risk management, 18 hydrogeology,
14 economy, 11 engineering, 30 geosciences, and 10 administration studies (Chailleux 2015).
Results from the EES were publicly available and formed the basis of 2014 hearings.
II – Data
The state of the information network and collaborative dynamics are measured using
Social Network Analysis. Formally, SNA is the mathematical study of links between nodes. In
political science terms, SNA “offers a means of addressing one the holy grails of the social
sciences:  effectively  analyzing  the  interdependence  and  flows  of  influence  between
individuals,  groups,  and  institutions”  (Ward,  Stovel,  and  Sacks 2011,  245).  Among  the
advantages  of  the  approach,  one  may  note  the  possibility  to  review,  visually  and
quantitatively,  important  aspects  of social  organizations that  are  not captured by study of
personal  attributes  or  characteristics.  By  taking  into  account  social  configurations  and
systemic properties, SNA extracts features from the network level—density of interactions,
clustering,  structural  holes,  centralization,  etc.—as  well  as  from  the  individual  level—
proximity between individuals, peripheral positions, dependencies upon others, etc.
Given  these  capacities,  SNA appears  well-suited  to  political  science,  and  has  been
applied accordingly.  For instance,  Ingold and Varone (2011) used it  to identify brokerage
activities in a subsystem; Ingold (2011) qualified advocacy coalitions in light of coordination
relations between organizations; Scholz, Berardo, and Kile (2008) evaluated the correlation
between  network  properties  and collective  action  problems;  Considine  and  Lewis  (2007)
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identified  sources  of  innovation  among  local  governments;  Ingold  and  Gschwend  (2014)
documented  the  position  of  scientists  within  adversarial,  collaborative,  and  dominated
subsystems; Frank et al. (2012) showed the relations between occupying a structural hole and
increased  advocacy  and  advisory  behaviours;  Weible  and  Sabatier  (2005)  measured  the
asymmetric  influence  of  policy  beliefs  on  information,  ally,  and  coordination  networks;
Fischer (2014) associated patterns of coalition structures with policy change; Kriesi, Adam,
and Jochum (2006) developed a typology of policy networks in Western Europe using SNA;
finally, Lee and van de Meene (2012) explained learning dynamics of local governments with
regard to green-building policy networks. On the whole, it makes little doubts that SNA can
be a valuable tool to study inquiries dealing with relational phenomena.
Relational Data: From References to Collaborative Dynamics
Those numerous examples show that, on the whole, the main challenge of SNA does not
concern  its  scope  of  implementation,  but  rather  is  the  compilation  of  the  relational  data
needed to measure systemic properties. This is especially true for subtle phenomena such as
collective learning and scientific policy brokerage. To circumvent such problems, the data
used in this research come from a content analysis of 5751 references included in documents
—memoirs,  working  papers,  and  scientific  studies—published  by  268  advocacy  or
governmental  organizations  during  the  two  public  consultations  of  2011  and  2014.  The
ensuing database is two matrices of relations, with senders and receivers of links.
Only  organizations  were  included  in  the  content  analysis,  with  the  exception  of
individual  experts.  That is,  individual  citizens  were excluded.  This methodological choice
resulted  from  empirical  observations:  political  sophistication  of  lone  residents  appeared
objectively low when compared with organized groups. Most of them expressed their views
without  engaging  the  policy  debate.  On  average,  rational  justifications  of  opinion  were
seldom articulated,  references  to intellectual  authorities  uncommon,  and the length of the
argumentation  short.  Accordingly,  to  include  individual  citizens  in  information  networks
would have created more methodological noise than insights. In 2011, documents from 168
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organizations  were  coded:  24  autonomous  experts,  27  industry  representatives,  42
environmental groups, 10 local groups, 8 governmental departments, 23 local governments, 3
public  agencies,  22 business  and labour  associations,  and 7 others.  The participation was
slightly more homogeneous in 2014 and included 100 organizations: 3 independent experts,
19  experts  from  the  scientific  assessment  (EES),  10  industry  representatives,  17
environmental groups, 18 local groups, 8 governmental departments, 14 local governments, 3
public agencies, 7 business and labour associations, and 1 other.
References contained in policy documents are among the most reliable and consistent
relational  data  available  to  delve  into  system-wide  intellectual  interactions.  Structural
approaches to references have been a common in science mapping. For instance, Shwed and
Bearman  (2010)  relied  on  citation  networks  to  identify  scientific  sub-communities  and
concluded that structural approaches enabled the identification of scientific consensus without
requiring qualitative investigations; network structure in itself reflects substantive attributes.
Just like Shwed and Bearman (2010) and Hanney et al. (2005), this study assumes that the act
of  citing  and  referring  is  not  a  trivial  behaviour.  By  doing  so,  an  individual  implicitly
acknowledges  the  reliability  of  the  source  and  tacitly  concedes  the  presence  of  external
influence on its  own rationale.  Mcnutt  and Pal  (2011 :  450),  in  spite of using hyperlinks
instead of references, convincingly relate the process involved:
[…] a substantial body of research has found that when a source page links to a target
Web page, the source of the hyperlink is conferring trust in the receiving Web page’s
content  (Cugelman,  Thelwall,  and  Dawes 2008;  Gefen 2000).  This  does  not  suggest
hyperlink creators  necessarily  agree with or  endorse the meaning of  the  content  but
rather than the creators endorse the reliability and credibility of the source of the content
and the information provided.
Readers  should  bear  special  attention to  the meaning of  those references,  as  they  do not
necessarily reflect policy preferences directly, but rather illustrate the flows of information. As
a consequence, two organizations might share a common policy position and participate in the
same coalition, but nevertheless rely on completely different information sources. Similarly,
two competing actors might argue over the soundness of exploitation, but nevertheless share
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common information sources. This might appear surprising to some readers, yet measuring
the flow of information is of considerable relevance with regard to policy learning. Because
sharing  common  understandings  can  be  achieved  via  conjoint  knowledge,  two  actors
possessing a common information source might at least talk the same language when debating
about an issue, a first step toward policy learning. Pushing the process a little further, those
two actors might even reach total understanding if they abandon their respective, unshared
sources of information to the benefit of their common knowledge-provider. On the whole,
then, references, and the information flows they represent, seem worthy of interest and might
even provide better causal demonstrations than relying solely on policy preferences.
References also possess the methodological advantage of being directional measures,
allowing  to  distinguish  between  mutual  and  asymmetric  relations.  As  shown in  the  next
section,  this  important  attribute  considerably  improves  SNA’s analytical  power,  especially
with regard to brokerage activities and influence. Another asset of these data is that theoretical
assumptions regarding information sources can be left aside, expertise being defined in an
empirically  grounded fashion. Lastly,  the measure can be systematized across individuals,
networks, and time periods.
The portrait  is not entirely bright, though. One of the most serious limits pertains to
inconsistency between uses of references. Professional norms and academic formations may
influence how, and how often,  actors  mention external sources.  For instance,  independent
experts may have higher likelihood of listing their references rigorously in bibliography. By
opposition, local groups may employ vague phrasing such as “a study by Professor Howarth”
or “the U.S. EPA showed”. To limit such bias, the coding procedure was applied to in-text,
footnotes, and bibliographic references. Unfortunately, such ambiguous references also made
the identification of documents unreliable. Accordingly, authors are used as units of analysis
instead of documents themselves. Similar considerations constrained the adjacency matrix to
binary relations rather than weighted influence, i.e. actors either refer to someone [1] or they
don’t [0].
The second limit of the approach is that some references may contain severe criticisms,
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to the point where assumptions about the meaning of references no longer hold. To avoid
those kind of invalid data, negative references and instrumentalized citations were excluded
from the database. Precisely, the reference was coded if the answer to the following question
was affirmative: Does the actor cite, refer to, or name another actor to lead the BAPE toward
an additional source of information, or to build on the other actor’s knowledge? In the few
cases where participants mentioned a study through a newspaper,  the research was coded
instead of the media article.
Some skeptical readers might append a third limit: memoirs and working documents do
not mirror academic papers, people may not be transparent about their sources of information.
Such criticism is  relevant,  yet  empirical  results  showed that  the  argument  is  not  entirely
warranted. In 2011, the 168 actors used on average 10.15 references, totalling 1706 links. In
2014, the 4045 references represented an average of 40.45 by actors. While it is impossible to
dismiss completely the risks associated with undervaluation of relations, it seems reasonable
to assume that political actors’ willingness to improve their credibility in a technically framed
process gave them the necessary incentives to outline their references.
III - Analytical Strategy: A Dual Investigation
In order to fully grasp the analytical power of SNA, the appraisal presented in Chapter 3
answers  the  two  sub-questions  underlying  the  hypothesis:  (1)  Did  collective  learning
dynamics  improve  between  2011  and  2014,  and  if  so,  how?  (2)  Is  scientific  brokerage
responsible for this outcome, and if so, how?
A Macro-Order Analysis
The first sub-question is answered using a macro-order scope of analysis. Using network
statistics and the R package Igraph (Csardi and Nepusz 2006), the information networks of
2011  and  2014  are  compared  with  regard  to  collective  learning.  Admittedly,  collective
learning is an abstract concept with numerous subjacent dimensions, and it seems unlikely
that  any  empirically  measurable  metric  faithfully  represents  the  whole  phenomenon.
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Nevertheless, DeLeon and Varda (2009) argued that collaborative and adversarial  network
members do not, by nature, behave in a similar fashion. Accordingly, they hypothesized that
some of  those behaviours  were empirically  observable,  and that  describing  these patterns
cumulatively should make valid inferences regarding the amount of collaboration found in a
network possible. Hence, the first part of the analytical strategy draws heavily on their work
and  adapts  it  to  information  networks.  On  the  whole,  seven  statistics  measured  four
dimensions of collective learning. Because only the members of the subsystem and not the
entire set of sources were of interest,  nodal statistics were only calculated for actors who
participated in the hearings. Mathematical details are given in Appendix A.
1. Reciprocity
First of all, networks with higher collective learning should exhibit frequent reciprocated
ties. That is, people tend to perceive each other as reliable sources, and information flows in a
bilateral  manner  instead  of  being  unidirectional.  Reciprocity  is  measured  as  the  ratio  of
mutual links to total links.
2. Structural Holes and Authority-hub Scores
The  second  dimension  pertains  to  hierarchical  relationships.  In  settings  with  strong
collective learning, horizontal and decentralized interactions should constitute the norm rather
than  the  exception.  As  a  corollary,  the  number  of  structural  holes  and  individuals  in
disproportionate  positions  of  influence  should  be  limited.  With  regard  to  information
networks,  this  does  not  imply  that  actors  cannot  be  notorious.  After  all,  the  theoretical
framework  developed  in  Chapter 1  explicitly  recognized  that  an  influential  broker  may
improve  collective  learning.  Rather,  authority  should  be  distributed  more  equally  among
individuals, with peripheral actors receiving similar attention as central ones.
The first measure of hierarchy relies on Burt’s constraint (Burt 2004). The statistic range
from 0 to 1 for each network members. The closer to 1 the score is, the more the individual is
constrained by structural holes: his relations are either sparse, strongly redundant, or both. 
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The second measure of hierarchy uses Kleinberg’s (1999) hubs-authorities algorithm.
The hub and authority scores were initially designed to study links between Web pages, with
the  idea  that  some  of  them  issued  complex  authoritative  content,  for  instance  scientists
publishing papers about various illnesses, while others acted as information hubs and bridged
between  numerous  authoritative  sources  to  provide  a  more  accessible  and  wider
understanding of the topic at hand, for example a medical association publishing summaries
of these scientific reports. Hence, a good authority is pointed by many good hubs, and a good
hub  points  toward  many  good  authorities.  Using  this  definition,  Kleinberg  developed  an
iterative algorithm. At each step of the process, the score of an individual is updated in light of
the authority and hub scores of its connected neighbours. The sequence is repeated until the
algorithm  stabilizes.  See  Figure 2.2  on  page 61  for  an  illustration  of  good  hubs  and
authorities. Authority and hub scores have been normalized such that 1.00 corresponds to the
greatest and 0.00 the least; a score of 0.50 stands for 50% of the largest authority.
3. Communities and Modularity Score
Diversity  of  ties,  by  opposition  to  homogeneity  of  relations,  constitutes  the  third
dimension. Because accumulating connections outside one’s immediate intellectual network
yields valuable opportunities for learning (Granovetter 1973), intellectual isolationism in the
form of homophily8 should remain an unusual phenomenon in collective learning settings. In
other words, tie formation should “be based on the policy topic at hand with a tendency to
draw together a diverse group of stakeholders” (DeLeon and Varda 2009, 67).
Measuring homophily in  information networks,  however,  is  not as straightforward as
with social networks. That is,  because two actors may share identical information sources
without sending links to each other, using traditional community detection methods to localize
dense  intellectual  subgroups is  ill-suited.  To circumvent  the  problem,  the  2011 and 2014
information networks were transformed using structural equivalence. Structural equivalence
8 Homophily describes the tendency of people to relate with individuals sharing similar attributes, for instance
expertise or organizational type.
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occurs when two actors hold the same position inside a network. For instance, if A refers to C,
and B also refers to C, then A and B are considered structurally equivalent. In the transformed
networks, the strength of the relation between two actors is given by the Jaccard coefficient:
the number of neighbours they share divided by the total number of neighbours they have
(Csardi and Nepusz 2006). In other words, it measures the ratio of common references to total
references. Prior to transformation, loops were added to each nodes, i.e. actors are considered
sending a link to themselves. Without such addition, a link from an actor to another would
count in the total number of links instead of the number of shared links, which makes no
sense if the objective is to measure intellectual congruence. The outputs are two weighted
networks,  where  the  weights  of  relations  between two actors  correspond to  their  Jaccard
similarity coefficient. 
Once similarity networks were calculated, the Louvain community detection algorithm
was applied to uncover underlying communities (Blondel et al. 2008). This iterative algorithm
works by finding the two most similar actors and merging them into a single node, hence
creating a new network with a higher modularity. The process goes on until modularity can no
longer improve. Modularity varies between -1 and 1, and corresponds to the density of links
inside communities as opposed to links between communities. The higher the score, the more
divisible a network is into “modules”. Therefore, the first measure of the third dimension—
diversity of relationships—is the number and size of communities determined by the Louvain
algorithm in the similarity network. Those communities do not necessarily mirror advocacy
coalitions sharing similar preferences, but rather illustrate subgroups of actors sharing similar
knowledge; competing organizations may occupy a common community if they debate over
the same sources.
The  modularity  score  constitutes  the  second  one.  Precisely,  computing  modularity
requires both a network on which divisibility is to be measured and predetermined categories
to  guide  the  internal/external  density  ratio.  In  the  present  case,  information  community
membership is applied to the raw information networks, as coded from advocacy documents.
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4. Closeness and Local Transitivity
The last  dynamic corresponds to the amount of integration found in the network. As
Deleon and Varda (2009, 68) argued: “The theory of embeddedness suggests that people will
make choices based on past interactions and will be particularly inclined to initiate network
connections with those whom they can trust. Collaborative policy networks may work well
when  stakeholders  are  familiar  with  one  another  along  a  continuum  of  relationship
dimensions.” 
The first measure of the phenomenon is the closeness statistic, which corresponds to the
inverse  of  the  average  distance  between  an  actor  and  all  other  members  of  the  network
(Freeman 1979). Hence, a high closeness score indicates that an actor is strongly integrated
within the network as a whole. The distance equals 1 for immediate neighbours and increases
by 1 for every intermediary between two actors. If two nodes are not connected, then the
distance  is  assumed  to  equal  the  total  number  of  nodes  in  the  network.  To avoid  biases
associated with different network sizes, closeness scores have been normalized by multiplying
them by N-1, where N relates to the quantity of nodes.
The  second  measure  is  called  local  transitivity,  also  known as  clustering  coefficient
(Watts and Strogatz 1998). Local transitivity corresponds to the number of relations between
an actor’s neighbours divided by the number of possible relations between them. If all the
neighbours of a nodes are interconnected, the node is strongly embedded and the score takes a
value of 1; if there is no attachment between them, then embeddedness is at its lowest and
local transitivity takes the value of 0.
Table I summarizes the statistics. Combining the four dimensions has the advantage of
allowing a very precise analysis of improvements in collective learning. Moreover, the two
instruments of the second, third,  and fourth dimensions can be seen as robustness checks
strengthening  inferences.  That  being  said,  demonstrating  improvements  along  the
collaborative continuum does not explain why those happened; a situation addressed by the
second part of the analysis.
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Table I: Summary of the Macro-order Instruments
Macro analysis: Did collective learning dynamics improve between 2011 and 2014?
Dynamics Measures Descriptions
I - Reciprocity Reciprocity Ratio of reciprocated links to total links 
II - Hierarchy 1. Burt’s constraint Ranges between 0 and 1.  The more an actor  is
constrained  by  a  structural  hole  (few  ties,
redundant ties, or both), the closer to 1 the score
is.
2. Distribution of authority Good  authorities  are  pointed  at  by  good  hubs.
Good  hubs  point  toward  good  authorities.  (See
Figure 2.5 for an illustration)
III - Diversity of 
relations
1. Number and size of 
communities
Communities are detected by merging iteratively
most-similar  actors  together  until  modularity  is
maximized. Similarity is based on the number of
common references.
2. Modularity score Ranges between -1 and 1. Measures the density of
links  inside  communities  as  opposed  to  density
between communities.
IV - Integration 1. Closeness The inverse of the average distance between an
actor  and  every  other  actors  in  the  network.
Distance equals 1 for immediate neighbours and
increases by 1 for every intermediary.
2. Local transitivity Number of links between an actor’s  neighbours
divided  by  the  maximum  potential  connections
between them. Ranges between 0 and 1.
A Micro Order of Analysis
Is  scientific  brokerage responsible  for  this  outcome,  and if  so,  how?  Answering this
requires,  on  the  one  hand,  the  identification  of  influential  actors  and,  on  the  other,  the
validation of their  impacts.  To be sure,  this  complex demonstration would,  in a  best-case
scenario, rely on objective and conscientious self-reports about the influence of the scientific
broker. To overcome the lack of such data, the micro order part of the analysis combines two
descriptive  statistics  to  assess  individual  influence,  and  confirms  observations  through
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inferential network modelling.
Figure 2.4: Brokerage Types9
1. Descriptive Statistics
First, a measure counts the number of times an actor act as a broker between two actors
that  may,  or  may  not,  adhere  to  the  same information  community.  As  Figure 2.4  shows,
brokerage activities  can be divided into five distinct  roles:  (1)  coordinating a  community
[coordinator]  (2)  coordinating  a  community  without  belonging to  it  [itinerant  broker]  (3)
representing  a  community  before  another  one  [representative]  (4)  representing  another
community before its own one [gatekeeper],  and (5) linking between two communities to
which one does not belong [liaison] (Gould and Fernandez 1989). Brokerage activities are
quantified using the software Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar 1999). The communities dividing
actors are those computed by the Louvain algorithm.
To fortify the results, a second measure of influence is added: authority and hub scores,
as described above. While the macro order analysis focused on the distribution of authority,
what is under scrutiny here are the scores of the scientific broker. Indeed, an effective broker
is  expected  to  have  an  elevated  amount  of  authority  within  its  network;  that  is,  most
subsystem members  refer  to  him.  In  addition  to  being  popular,  a  broker  must  act  as  an
information hub and point toward other influential  sources to “close” the knowledge gap.
Accordingly, a broker is expected to possess a substantial combination of authority and hub
9*Brokerage types have been defined by Gould and Fernandez (1989). The Figure comes from Batagelj and
Mrvar (2011, 34).
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scores. Hence, the instrument used to identify brokerage behaviour is a factor of hub and
authority scores. Figure 2.6 illustrates the idea behind the metric.
Figure 2.6: The Relation Between Authority Score, Hub score, and Brokerage
2. Inferential Modelling
Descriptive statistics, however, may lead to spurious inferences. One of the main issue is
that there are no means of knowing whether brokerage activities are higher or lower than what
would be expected by pure chance. Similarly, qualifying the amount of collective learning
dynamics found in a network as opposed to a random behaviour is impossible. Fortunately,
tools for inferential network analysis have been developed over the past few years. Unlike
traditional inferential models, those do not assume the autonomy of observations, but rather
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embrace  the  interdependencies  between  them.  As  Cranmer  and  Desmarais (2011,  69)
expressed: “The failure of a model to recognize dependence among outcomes is as threatening
to the validity of results as omitting an important covariate.” The reason is simple: interacting
individuals likely change their behaviour according to their environment. For example, the
odds of interaction between two actors with the same expertise  are higher  in closely-knit
communities than in sparse networks. The same goes for brokerage activities. A given number
of brokerage activities might be considered low in a collaborative network, but high in an
adversarial  one.  Accordingly,  an  observation  about  brokerage  may  be  spurious  if  the
environment in which it occurs is not controlled for.
This research relies on the Exponential Random Graph Model to include environmental
variables in the inferential model (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011; Hunter et al. 2008; Ward,
Stovel,  and  Sacks 2011).  In  an  ERGM,  the  dependent  variable  is  binary;  it  reflects  the
existence—or  absence—of  a  tie  (relation)  between  two  nodes  (actors).  The  independent
variables may be individual, structural, or both. Individual variables include, for instance, the
impact  of  wealth  on the  probabilities  of  receiving  a  tie,  or  the  increased  probabilities  of
friendship resulting from age or gender homophily. Structural variables encompass popularity
effects,  clustering  effects,  density  of  interactions,  number  of  isolated  individuals,  etc.  An
ERGM  without  structural  variables  equals  a  logistic  regression  (Cranmer  and
Desmarais 2011).  When  structural  variables  are  added  to  the  model,  ERGM  simulates  a
number  of  similar,  randomly distributed  networks—usually  1000—and then estimates  the
likelihood of observing a given statistic by pure chance. Because computational limits make
the estimation of the exact likelihood impossible, the ERGM uses the Markov Chain Monte
Carlo to approximate it.  The model outputs a logistic coefficient expressing the increased
probabilities of detecting a tie between two actors resulting from an increase of one unit in the
independent  variable,  controlling  for  the  remaining  variables.  Interpretation  can  either  be
systemic, i.e. inferences about the state of the network, or localized, i.e. relational dynamics
between subsections of the network (Desmarais and Cranmer 2012). Again, further details
about ERGM can be found in Appendix A.
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It is important to note that ERGM possesses serious limits, the most constraining of them
being degeneracy problems associated with poor comparability between the observed network
and  simulated  ones,  in  which  case  the  coefficients  are  simply  impossible  to  evaluate  or
strongly biased (Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011). Fortunately, robustness checks exist and the
model described in Chapter 3 does not appear degenerate (Appendix B). Table II summarizes
the micro-order instruments.
Table II: Summary of the Micro-order Instruments
Micro analysis: Is scientific brokerage responsible for this outcome, and if so, how?
Dynamics Measures Descriptions
I – Influence Authority * hub 
score
Good authorities are pointed by many good hubs. Good
hubs  point  toward  many  good  authorities.  Effective
brokerage is expected to cumulate both behaviours.
II – Brokerage activities Brokerage types Five types of brokerage are calculated based on the link
they  create  between  communities  of  information.
Communities  used  are  those  calculated  by  the  Louvain
community detection algorithm.
III – Inferential validation ERGM Randomly creates 1000 networks comparable in structural
attributes.  Using  the  normal  distribution  of  statistics
created,  ERGM calculates  the  impact  of  individual  and
structural  variables  on  tie  formation,  along  with  the
likelihood of observing such impact by pure chance.
IV - Conclusion
As  a  whole,  the  research  design  presented  above  took  advantage  of  the  scientific
uncertainties of shale gas and its related political disputes. It selected a case where the impacts
of scientific brokerage activities on an adversarial network can be measured. If the hypothesis
advanced in Chapter 1—The presence of a broker in an adversarial structure of governance
increases  the  probabilities  of  observing  a  shared  understanding  of  policy-relevant
information  between  policy  actors—has  empirical  resonance,  then  the  selected  events
represent a best-case scenario to document it. If, on the other hand, brokerage activities do not
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influence  policymaking  in  adversarial  settings,  then  the  case  constitutes  a  robust
demonstration of the failure. The measurement of successes or failures is made possible by
scrutinizing multi-scale dynamics with numerous indicators from Social Network Analysis. In
addition, observations are validated using ERGM, which further increases reliability of the
interpretations. Next chapter presents the results along with a theoretical discussion.
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Chapter 3: Results and Discussion
Following the analytical strategy presented in Chapter 2, the next chapter empirically
documents  the  role  played  by  scientific  brokerage  in  adversarial  policymaking  before
engaging a theoretical debate.  Results are divided in two sections reflecting the analytical
subquestions.
I - Improved Collective Learning
As stated in chapter 2, the measure of collective learning relies on 4 dynamics estimated
by  7  metrics:  (1)  reciprocity  of  relations  (2)  amount  of  hierarchy  regulating  information
exchanges (3) heterogeneity of sources, and (4) proximity to the network as a whole. Readers
unfamiliar with Social Network Analysis should refer to Chapter 2 and Appendix A to grasp
the details of each statistics.
Table III  summarizes the findings: collective learning improved on all  four dynamics
between 2011 and 201410. Namely, the proportion of mutual links increased by more than
three times (from 0.009 to 0.032), implying that transmission of knowledge is less one-sided
in  2014 than it  was  in  2011.  Moreover,  information  diffusion  appeared  considerably  less
hierarchical in 2014. Burt’s constraint diminished by 2.6 times (from 0.39 to 0.15; p <0.001).
Such  a  transformation  points  toward  fewer  dependencies  and  more  homogeneous
opportunities  to learn from others.  In  addition,  not only did the average authority  among
policy actors increase by more than five times (from 0.034 to 0.175; p <0.001), but authority
also  tended  to  be  apportioned  more  evenly  between  members.  As  Figure 3.1  shows,  the
10 Burt’s constraint, distribution of authority, local transitivity and closeness report the average score of active
policy actors only, i.e. “internal information sources.” A contrario, the averages exclude all information sources
that  are not  consultation participants,  i.e.  “external  information sources”.  The research purpose makes such
disqualification  mandatory;  failing  to  remove  external  information  sources  would  have  strongly  biased  the
interpretations. For instance, the closeness statistic represents the inverse of the average distance between a node
and all other nodes in the network. In the case of external information sources, they do not perform any link-
sending activities. Hence, their closeness is considerably lower than active subsystem participants, and including
them would push the average toward zero. Similar consideration applies to the three additional statistics.
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distribution was considerably more localized in 2011 than in 2014. Specifically, the high and
positive kurtosis of 2011 (83.82) indicates few individuals possessed a large amount of the
total authority, whereas a smaller kurtosis (17.18) shows concentration of influence was a
phenomenon of smaller significance in 2014.
Table III: Summary of Collective Learning Dynamics
Measure 2011 2014 T-test
Reciprocity 0.009 0.032 N.A.
Burt’s constraint 0.39 0.15 P <0.001
Distribution of authority 0.034
Kurtosis = 83.82
0.175
Kurtosis = 17.18
P <0.001
Communities 49 communities
7 meaningful
21 communities
9 meaningful
N.A.
Modularity score 0.44 0.31 N.A.
Closeness 0.0012 0.0046 P <0.001
Local transitivity 0.059 0.148 P <0.001
Regarding diversity of relationships, the number of information communities identified
by the Louvain algorithm decreased from 49 to 21. That being said, 42 individuals were the
sole active member of their groups in 2011, indicating that the accurate number of meaningful
communities—i.e. between 2 and 31 people—was 7 in 2011. By contrast, there were only
three isolates in 2014, and the number of real communities was 9, comprising between 2 and
21 policy actors. Whereas the absolute quantity of groups increased by 2 in three years, the
biggest community encompassed a total of 1802 information sources in 2014 (71% of the
entire set), by opposition to 336 (34%) in 2011. Importantly, the 2014 network appeared less
divisible  with regard to  intellectual  similarity  than its  2011 counterpart,  as  shown by the
modularity  scores  [from  0.44  to  0.31].  On  the  whole,  the  picture  suggests  intellectual
partitioning  declined:  the  number  of  isolated  actors  melted,  the  size  of  the  principal
information  community  doubled  in  relative  terms,  and  the  density  of  inter-community
relations amplified by about 30%.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Normalized Authority in 2011 and 2014
Looking at embeddedness comforts the aforementioned analysis. As Table III shows, the
average closeness between an actor and the entire set of information sources grew by about 4
times (from 0.0012 to 0.0046; p <0.001). Conceptually, those results indicate that the network
collapsed into a denser, more intertwined entity that shortened the intellectual gap between
active subsystem members. A three-times increase of local transitivity further reinforces these
observations (from 0.059 to 0.148;  p <0.001).  Since transitivity  can be understood as the
number of triangles a given political actor is participating to11, those results either demonstrate
that actors had more inclination to adopt the same references as their informants, or that they
had a greater propensity to refer to political actors sharing the same sources. In any case, the
outcome of such process was that the frame of understanding converged. As a matter of fact,
the number of links sent to internal actors confirms this interpretation: in 2011, subsystem
members received on average 1.89 ties, whereas the average reached 5.21 in 2014 (p <0.001).
11 For example: a→ b; b→ c; a→ c, where a and b are internal information sources
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All things considered, did collective learning dynamics increase between 2011 and 2014?
Reinforcement  of  the  four  dimensions  combined  with  consistency  across  statistics  point
toward a robust affirmative answer to this subquestion. This being so, an important caveat
appears necessary.  Collective learning did improve,  but  the outcome is  far  from peaceful
policymaking and global collaboration. Even in 2014, real-world ramifications of the outputs
indicate that collective learning remained a scarce phenomenon. Approximately 3% of links
were  mutual.  Structural  holes  persisted  to  constrain  access  to  information  sources.
Hierarchical  authority  endured.  9  communities  partitioning  100  people  combined  with  a
modularity  of  0.31  show  that  divisibility  persisted.  Closeness  appears  objectively  low
considering  its  theoretical  maximum of  1.00:  assuming  infinity  corresponds  to  2537,  the
average distance between a node and all others was approximately 546,448 liaisons. Similarly,
about only 15% of possible relations between the information sources of the average policy
actor existed in 2014. It is not to say, however, that those changes are insignificant. After all,
theory  suggests  a  strong resistance  to  collective  learning  in  conflicting  environment,  and
improving  collective  learning  by  about  three  time  over  three  years  is  a  non-trivial
achievement.
II – Influential Brokerage
Is scientific brokerage responsible for the observed outcome? According to the results
described  in  the  following  lines,  it  is.  This  being  said,  what  occurred  does  not  exactly
correspond to theoretical expectations. On the one hand, the—rather coarse—count of bridges
suggests that brokerage increased, but also that the scientific assessment (EES) was not the
sole  broker  participating  to  the  phenomenon.  Figure 3.2  gives  the  number  of  times  an
organization  bridged  between  two  individuals  [a→ b;  b→ c]  from  different  information
communities [brokerage], along with the number of times it bridged between two actors in the
same community [coordination]. Only the most important brokers are presented.
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Figure 3.2: Brokerage Count in 2011 and 2014
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In  2011,  both  brokerage  and  coordination  activities  were  uncommon.  At  most,  the
Environmental  Department  bridged  1531  times,  followed  by  the  Natural  Resources
Department (877) and the Industry association (784). Regarding coordination, the number is
appreciably lower, with industry representing a large part of it (Junex = 198; ALL consulting
= 177; Industry association = 159; Natural Resources Department = 126; Talisman Energy =
81).  While  one might  interpret  these absolute  numbers  as  being significant,  their  relative
weight is trivial when compared with the 2014 count. Indeed, the Environmental Department
spanned  between  different  communities 14,637  times  in  2014,  followed  by  the  scientific
broker  (5285),  the  INSPQ—a public  health  agency  (4318)—,  and  the  Natural  Resources
Department (4318). Coordination also increased substantially (e.g. Environmental Department
= 3740), but nevertheless remained a phenomenon of tinier significance.
By opposition to what was theoretically expected, the EES is neither the sole nor the
most important broker. Rather, the Environmental Department acted as a broker almost three
times  as  much  as  the  EES  did.  Even  if  the  EES  ranked  second,  his  followers  scored
objectively close. Overall, the Environmental Department, the EES, the INSPQ, the Natural
Resources Department, HEC, and the CRCDE all did more brokerage than 2011 best broker.
As a consequence, it is possible to conclude that brokerage was considerably more present in
2014 than in 2011, but also that brokerage was not exclusive to any political actors.
Unfortunately,  the count of brokerage and coordination activities only gives a partial
diagnostic. First, whether increased brokerage had influence on collective learning stays an
unanswered question. Second, the count of brokerage does not account for the relative size of
networks,  which  is  an  important  insufficiency  considering  that  opportunities  to  bridge
between actors rise exponentially when the network size inflates. As a consequence, part of
the rise results from an increased quantity of information sources. Third, the measure is highly
dependent upon the number of references possessed by a broker. For instance, most of the 383
references  of  the  Environmental  Department  have  been  classified  in  the  Environmental
Department’s community. This means that the count of brokerage activities rises by almost
383 each time an individual from another community refers to the Environmental Department.
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By contrast,  the  same  department  only  had  33  references  in  2011.  This  does  not  mean,
however, that the observations are completely spurious. After all, bridging with 383 sources
corresponds to an objectively better brokerage than bridging with 33 references. Nevertheless,
an additional measure of brokerage appears warranted to dissipate this uncertainty.
This second measure looks at unscaled authority and hub scores. Under the assumption
that  an  effective  broker  is  both  influential  and aware  of  its  intellectual  environment,  the
multiplication of authority and hub scores should allow for the identification of brokers. As
the upper part of Figure 3.3 shows, the Environmental Department again scored the highest in
2011 and 2014. Precisely, it almost doubled its brokerage score in three years, i.e. from 0.05
to 0.09. The rest of the picture, however, is not conclusive regarding brokerage improvements.
The second most likely broker, the Natural Resources Department, scored almost equivalently
in 2011 and 2014 [from 0.049 to 0.046]. Most importantly, the EES and all remaining brokers
obtained less than 2011 leaders, except for the Environmental Department.
Why is that so? A part of the answer lies within the lower part of Figure 3.3. As can be
seen by comparing the graphs, the absolute authority scores declined between 2011 and 2014.
That  is,  even  if  authority  was  better  distributed  among  policy  actors,  they  individually
possessed less influence in 2014 than in 2011. For instance, the most authoritative broker of
2014—the scientific broker—enjoyed an authority of 0.15, whereas the Natural Resources
Department  scored  an  absolute  0:43  in  2011.  On  the  contrary,  hub  scores  are  strikingly
different.  They  increased  from  an  average  of  0.14  to  0.23.  Again,  the  Environmental
Department, the Natural Resources Department, and the EES scored among the highest of
2014, with a respective 0.68, 0.36, and 0.22. 
Substantively,  Figure 3.3 reveals  that  a  dual  process  is  at  play:  while  network-aware
organizations are both more numerous and more enlightened, they have a smaller influence on
the rest of the network. Hence, the abundance of bridges is not purely the consequence of
influential brokerage, but rather the outcome of more comprehensive knowledge-gathering
activities.  This  is  puzzling:  if  collective  learning,  community-bridging,  and  knowledge
gathering did proliferate, how did authority decline, and why?
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Figure 3.3: Authority and Hub Scores
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Organizational Affiliations by Information Communities
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An Explanation: The Collaborative Core Thesis
As the horizontal axis of Figure 3.3 illustrates, virtually all brokering organizations of
2014 were experts mandated by the scientific assessment, including the two governmental
departments.  Figure 3.4  exposes  the  distribution  of  organizational  affiliations  within
information  communities  of  at  least  2  people. As  can  be  seen,  the  community  detection
algorithm  grouped  14  out  of  19  EES  experts  with  4  governmental  departments—
Environment, Transport, as well as federal and provincial Natural Resources. Importantly, no
other  policy  actors  have  been classified  with  those  18  organizations,  which  casts  further
doubts  on  the  unifying  power  of  the  scientific  assessment.  If,  indeed,  the  EES  had
successfully positioned itself as a dominant access-point for information, then some actors
would have been categorized in its community. To be sure, these results do not mean that no
links existed between subsystem members and the scientific assessment.  In fact, EES and
affiliated experts were among the top internal information sources (i.e. 53 references to the
EES,  50 to  the  Environmental  Department).  Rather,  those results  imply  that  the relations
between the scientific assessment and policy actors referring to him were considered trivial by
the algorithm in light of the vast number of competing references they kept. By opposition,
the EES, his experts, and governmental departments sustained sufficient acquaintance with
each other's references and shared a common understanding of the issue.
To dig further into the assessment/advocacy divide, the 2014 information network was
divided in two subnetworks; the first of which encompassed solely the scientific assessment,
his  experts,  and  governmental  departments  [assessment network],  while  the  second
constrained  membership  to  advocacy  organizations  [advocacy network]12.  Table IV
summarizes three of the four collective learning dynamics within those networks13. Simply
looking at the density of interactions outlines the amount of collective learning found inside
the  assessment  network:  30  organizations  nourished  189  relations,  of  which  32%  were
12 References to external sources were removed to delve into the quality of internal relations.
13 Community and modularity were excluded from this analysis because measuring structural equivalence is
irrelevant without external information sources.
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reciprocated.  The  assessment’s  experts  and  departments  were  moderately  constrained  by
structural  holes  (Burt  =  0.29);  average authority  appeared relatively high  (0.15)  and well
distributed (kurtosis = -0.39); closeness reached impressive heights (0.50); local transitivity
indicated 47% of possible triangles were closed.
Table IV: Collective Learning Dynamics in Assessment and Advocacy Subnetworks
Measures Assessment Advocacy Both
Number of Nodes 30 70 100
Number of Ties 189 41 527
Reciprocity 0.32 0.03 0.14
Burt’s constraint 0.29 0.83 0.33
Distribution of authority 0.15
Kurtosis = -0.39
0.04
Kurtosis = 9.77
0.05
Kurtosis = 7.26
Closeness 0.50 0:01 0.03
Local transitivity 0.47 0.03 0.40
By opposition, collective learning was largely absent from advocacy actors, as shown by
their  small  number of relations (41).  Among this  second subnetwork of 70 organizations,
reciprocity  fell  to  only 3% of  ties,  structural  constraints  were almost  total  (Burt =  0.83),
relative authority was low (0.03) and concentrated around few individuals (kurtosis = 9.77),
closeness only equalled 2% of its assessment counterpart, and about 3% of potential triangles
were closed. Unsurprisingly, all dynamics ranged somewhere between both extremes when
the  subnetwork encompasses  every  policy  actors,  as  shown by the  right-hand column of
Table IV. Nevertheless, the total number of relations (527) suggests considerable advocacy-to-
assessment awareness, or vice-versa.
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On  the  whole,  it  makes  little  doubts  that  the  observations  made  about  improved
collective learning were entirely imputable to the appearance of the assessment community:
the phenomenon arose as the exclusive domain of EES experts and governmental authorities.
While the community was densely knit, it was far from being closed on itself. Assessment
experts acknowledged advocacy actors and their information sources in an effort to integrate
policy-relevant  information.  These  efforts,  by  contrast,  were  insufficient  to  influence
advocacy rationales. As a matter of fact, advocacy actors examined the brokered picture as
well as experts’ research, yet they largely kept their own, distinct information sources. On a
micro-order of analysis, then, brokerage in adversarial policymaking failed.
This  being  said,  the  picture  is  completely  different  when  one  moves  away  from
individual-level effects and instead embraces a systemic view based on communities. Because
adversarial  communities  refuse  to  acknowledge  the  relevance  of  competing  claims,  they
subdue each other’s power over policymaking.  In this  environment,  a community gaining
partial recognition from the whole set of subsystem members, whether by means of reputation
or coercive influence, rapidly emerges as the most central, well-known group. While every
other communities possess virtually no external influence, the central community enjoys the
best systemic position to steer policymaking. This phenomenon is hereafter referred to as the
structural predominance of a community. To some extent, structural predominance is a factor
of political division and external recognition.
structural predominance=political division∗external recognition
Both are necessary conditions. Without political division, possessing external recognition can
seldom be beneficial: all communities are considered legitimate and influence is more or less
equally divided. Without external recognition, a community cannot take advantage of political
division: efforts to influence are either blocked or ineffective. In the present case, the data at
hand  suggest  that  structural  predominance  gave  the  collaborative,  brokering  community
considerable  significance  in  the  information  network,  and  thus  in  policymaking.  The
assessment community became the collaborative core of an adversarial network.
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Figure 3.5: Cumulative Authority of Information Sources by Community
Figure 3.5  sustains  this  interpretation  by  showing  that  information  provided  by  the
assessment community [id = 12] was considerably more authoritative than the rest  of the
network. Both the cumulative authority of policy actors and the cumulative authority of top 25
information sources demonstrate that the assessment community dominated the information
network14. In addition, the cumulative hub score shows that it was also the community doing
the  most  knowledge-gathering  activities.  In  short,  the  network-conscious,  collaborative
community enjoyed structural predominance in addition to proximity with shale gas’s most
relevant governmental departments: environment, natural resources and transport.
14 Using top 25 authorities instead of total information sources is important to avoid a bias associated with
asymmetric community sizes. For instance, a community of 1800 information sources having an authority score
of  0.01 would equal  the  same total  authority  as  18 highly  influential  sources  having  an  authority  of  1.00.
However, influence of the latter is logically higher than the former.
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Inferential Modelling
So far, the collaborative core thesis has been supported by descriptive statistics only.
While numerous measures were used and consistency across them appeared convincing, an
effective demonstration should reduce the likelihood of spurious observations. This section
addresses this situation using the Exponential Random Graph Model. Readers unfamiliar with
ERGM should pay careful attention to the explanations provided in Chapter 2 and Appendix
A. Robustest probes and degeneracy diagnostics are available in Appendix B. R codes are
displayed in Appendix C.
In the present  case,  the dependent  variable  is  the probability  of  observing a  relation
between  two  actors,  and  the  independent  variables  include  community  homophily,
subnetwork membership, reciprocated relations, transitivity15,  and popularity16.  Subnetwork
membership  terms  (assessment-to-assessment,  advocacy-to-advocacy,  assessment-to-
advocacy, and advocacy-to-assessment) gives the probabilities of observing a relation going
from the former to the latter. For example, the assessment-to-advocacy coefficient gives the
increase  in  probabilities  associated  with  a  link  going  from an  assessment  member  to  an
advocacy organization. Regression results are presented in Table V. Models A, B, C, D, and E
are  performed  on  the  same  network17,  the  only  differences  being  the  set  of  independent
variables. Advocacy-to-advocacy subnetwork membership represents the base term.
From a network perspective, coefficients of model E are all large and significant at the
0.001 threshold; the observed network is strongly different from randomly generated ones
with  regard  to  selected  characteristics.  At  first  sight,  all  type  of  relations,  regardless  of
network membership, are less likely than what would be expected by chance, i.e. tie density is
extremely low. This being said,  all  types of subnetwork interactions are more likely than
15 Transitivity  can  be  summarized  as  “a  reference  of  my reference  is  also  my reference”.  The coefficient
associated with transitivity illustrates the increased likelihood of observing a tie that closes one triangle.
16 Popularity  can  be  summarized  as  “I  refer  to  you  because  everybody  refers  to  you”.  It  is  the  ERGM
counterpart of the hub-authority algorithm.
17 Akin to  what  was done with the comparison of  subnetworks,  ties  to  external  information sources  were
excluded from the analysis to grasp internal dynamics.
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advocacy-to-advocacy exchanges of information. Community homophily, reciprocity of ties,
transitivity and popularity are all more present than what can be found in similar, randomly
created  networks,  which  is  coherent  with  the  view upon which  information  flows  reflect
identifiable social interplays.
Table V: ERGM Results
Variable Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
Advocacy-to-
advocacy
-4.76* (0.16)
0.009
-4.97* (0.16)
0.007
-4.95* (0.16)
0.007
-5.55* (0.17)
0.004
-5.33* (0.16)
0.005
Assessment-to-
advocacy
1.59* (0.19)
4.90
1.75* (0.19)
5.75
1.52* (0.20)
4.57
0.98* (0.21)
2.66
1.37* (0.20)
3.94
Advocacy-to-
assessment
2.57* (0.17)
13.07
2.73* (0.18)
15.33
2.64* (0.18)
14.01
1.80* (0.19)
6.05
1.56* (0.17)
4.76
Assessment-to-
assessment
3.47* (0.18)
32.14
3.35* (0.18)
28.50
3.02* (0.18)
20.49
1.51* (0.19)
4.53
1.91* (0.17)
6.75
Community 
homophily
0.77* (0.12)
2.16
0.65* (0.11)
1.92
0.64* (0.11)
1.90
0.72* (0.12)
2.05
Reciprocity 1.27* (0.18)
3.56
0.83* (0.19)
2.29
0.71* (0.21)
2.03
Transitivity 1.46* (0.12)
4.31
0.74* (0.11)
2.10
Popularity 0:04* (0.003)
1.04
AIC
BIC
3475
3503
3440
3476
3398
3441
3205
3255
3053
3110
* p <0.001; Standard errors in parentheses
Odds ratios are presented underneath logistic coefficients.
Lowering the scope of analysis gives interesting insights about the plausibility of the
collaborative core thesis. Firstly, odds ratios of Model A show that the raw likelihood of inter-
subnetwork relations is extremely higher for assessment-to-assessment ties than for advocacy-
to-advocacy (32.14 and 0.009, respectively; p <0.001). Moreover, odds ratios are greater than
one for assessment-to-advocacy and advocacy-to-assessment references, the latter outstanding
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the former by about three times (13.07 and 4.90; p <0.001).
Tracing the evolution of those coefficients as structural factors are added to the model
yields additional understandings of the dynamics at play. As can be seen with model B, taking
into account community homophily slightly reduces the likelihood of within-subnetwork ties,
but  also  moderately  increases  the  probabilities  of  observing  cross-subnetwork  relations.
Substantively, this confirms the view upon which information communities do not span the
assessment-advocacy divide. Regarding reciprocity, adding the variable to model C reduces
the  coefficients  of  all  but  advocacy-to-advocacy  relations,  with  assessment-to-assessment
linkages exhibiting the most important drop in probabilities. Corollaries are twofold: (1) only
a small part of cross-subnetwork interactions occurred following the “a refer to you because
you referred to  me” principle  and (2) mutual  exchanges of information is  a  phenomenon
predominantly circumscribed within the assessment community boundaries.
Model  D  is  conclusive  regarding  transitivity:  it  is  by  far  the  strongest  structural
explanation at hand. While the plunge of coefficients is objectively large for all categories of
ties, the effect is striking in the assessment subnetwork: a sharp decline in the odds ratio, from
20.49 to 4.53 [p <0.001]. Again, this substantiates the idea that the EES core is by far the most
collaborative. The last addition is made by Model E, which incorporates a popularity effect.
As can be seen by comparing the two right-hand columns of Table V,  within-subnetwork
probabilities increase—marginally so for advocacy actors—and cross-subnetwork equivalents
diminish. The nuance is noteworthy, because it demonstrates that interactions among EES
experts or governmental departments are not based on the popularity of the source in the
whole network, but rather correspond to the dense web of relations expected in a collaborative
core. By opposition, cross-subnetwork dynamics are partly mediated by the popularity term:
advocacy actors tend to refer to important assessment members such as the Environmental
department or the EES, and collaborative core affiliates lean toward well-known purposive or
material  organizations,  for  instance  the  industry  representatives,  the  union  of  agricultural
producers, a collective of advocacy scientists, etc.
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Table VI: Typical Cases Facilitating ERGM Interpretation
Case Coefficients included Tie probabilities
Advocacy to advocacy Popularity = 1.8 1.4%
Advocacy to influential advocacy
(Industry association)
Homophily = 1
Popularity = 12
4.3%
Assessment to assessment Advocacy-to-advocacy = 1
Homophily = 1
Popularity = 12
Mutuality = 1
Transitivity = 1
55.7%
Assessment to assessment broker 
(MDDEP & EES)
Assessment-to-assessment = 1
Homophily = 1
Popularity = 52
Mutuality = 1
Transitivity = 1
86.1%
Advocacy to assessment Advocacy-to-assessment = 1
Popularity = 12
9.5%
Assessment to advocacy Assessment-to-assessment = 1
Popularity = 1.8
5.3%
Advocacy to assessment broker
(EES & MDDEP)
Advocacy-to-assessment = 1
Popularity = 52
Mutuality = 1
11.1%
Overall, ERGM results corroborate the collaborative core thesis. But what are the exact
probabilities of observing a relation, and what do those results imply for collective learning?
To  push  the  analysis  of  logistic  coefficients  further  and  answer  these  questions,  realistic
illustrative cases inspired by subnetwork statistics are created. For instance, Table IV showed
that reciprocity of ties was highly unlikely in the advocacy subnetwork, just like the number
of closed triangles. Accordingly, reciprocity and transitivity coefficients should be excluded
from  advocacy-to-advocacy  probability  computation.  By  opposition,  those  characteristics
were very important in the assessment subnetwork, and should be included in the assessment-
to-assessment equivalent. Popularity effects are based on the number of references received
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by typical actors. Table VI dresses the list of illustrative cases18.
According to Table V, the likelihood of observing a tie between two advocacy actors is
merely  1.4%.  Even  if  one  hypothesizes  that  both  actors  are  in  the  same  information
community  and  one  of  them coordinates  the  community—as  would  be  the  case  for  the
Industry association—, the probabilities only rise to 4.3%. On the opposite, members of the
collaborative  core  have  55.7%  chances  of  being  in  relation,  assuming  mutuality  and  a
common reference. For the potential brokers such as the Environmental Department and the
EES,  the  probabilities  increase  to  86.1%.  Importantly,  advocacy-to-assessment  and
assessment-to-advocacy relations are both more likely than advocacy-to-advocacy relations,
but nevertheless remain marginal (9.5% and 5.3%, respectively). Even for scientific brokers,
the  probabilities  of  receiving  a  tie  from advocacy actors  are  only of  11.1%. Overall,  the
collaborative core sent links to outsiders and received some from advocacy actors, but these
activities were relatively trivial when compared with what occurred within the assessment
subnetwork (p <0.001).
III - Discussion: Strengthening Brokerage Theory
A theory on policy brokerage began emerging over the last few years (Ansell, Reckhow,
and  Kelly 2009;  Carpenter,  Esterling,  and  Lazer 2004;  Christopoulos  and  Ingold 2014;
Ingold 2011;  Ingold  and  Varone 2011;  Pielke 2007),  and  this  research  constitutes  an
interesting opportunity to test and refine existing conceptions. Chiefly, the findings support
the hypothesis developed in chapter 1: the presence of a broker in an adversarial structure of
governance does increase the probabilities of observing a shared understanding of policy-
relevant information between policy actors. This being said, multiple important caveats must
be added to this assertion. Precisely, there are several differences between micro and macro
phenomena at  play.  The following lines propose 6 considerations to nuance or enrich this
18 Tie probabilities were calculated by transforming odds ratios into probabilities: probabilities = odds/ (1+odds)
where  odds =  0.005 + (assessment-to-assessment*3.94  OR advocacy-to-assessment*4.76  OR assessment-to-
assessment*6.75) + homophily*2.05 + reciprocity*2.03 + transitivity*2.10 + popularity*1.04
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conclusion.
Explaining the Collaborative Core
Foremost, the fact the scientific brokerage created a collaborative core in a persistently
adversarial subsystem  is  an  utterly  surprising  result.  Why  did  the  EES  only  improved
collective learning among close collaborators, and what are the consequences for brokerage
theory?  Answering  these  questions  offers  an  opportunity  to  address  the  debate  about
necessary and sufficient conditions, but also to suggest a novel consideration pertaining to the
scope of effects. Regarding micro-level interactions, the existing literature implicitly supports
the idea that brokerage is only possible if three necessary conditions are reunited: the broker
(1) displays moderate beliefs (2) is familiar to and (3) deemed trustworthy by policy actors
(Ansell  and  Gash 2008;  Gerlak  and  Heikkila 2011;  Heikkila  and  Gerlak 2005;  Lee  and
Meene 2012;  Steyaert  and  Jiggins 2007;  Weible,  Pattison,  and  Sabatier 2010).  To  some
extents, the results described in the first part of this chapter are coherent with these conditions,
although  a  fourth  condition  must  be  added  to  the  list:  moderate  beliefs  by  brokered
individuals.  Indeed,  all  members  of  the  collaborative  core  were  experts  or  governmental
departments, that is people and institutions well-known for their moderation (e.g. Ingold and
Gschwend 2014;  Jenkins-Smith  et  al.  2014;  Meijerink 2005;  Weible 2008).  Moreover,  it
seems  acceptable  to  assume  that  experts  and  governmental  departments  considered
themselves familiar with the procedure and expressed considerably greater deference toward
the EES than advocacy organizations. The logical corollary goes as follows:
Contribution 1: Results sustain the idea whereby trust, familiarity, and moderate
policy beliefs are necessary conditions for individuals to relate to policy brokers.
In adversarial polity, the strongest advocates should not accept brokerage without
a serious stalemate.
However,  the  findings  also point  toward a  novel  consideration:  on  a  macro  scale,  a
majority of trustworthy, familiar, and moderate policy actors is by no means necessary to shift
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the subsystem from adversarial  to  collaborative.  An accessible  way of dealing with inter-
coalition dynamics  is  to  assume that  the quantity  of  adversarial  or collaborative relations
echoes the state of the subsystem. Yet scholars should be careful going down that path, as all
actors  are  not  born  politically  equal  with  regard  to  influence  over  policymaking.  By
considering the dominant trend as a mirror of the whole process, studies will likely miss out
significant information covered up by power asymmetries: governmental departments have
greater  control  of  the  output,  experts  reputed  as  such  by  those  departments  have  higher
probabilities of impacting the course of actions than unknown counterparts, and closely-knit
communities in fragmented environment plausibly have greater structural predominance. This
is an important consideration because it implies that a broker does not have to transform the
whole subsystem to help generate policies akin to what would have occurred under perfect
collaboration. As long as main policymakers adopt a compromising attitude and consider the
entire set of available arguments, whether secondary actors engage in similar behaviour and
change their beliefs accordingly is irrelevant for the policy at hand. Hence, the idea suggested
in Chapter 1 that brokers may build on dependencies—bounded policy capacity, constraining
social  image,  and  collective  action  problems—to  compel  collaboration  in  an  adversarial
subsystem takes on its full significance when one moves away from individual cognition and
considers the macro-dimension of political interactions. Theoretically, dependencies may be
the explanatory factor behind external recognition, one of the two conditions for structural
predominance to exist. Formally, the contribution goes as follows:
Contribution 2: While trust, familiarity, and moderate policy beliefs are necessary
conditions for brokerage to have an effect on individuals, they are by no means
necessary for brokerage to have an effect on subsystems. Precisely, a subgroup
affected  by  brokerage  activities  can  build  on  structural  dependencies  of  the
remaining actors to achieve structural predominance and impose collaborative-
like  policymaking.  Structural  dependencies  include,  but  are  not  limited  to,
collective  action  problems,  bounded  policy  capacity,  and  constraining  social
image.
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structural predominance=political division∗external recognition
Where political division = conflict * balanced power
and external recognition = favourable structural dependencies
A Better Definition of Policy Brokers
Second,  the  impressive  empirical  complexity  of  brokerage  contrasts  seriously  from
textbook  conceptions  of  a  single  broker  bridging  competing,  otherwise-unconnected
subgroups. In fact, the results described above even cast some doubts about the existence of
brokers as a  category  of actors. By asking themselves who was the broker, many scholars,
including the author of the present investigation, designed their analytical strategy to identify
exceptional structural positions, for instance by looking at betweenness centrality (e.g. Ansell
and Gash 2008; Ingold and Varone 2011).  Such procedure would be well-suited if brokers
were solely definable by their relative network location. The picture, however, is considerably
more complex,  and empirical  observations suggest  policy science has much to gain from
conceptualizing brokerage as a behaviour. In other words, asking whether brokerage occurred
seems of greater interest than searching for the broker, and identifying the latter doesn’t prove
the former exist.
Reasons are twofold. First, understanding brokers as a special type of actor induces risks
of developing non-mutually exclusive categories. To be sure, coalitions are not the sole units
of interest inside subsystems, and the idea of “exceptional actors” proposed by Christopoulos
and Ingold (2014) seems worthy of further investigations. But to take the present inquiry as an
example, it is unclear whether the assessment was indeed exceptional, or merely an influential
epistemic community well aware of its intellectual environment. But what about the large
body of literature demonstrating brokers’ distinctive good faith, moderate belief system, and
attachment  for  conflict-avoidance,  communication,  and  unifying  frames  (Burt 2004;
Christopoulos and Ingold 2014; Ingold 2011; Ingold and Varone 2011; Koski 2010; Mintrom
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and Norman 2009; Zito 2001)? To be clear, the argument does not, by any means, disregard
the literature identifying these singular attributes. After all, people engaged in such activities
logically have different incentives than traditional rent-seekers. Rather, the claim is simply
that conceptualizing brokerage as a behaviour that can be undertaken by any political actors
avoids unnecessary confusion.
The second problem pertains to documenting the existence of real brokerage activities.
Taking  again  this  research  as  an  illustration,  if  one  had  relied  on  a  priori expectations,
betweenness  centrality,  or  mere  number  of  references  received to  consider  the  EES as  a
broker, then it would have missed two crucial points: (1) the EES was neither the sole nor the
most prominent broker and (2) virtually every advocacy actors, despite referring to the EES
experts,  kept  strong  external  relations  suppressing  the  relative  significance  of  brokerage.
Moreover,  assuming  that  theoretical  insights  about  the  trust-building,  bridge-building,
structural-hole-reduction  and  knowledge-diffusion  effects  have  an  empirical  resonance,  a
method relying purely on structural positions could generate misleading conclusions. Indeed,
people  seldom limit  their  interactions  to  a  single  individual—i.e.  the  broker—when  they
accept, consciously or not, to engage in collaborative behaviour. If, as a result of brokerage
operations,  competing  organizations  relate  to  each  other,  then  searching  for  betweenness
centrality in a web of ties no longer makes sense. Of course, a single actor might initiate the
phenomenon, but once it is activated and diffused, looking for localized, microscopic traces of
it is unlikely to yield reliable insights. As an alternative, approaches encompassing several
cumulative  indicators  (e.g.  Ingold  and  Gschwend 2014),  longitudinal  data,  behavioural
networks such as ally recognition, coordination, and information gathering (e.g. Weible and
Sabatier 2005),  and  patterns  of  collaboration  surrounding  potential  brokers  could  foster
worthier findings. For instance, digging further into the authority-hub algorithm could be an
interesting path toward differentiating fact mapping from knowledge diffusion.
Contribution 3: Conceptualizing brokerage as a dynamic process based on trust-
building,  bridge-building,  structural  hole  reduction,  and  knowledge-diffusion
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would likely yield better empirical leverage than seeing it as a peculiar structural
position.
The State of Information in Adversarial Policymaking
In  addition  to  brokerage,  the  findings  offer  an  interesting  opportunity  to  address
questions pertaining to the state of knowledge in adversarial policymaking. At first sight, the
extreme dispersion of sources is striking, as shown by the impressive number of information
communities  found in subsystems of  168 and 100 organizations:  49 and 21,  respectively.
These  communities  transcended  groupings  typically  scrutinized  by  political  science
(environmental and local organizations, industry, scientists, governments, etc.); organizational
affiliations,  advocacy  coalitions,  and  information  networks  do  not  echo  each  other.  The
contrast between both is sharp: in the 2011 case, 168 organizations referred to 986 different
sources. The picture is even more evident in 2014: 100 actors mobilized 2538 knowledge
providers. This tends to confirm, with novel methodological tools and data, the widely held
views regarding the political nature of policy intelligence, the multiplication of incompatible
interpretations,  and the unshared understandings about societal  issues  (Barke and Jenkins-
Smith 1993; Hoppe 1999; Kahan, Jenkins‐Smith,  and Braman 2011; Lachapelle, Montpetit,
and Gauvin 2014; Nilsson 2005; Vifell and Sjögren 2011). Even under the assumption that all
references  are  fact-based  knowledge,  with  is  rather  unrealistic,  their  vast  and  persisting
diversity  shows that  much more than  the advocacy/empirical  divide  is  at  work:  expertise
familiarity, perception of being trustworthy, experiences with the authors, reputation within
social  circles,  and  popularity  among  friends  all  remain  credible  explanations  of  source
selection.
Contribution 4:  Results  tend  to  confirm  the  political  nature  of  knowledge  in
adversarial policymaking: contested, disparate, unshared, and often exclusive.
Findings  have  much  more  to  say  about  the  cognitive  processes  of  enlightenment,
however. Precisely, many studies alleged that preferences were relatively stable across time,
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and that the likelihood of transforming belief systems with collective learning was extremely
low when views  were  polarized  (Jenkins-Smith  et  al.  2014;  Paul  A.  Sabatier 1987;  P.  A.
Sabatier and Zafonte 2001; Weible, Pattison, and Sabatier 2010; Weible and Sabatier 2009).
Unfortunately  for  proponents  of  deliberative  democracy,  the  statistics  presented  earlier
reinforce such thesis. Of course, collective learning dynamics did improve in the short run, yet
the progress is marginal and intellectual alienation persisted. The demonstration may not close
the debate, but it surely adds another layer of evidence supporting conflict stability and the
importance of exceptional events to shift predominant attitudes.
Contribution 5:  Results  confirm  the  minimal  probabilities  of  changing  belief
systems through collective learning in adversarial settings in the short-term. By
the same token, findings pinpoint that partial acceleration of the process through
brokerage is possible, yet total transformation unlikely.
The last contribution discusses a specific claim made by Jones and Jenkins-Smith (2009),
who contented that nascent subsystems had to deal with considerable confusion with respect
to policy-relevant information. They further added that as time goes by, familiarity should
increase  and  the  knowledge  may become more  accessible  to  policymakers  and advocacy
organizations.  Their  argument  was  mainly  theoretical  and  falls  outside  the  scope  of  this
research,  but  few words  on  the  matter  should  nevertheless  be  expressed  considering  the
supportive findings. In 2011, the relatively new shale gas subsystem exhibited considerable
fragmentation with regard to information, yet between 2011 and 2014, the average size of
communities increased, modularity diminished, and several structural holes were suppressed.
It is, of course, impossible to claim that the same process would have occurred without policy
brokerage, but the following statement seems noteworthy:
Contribution 6:  Results  are  compatible  with  Jones  and  Jenkins-Smith’s  thesis
(2009),  which  argues  that  the  initial  fragmentation  of  knowledge  typical  of
nascent subsystems should diminish as time and institutionalization go by.
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IV - Conclusion
Hopefully,  readers  considered  the  evidences  conclusive  about  the  collective-learning
potential of brokerage in adversarial subsystems. Of course, the outcome is far from perfect:
conflict requires much more than a two-year inclusive assessment to disappear. Nevertheless,
it has been shown that some actors were more sensitive to scientific mediation than others,
and as long as those are the most influential of the subsystem, collaborative-like policymaking
can flourish in conflicting polity.
The conclusive chapter describes this research’s main limits, along with methodological
recommendations  intended to  researchers  interested  in  continuing the  research  agenda on
policy brokerage.
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Concluding Remarks
Can scientific  assessments  foster  a  shared  understanding  between  political  actors
operating in adversarial policymaking? Answering this question constituted the main goal of
this research, and the verdict is somehow mixed. Specifically, the inquiry drew upon three
innovations  to  foster  novel  insights  on the matter.  From a purely conceptual  perspective,
mobilizing brokerage theory was a suited, original, and fruitful way of understanding how
scientific  assessments  may  positively  affect  their  policymaking  environment  to  stimulate
collective learning. In the present case, picturing such environment in light of network theory
refocused the scope of analysis on macro-order dimensions of the phenomenon: presence of
structural  holes,  distribution  of  intellectual  authority,  advantageous  network  positioning,
governance  improvements,  number  of  bridges,  facilitation  of  knowledge  transmission,
interactions  between  sub-communities,  etc.  On  the  whole,  the  conceptual  framework
developed in Chapter 1 sustained a positive response: scientific assessments likely behave as
policy brokers in information networks, easing optimization of collective learning dynamics.
A method was designed to confirm—or overturn—theoretical perceptions. The challenge
was to appraise the state of collective learning in the whole subsystem before and after a
scientific assessment mobilized its brokerage functions. Drawing on the Quebec Shale Gas
case,  this  research  innovated  by  extracting  quantitative  data  from  policy  and  advocacy
documents  published  in  two  province-wide  consultations  separated  by  a  sophisticated,
inclusive  scientific  assessment.  Precisely,  the  second  innovation  was  to  apply  methods
commonly implemented in science mapping to subsystems: using references as a measure of
influence on actors’ rationale. Inspired by the work of DeLeon and Varda (2009), this research
developed four dimensions and seven instruments which cumulatively grasped the state of
collective  learning  in  the  two information  networks  emerging  from citation  matrices.  By
employing  the  number  of  bridges  between  information  communities  (Gould  and
Fernandez 1989) and the authority-hub algorithm (Kleinberg 1999), brokers were identified
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along with their respective influence on collective learning improvements. The descriptive
results were validated using ERGM, an inferential network analysis tool generating normal
distributions  of  various  statistics  from randomly  created,  similar  networks  (Cranmer  and
Desmarais 2011; Desmarais and Cranmer 2012; Handcock et  al.  2008; Hunter et al.  2008;
Morris, Handcock, and Hunter 2008; Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011).
While  the  scientific  assessment  and  surrounding  governmental  departments  were
identified as the most likely brokers, they only had marginal influence on advocacy actors.
Unfortunately for defenders of scientific enlightenment, empirical insights were, thus, highly
coherent with the body of literature pointing toward the instrumentation of science and limited
propensities to understand adversaries when conflict is excessive. A detailed investigation of
subnetworks showed that launching a scientific assessment did not challenge efficiently one-
sided  belief  systems,  but  nevertheless  created  a  closely  knit,  highly  cooperative  core
encompassing  governmental  departments  and  shale  gas  experts.  Because  the  group
surrounding the broker enjoyed structural predominance, this research’s third innovation, and
gathered  knowledge  from the  whole  information  network,  the  policy  emerging  from the
process  at  hand  was  plausibly  very  similar  to  what  would  have  occurred  under  perfect
synergy. That is, subsystem-wide cooperation appears unnecessary to conduct cooperation-
like policymaking.
I - Addressing Limits and Their Consequences
Reflexivity on the reliability of a research design is an integral part of any good scientific
study.  Accordingly,  this  subsection  dresses  the—hopefully  exhaustive—list  of  limitations,
assesses their impact on the results, and defends them from alternatives.
Capturing Collective Learning
From the outset,  readers should bear  in  mind the methodology’s imperfect character.
Foremost, it would be important to consider the value of collective learning proxies, which
contrast  sharply  with  how  social  science  traditionally  deal  with  cognitive  processes.  Of
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course,  learning  is  a  subtle  phenomenon  hardly  comprehended  by  a  single  indicator  or
outright questionnaires, a picture that even worsen when researchers consider the underlying
social components of interdependent intellects. Some readers might argue that well-fashioned
surveys would have shed brighter light upon the matter, but financial and time constraints left
aside,  Social  Network  Analysis  and  surveys  make  bad  associates.  Precisely,  because
participation rate seldom—if ever—reach 100 percent, important network ties may be missed
out with serious consequences on the inferences—imagine, for instance, that the EES had not
accepted to collaborate (Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011). 
Other  researchers  might  assert  that  traditional  content  analyses  could  have  been  a
valuable alternative to construct a collective learning scale relying on longitudinal changes in,
say, policy preferences, the tone adopted, the level of scientific sophistication, the perception
of adversaries, the aversion to risk, the types of benefits and/or problems identified, etc. Yet
again,  this  approach  possesses  three  major  challenges,  the  first  of  them  being  time  and
financial constraints associated with dissecting 268 policy documents encompassing several
hundreds of pages. Second, reliability and transparency of a single-coder procedure would
have emerged as a striking problem. Third, it is unclear how isolated content analyses can be
conclusive about the relational dimension of collective learning. By contrast, the structural
approach  exposed  novel  interplays:  density  of  ties,  reciprocity  of  relations,  intellectual
similarities, bridges, information hubs, authorities, clustering behaviours, structural holes, and
closeness  to  the  whole  set  of  information  sources.  Moreover,  analyzing  those  factors
cumulatively strengthened confidence about the reliability of inferences.
However suited, the structural proxies were partly incomplete when compared with what
DeLeon  and  Varda  (2009)  suggested.  First,  it  would  have  been  useful  to  understand
modularity more thoroughly, for instance by taking into account expertise and organizational
homophilies.  Unfortunately,  this  would have required considerable research on more than
3500 organizations, an unrealistic goal given the scope of this study. Similarly, DeLeon and
Varda  conceptualized  embeddedness  as  the  diversification  of  relations  between  actors.  In
theory, this could have been measured by specifying the purposive nature of references, e.g.
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showing an example of good practices, acquiring an argument, suggesting an authority on the
matter, etc. Nevertheless, coding more than 5900 ties was unfeasible. Circumventing the lack
of data with the closeness score was partially useful, but this approach is not perfectly suited
to segmented networks because of unrealistic assumptions about the infinite distance between
unconnected  nodes  (Opsahl,  Agneessens,  and  Skvoretz 2010).  Lastly,  measures  of  trust,
formality,  and  transparency  throughout  the  network  were  dropped  out  due  to
operationalization issues. Surely, then, the set of proxies could have been more complete, but
this by no means implies the unreliability of the dependent variable. Besides, it is among the
most suited operationalizations of collective learning available. The problems noted above
should not pose major threats to internal validity.
Before considering limits associated with citations and information networks, one last
criticism deserves  attention.  Precisely,  some  readers  might  think  that  the  seven  statistics
display  strong  collinearity.  For  instance,  the  closeness  score  logically  increases  when
transitivity, number of common references, and mutuality expand, and the effect is similar
when modularity  and structural  holes  erode.  At  first  sight,  the argument  appears partially
founded. After all, social structures are inherently intertwined. That being said, the reasoning
is fallacious, as each statistic does quantify very different dynamics. Taking again closeness as
an example, the score could have lowered as a consequence of stronger ties, more shared
references,  and  higher  transitivity  if  those  phenomena  consolidated  existing  network
divisions, for instance by generating completely isolated clusters of individuals. The same
goes for remaining characteristics: mutuality does not imply common references, transitivity
does not lead to mutuality, multiplying useless social relations may increase structural holes,
etc. In other words, those several interplays may evolve together, yet they are not bounded to
do so.
Network Construction
Using a well-fitted operationalization of collective learning is worthless if the underlying
network on which it is applied is ill-convinced. On such matter, assuming that information
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networks are a good structural representation of social cognition is legitimately debatable. The
instrument is fairly imperfect: references do not bear the same connotation in every contexts,
qualitative nuances are of substantial significance, the propensity to cite differs across policy
actors, and searching for in-text references may have induced some mistakes. Nevertheless,
those caveats should not push policy researchers to abandon citation networks, for reliability
threats appear objectively thin. 
Advocacy  actors  and  experts  may  not  share  a  common commitment  for  intellectual
transparency,  yet  the  scientific  nature  of  the  procedure  and  a  willingness  to  convince
policymakers logically gave the necessary incentives to strengthen arguments via references.
The remaining effect of heterogeneous propensities to cite was tempered by looking carefully
at in-text references. To be sure, missing links potentially results from this approach, but the
coding experience showed that the most significant information sources of individuals were
referred to several times in a document.  Hence,  a major misidentification seems unlikely.
Furthermore, overlooked secondary relations presumably distribute at random between policy
actors, thus failing to induce serious bias.
ERGM Degeneracy
While  the  degeneracy  problems  of  ERGM  have  been  mentioned  before,  their
consequences  on  the  research  have  not.  The  most  serious  consequence  has  been  the
impossibility  to  include  structural  equivalence  as  an  independent  variable,  i.e.  shared
references. Whenever the model took into account this statistic, it either failed to converge or
was so unstable that serious reliability threats arose. This is especially unfortunate considering
that  structural  equivalence  embodies  a  dynamic  of  utter  interest  for  collective  learning.
Nevertheless,  the exclusion doesn’t  compromise the accuracy of remaining coefficients,  it
simply  implies  that  the  effect  stays  intertwined  with  subnetwork  terms.  Furthermore,
information  communities  were based  on structural  equivalence,  and including community
homophily  among  independent  variables  provided  a  partial  workaround.  In  any  case,
structural  equivalence  becomes  of  secondary  worry  when  the  analysis  excludes  external
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sources from scrutiny: the vast majority of shared references vanished from the network.
This last point brings another concern in the debate:  why was the ERGM model only
applied to internal information sources, and not to the whole network? Part of the justification
is  theoretical,  i.e.  collective  learning is  only  possible  for  policy  actors.  Just  like  external
sources were excluded from the computation of descriptive statistics, omitting to do so for
ERGM would have seriously biased the coefficients toward zero. Still, some might reasonably
think  it  would  have  been  interesting  to  compare  with  the  whole  information  network.
Unfortunately, ERGM degeneracy surfaces when one tries to do so. The problem is that the
density of ties is so unusual—bear in mind that 2438 nodes did not send any references in
2014—that  the algorithm fails  to  generate  networks of comparable densities.  Holding the
number of links constant is a partial workaround, but doing so causes coefficient estimation
issues with other variables.
External Validity
Under  the  largely  quantitative  character  of  this  research  lies  a  case  study.  Thus,
legitimate  concerns  about  its  representativeness  may  arise:  is  the  Quebec  Shale  Gas
subsystem valid for scientific inferences? At first sight, there are no reasons to believe it is
not. Just like it did in many jurisdictions around the globe, shale gas stimulated major debates
in the province. Moreover, the events allowed building a robust test for brokerage theory. This
being so, commitments to scientific transparency justify two caveats. Firstly, Quebec as been
described  for  its  distinctive  character  among  the  Canadian  federation.  Long  story  short,
Quebec inhabitants exhibit stronger attachment to egalitarian values than their Rest-of-Canada
and American counterparts (Montpetit and Lachapelle 2013). Second, everything was not held
constant during the period of analysis;  two non-negligible political  turnovers changed the
governing party between 2011 and 2014. It is unclear how this might exactly affect external
validity, but one possibility could be that the strong popular opposition to shale gas and the
brief interlude where the Parti Quebecois took power influenced membership and decision-
making inside governmental departments, which helped the assessment community to reach a
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common understanding.
II - Few Words on a Brokerage Research Agenda
This study innovated on various points, as mentioned above, and yielded noteworthy
contributions  upon  which  future  research  might  draw  upon,  both  theoretically  and
methodologically. Methodologically, the thesis illustrated how worthy policy documents were
from a quantitative perspective. For good reasons associated with richness and accessibility,
qualitative researchers have long dealt with policy documents, yet the trend is younger for
purely quantitative studies, i.e. not relying on substantive content analysis. In the present case,
transforming in-text references, footnotes, and bibliographies into relational matrices yielded
enough understandings to reach transparent and reproducible analyses of subtle phenomena.
Hopefully, researchers will share an interest for those metadata, which surely are well-suited
for a wide array of complementary investigations. 
Second,  this  research  contributed  to  the  new body of  literature  using SNA or,  more
specifically,  inferential  modelling  such  as  ERGM  in  political  science  (Considine  and
Lewis 2007;  Cranmer  and  Desmarais 2011;  Desmarais  and  Cranmer 2012;  Fischer 2014;
Frank et al. 2012; Ingold 2011; Ingold and Gschwend 2014; Ingold and Varone 2011; Kriesi,
Adam,  and  Jochum 2006;  Lee  and  Meene 2012;  Scholz,  Berardo,  and  Kile 2008;  Ward,
Stovel,  and  Sacks 2011;  Weible  and  Sabatier 2005).  It  confirmed  that  by  transforming
structural factors into independent variables explaining the likelihood of interactions between
two individuals, the ERGM provides a useful heuristic to dissect widespread social relations,
but also local phenomena. In fact, the ERGM may even have been more fruitful to understand
collective learning than purely descriptive SNA, and further applications of the method are
thoroughly encouraged.
Lastly, and most importantly, the dual order of analysis confirmed a traditional micro
understanding of brokerage—prominence of trust, familiarity, and moderate policy beliefs—,
but also stressed the importance of power dynamics at play at the subsystem level. The former
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specifies  why  brokers  influence  individuals;  the  latter  explains  how  broker-friendly
communities  formed  by  those  people  affect  the  policymaking  process  and  compete  with
advocacy organizations. Both should be integral parts of a theory, and it might be useful to
reposition  brokerage  in  light  of  political  confrontations,  structural  predominance,  and
dependencies. Of course, the community-building potential of policy brokers deserves special
attention, but searching restlessly for optimistic humanism won’t favour its materialization.
After all, isn’t ubiquitous power relations the realm of political science?
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Appendix A: SNA Statistics Details
Reciprocity
Reciprocity measures probability that the inverted counterpart of a directed edge is also
included in the graph. Or simply put:
a
b
where: a = number mutual links
 b = number of total links
Burt's constraint
Burt's constraint (Burt 2004) measures how constrained in structural holes an actor is, or
more specifically, how dependent he is upon an individual to reach others, as measured by the
proportion of efforts he puts in that individual in addition to how redundant his contacts are.
Mathematically:
∑ c ij=(p ij+∑q p iq pqj)
2
where:
i = the actor on which burt's constraint is being measured
j = a contact of i 
∑ c ij = Burt's constraint, i.e. the sum of squared constraints for every contact of i 
pij=
zij
∑q z iq
where  z ij = the strength of the relation with j on a 0-1 scale and
∑q z iq = total strength of all relations of i 
pqj = the proportion of i's relations that are linked with j, i.e. redundancies of contact
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Hubs and Authorities Algorithm
The  hubs  and authorities  algorithm was  designed  by Kleinberg  (1999).  It  works  by
iteratively updating the authority and hub scores of nodes. The more the hub scores of a tie-
sending neighbour is high, the higher the authority scores of a node will be. Similarly, the
higher the authority score of a node is, the higher the hub score of a node connecting to it will
be. It begins by the following assumptions:
auth( p)=1
hub( p)=1
Where p is a node. Then, update rules are iteratively applied:
authority update rule: auth( p)=∑
i=1
n
hub (i)
where:
n = total number of nodes connected to p
i = a node connected to p
hub update rule: hub( p)=∑
i=1
n
auth(i)
where:
n = total number of nodes p connects to
i = a node which p connects to
Similarity Matrices
The similarity matrices are transformations of the raw citation matrices as coded from
the advocacy and working documents. Instead of assuming the strength of the relation from a
node to another one equals 1 if the former cites the latter and zero otherwise, the strength of
the relation becomes the number of common neighbors divided by the sum of total neighbors.
Furthermore, a loop was added to every nodes in the network, i.e. the measure assumes that
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people refer to themselves. Without this addition, a reference from a nodes to another one
would have counted in the sum of total neighbors instead of in the sum of common neighbors.
Louvain algorithm
The Louvain community detection algorithm (Blondel et al. 2008) works by repeating
iteratively two phases. In the initial phase, there are as many communities as there are nodes
in  the  network.  For  each  relations between  i and  j,  the  algorithm evaluates  the  gain  of
modularity resulting from placing i in the community of j. Only the move that maximizes the
modularity  of  the  whole  network  is  done.  This  principle  is  repeated  for  all  nodes  until
modularity can no longer improve, in which case the first phase is completed. In the second
phase, a new network is created, where the communities in the first network correspond to the
nodes of the second one. The weights of links between those new communities correspond to
the sum of the weights linking members of those communities in phase 1. Similarly, a self-
loop is added for each new nodes, which corresponds to the strength of relations between the
nodes that formed that community in phase 1. Once this new network is created, phase 1 is
applied again, and so on until modularity can no longer improve. 
Modularity is a scalar value ranging between -1 and 1 that measures the density of links
inside a communities as compared to links between communities. Mathematically, modularity
can be expressed as follow:
Q= 1
2m∑ij [A ij−
k i k j
2m
]δ (ci ,c j)
where:
A ij = the weight of the edge between i and j
k i=∑ j Aij i.e. the sum of the weights of the edges attached to i 
c i = the community to which i is assigned
δ (c i ,c j) = 1 if c i=c j and 0 otherwise
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and m=1
2∑ij A ij
Closeness
Closeness gives the inverse of the sum of the distance between a node and all other
nodes in the network. If there is not a directed path between both, then the distance is assumed
to be the total number of nodes in the network (Freeman 1979). The formula goes as follows:
closeness= 1
∑
ij
(dij )
where: d=distance ; ij=a pair of nodes ;and i≠ j
Local transitivity
Transitivity measures the probability that the adjacent nodes of a node are connected
together.  Transitivity makes no difference between the direction of relations,  as long as a
triangle is formed (Watts and Strogatz 1998).
Exponential Random Graph Model
As Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) explains it, ERGM begins by assuming that each of
the network statistics calculated on a network  m are the expected values of those statistics
across all possible networks: E[Гi ]=Г i where Г i is any network statistics
The second assumption is that only the statistics included in  Г influence the probability
that network m is observed. As a result, the relationship between the probability of a network m and
the network statistics in Г is:
P(Y m)=
exp (−∑ j−1
k
Гmj θ j)
∑m−1
M
exp(−∑j−1
k
Г mjθ j)
where θ is the vector of k parameters describing the
dependence of P(Y m) on the network statistics in  Г
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Appendix B: Degeneracy and Goodness of-Fit
ERGM  is  a  statistical  tool  relying  on  random  network  generation  to  draw  normal
distributions of independent variables included in the model. As a consequence, coefficients’
reliability depends on whether or not the networks are comparable with the observed one.
Another concern regards the generation of those networks. That is,  because each network
statistics  are  structurally  dependent  upon  others,  it  can  be  extremely  demanding  for  a
computer  to  generate  comparable  networks.  To  counteract  the  problem,  an  algorithm
facilitating the iterative computation is necessary: the Markov Chain Monte-Carlo algorithm.
Unfortunately,  this  algorithm  can  often  behave  unpredictably,  for  instance  by  generating
networks with a complete density of links,  i.e.  all  possible  relations are filled,  instead of
oscillating  randomly  around  the  mean  of  the  observed  network.  This  is  called  “model
degeneracy” (Hunter et al. 2008). Multiple causes are possible, but one of them is that the
model specifications are too sparse to effectively describe the real network: the algorithm
doesn’t  know how to constrain  network  generation.  The consequences  are  either  that  the
coefficients are impossible to estimate—the maximum likelihood estimator does not exist—or
that the coefficients are unreliable—the maximum likelihood estimator does not fit the data
(Handcock et al. 2008).
Fortunately,  it  was  possible  to  avoid  those  problems  for  the  ERGM  presented  in
Chapter 3. For simplicity reasons, only the degeneracy analyzes of Model E are presented, but
the MCMC algorithm exhibited a similarly sane behaviour with regard to the other models.
MCMC Behaviour
Ideally, the MCMC algorithm would oscillate randomly around the mean. In addition,
each statistic should not be strongly correlated with another one, and the correlation between
networks  with  regards  to  one  statistic—e.g.  triangles  in  the  1000  randomly  generated
networks—should  gradually  decrease  as  the  number  of  estimated  networks  increases.
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Figures 4.1 to 4.3 show that the first condition is met, and the degeneracy analyses outputs
given by the MCMC. diagnostics Statnet R software presented afterwards demonstrate that
the second and third are also fulfilled. 
Figure 4.1: MCMC Estimation Behaviour [1/3]
Edges  term  corresponds  to  advocacy-to-advocacy  relations;  mix.  collaborative2.1.0
corresponds to assessment-to-advocacy; mix. collaborative2.0.1 corresponds to advocacy-to-
assessment.
113
Figure 4.2: MCMC Estimation Behaviour [2/3]
Mix.collaborative2.1.1 corresponds to assessment-to-assessment;  nodematch.  community is
the information community homophily term; mutual is the mutuality term.
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Figure 4.3: MCMC Estimation Behaviour [3/3]
Gwesp.fixed.0 is a term encompassing the number of edges involved in at least one triangle in
the network and corresponds to the transitivity term (e.g. Goodreau et al. 2008). Istar2 counts
the number of 2-star received by a node, i.e. the number of pairs of links received by an actor,
and represents the popularity term. This statistic is, by far, the one which posed the biggest
estimation problems. It was, indeed, frequent to have degeneracy problems with this term.
The problem was partially resolved by increasing the number of estimated network “burned”
before adding the first network to the random set, as well as before adding each additional
network to the set. Doing so reduced the correlation between each network and allowed the
algorithm to get back on the right track after the three “falls” observable in Figure 4.3. That
being said, the coefficient was relatively stable across estimations, regardless of fine tuning.
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The following tables summarize the MCMC diagnostic outputs given by the Statnet R
software. Table VII gives indication about the number of burned networks, sample size, and
number of iterations needed to estimate the maximum-likelihood.
Table VII: General Estimation Information
Characteristic Information Comments
Number of iterations 4 out of a maximum of 50
Burned network 10,000 Number of networks burned before 
starting the random sampling.
Interval burning 5000 Number of network burned between each 
network of the sample.
Sample size 4096 Number of random networks in the 
sample.
Table VIII: Descriptive Statistics for Each Variable
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Quantiles
Advocacy-to-Advocacy -2.54 31.17 2.5% = -63.00
97.5% = 61.62
Assessment-to-Advocacy -0.45 11.00 2.5% = -21.62
97.5% = 22.00
Advocacy-to-Assessment -0.60 17.44 2.5% = -35.00
97.5% = 34.00
Assessment-to-
Assessment
-1.48 14.28 2.5% = -29.00
97.5% = 27.00
Community homophily -1.13 11.68 2.5% = -23.00
97.5% = 23.00
Mutuality -0.75 7.53 2.5% = -15.00
97.5% = 14.00
Transitivity -2.86 36.05 2.5% = -75.00
97.5% = 68.00
Popularity -9.75 591.41 2.5% = -1372.38
97.5% = 994.00
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Table VIII gives the descriptive statistics of the variables in the model. As can be seen,
the mean is approximately zero for every variable, with popularity being the farthest at -9.75.
Tables IX  and  X  display  the  cross-correlation  and  auto-correlation  of  network  statistics,
respectively. As can be seen in Table X, every variables decrease rapidly from 1.00 toward
zero, with the exception, again, of popularity. Overall, the picture is that there are no major
degeneracy problems with the MCMC algorithm, although readers should bear in mind that
the popularity term is on the edge of being unstable. The Geweke test, which is equivalent to a
t-test  comparing  the  first  10% of  networks  generated  by  the  MCMC algorithm with  the
subsequent  50%,  indicates  that  taken  individually,  the  assessment-to-assessment  and
popularity term may be problematic. They do not reach the 0.05 threshold, but are closer to it
than one.  However,  the joint p-value of all  variables (0.42) attests  that the model,  on the
whole, does not have auto-correlation problems. Also, it was impossible to completely reduce
auto-correlation through fine tuning, as modifying the model induced problems with other
variables.  Hence,  the MCMC behaviour  might  not be perfect,  but  it  does not pose major
reliability threats.
Table IX: Cross-correlation
Variable Advocacy-to-
Advocacy
Assessment-to-
Advocacy
Advocacy-to-
Assessment
Assessment-to-
Asssessment
Community 
homophily
Mutuality Transitivity Popularity
Advocacy-to-
Advocacy
0.55 0.76 0.67 0.61 0.68 0.92 0.67
Assessment-to-
Advocacy
0.55 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.49 0.47 0.76
Advocacy-to-
Assessment
0.76 0.16 0.29 0.30 0.44 0.78 0.77
Assessment-to-
Asssessment
0.67 0.13 0.29 0.68 0.50 0.60 0.30
Community 
homophily
0.61 0.22 0.30 0.68 0.46 0.51 0.26
Mutuality 0.68 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.74 0.51
Transitivity 0.92 0.46 0.78 0.60 0.51 0.74 0.80
Popularity 0.67 0.21 0.76 0.30 0.26 0.52 0.80
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Table X: Auto-correlation
Variable Advocacy-to-
Advocacy
Assessment-to-
Advocacy
Advocacy-to-
Assessment
Assessment-to-
Asssessment
Community 
homophily
Mutuality Transitivity Popularity
Lag 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Lag 5000 0.45 0.16 0.42 0.49 0.47 0.42 0.55 0.79
Lag 10 000 0.27 0.06 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.38 0.67
Lag 15 000 0.17 0.02 0.24 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.29 0.59
Lag 20 000 0.13 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.24 0.52
Lag 25 000 0.11 0.01 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.21 0.48
Geweke individual
P-values
0.75 0.39 0.14 0.07 0.30 0.70 0.39 0.14
Joint P-value = 0.42
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Goodness-of-fit
The  second  concerns  regarding  ERGM  reliability  is  whether  or  not  the  randomly
generated networks are comparable with the observed one. Figures 5.1 to 5.4 compare the
distribution  of  random networks  [whisker plots]  with  the  observed  one  [solid  line].  Four
dimensions are compared: the number of links received [in-degree], the number of links sent
[out-degree], the number of shared partners, and the geodesic distance distribution between
the nodes. Although the fit is not perfect—the solid lines often fall outside the whisker plots
—, the general pattern appears comparable.
Figure 5.1: In-degree Goodness-of-fit
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Figure 5.2: Out-degree Goodness-of-fit
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Figure 5.3: Shared-partners Goodness-of-fit
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Figure 5.4: Minimum Geodesic Distance Goodness-of-Fit
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Appendix C: R codes
For simplicity reasons, only the codes necessary to compute the statistics are provided,
i.e. readers willing to replicate the results should add the codes to load the database.
–-------------------------------------------------------
#Load R packages
library(igraph)
library(intergraph)
library(e1071)
library(statnet)
library(ergm)
library(sna)
library(coda)
library(latticeExtra)
#Transforming the data into R objects
b2011=graph.data.frame(BAPE_2011_Edges_clean, directed = TRUE, vertices = BAPE_2011_Nodes)
b2014=graph.data.frame(BAPE_2014_Edges_ID, directed = TRUE, vertices = BAPE_2014_Nodes)
b2014_NE=graph.data.frame(BAPE_2014_Edges_NoEES, directed = TRUE, vertices = BAPE_2014_Nodes) 
#Building the subnetworks
ees = induced_subgraph(b2014, vids = which(V(b2014)$collaborative2=="1"))
actors = induced_subgraph(b2014, vids = which(V(b2014)$actors2=="1"))
stake = induced_subgraph(b2014, vids = which(V(b2014)$stakeholder=="1"))
#Building the similarity matrices
similarity2011 = similarity(b2011, vids = V(b2011), mode = c("out"), loops = TRUE, method = c("jaccard"))
similarity2014 = similarity(b2014, vids = V(b2014), mode = c("out"), loops = TRUE, method = c("jaccard"))
similarity2014_NE = similarity(b2014_NE, vids = V(b2014_NE), mode = c("out"), loops = TRUE, method = c("jaccard"))
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similarity2014_ees  =  similarity(b2014,  vids  =  which(V(b2014)$collaborative2=="1"),  mode  =  c("out"),  loops  =  TRUE,
method = c("jaccard"))
similarity2014_actors = similarity(b2014, vids = which(V(b2014)$actors2=="1"), mode = c("out"), loops = TRUE, method =
c("jaccard"))
similarity2014_stake  =  similarity(b2014,  vids  =  which(V(b2014)$stakeholder=="1"),  mode  =  c("out"),  loops  =  TRUE,
method = c("jaccard"))
ms2011 = graph.adjacency(similarity2011, mode = c("lower"), weighted = TRUE, diag=FALSE)
V(ms2011)$id = BAPE_2011_Nodes[,1]
ms2014 = graph.adjacency(similarity2014, mode = c("lower"), weighted = TRUE, diag=FALSE)
V(ms2014)$id = BAPE_2014_Nodes[,1]
ms2014_NE = graph.adjacency(similarity2014_NE, mode = c("lower"), weighted = TRUE, diag=FALSE)
V(ms2014_NE)$id = BAPE_2014_Nodes[,1]
ms2014_ees = graph.adjacency(similarity2014_ees,  mode = c("lower"), weighted = TRUE, diag=FALSE)
ms2014_actors = graph.adjacency(similarity2014_actors, mode = c("lower"), weighted = TRUE, diag=FALSE)
ms2014_stake = graph.adjacency(similarity2014_stake, mode = c("lower"), weighted = TRUE, diag=FALSE)
V(ms2014_stake)$collaborative = nodes_stake[, 37]
V(ms2014_stake)$id = nodes_stake[, 1]
#Reciprocity
reciprocity2011 = reciprocity(b2011)
reciprocity2014 = reciprocity(b2014)
reciprocity2014_NE = reciprocity(b2014_NE)
reciprocity(ees, mode = c("ratio"))
reciprocity(actors, mode = c("ratio"))
reciprocity(stake, mode = c("ratio"))
#Transitivity
local_transityvity2011 = transitivity(b2011, type = c("local"), vids = NULL, weights = NULL, isolates = c("zero"))
local_transityvity2014 = transitivity(b2014, type = c("local"), vids = NULL, weights = NULL, isolates = c("zero"))
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local_transitivity2014_NE = transitivity(b2014_NE, type = c("local"), vids = NULL, weights = NULL, isolates = c("zero"))
local_transityvity2014_ees = transitivity(ees, type = c("local"), vids = NULL, weights = NULL, isolates = c("zero"))
local_transityvity2014_actors = transitivity(actors, type = c("local"), vids = NULL, weights = NULL, isolates = c("zero"))
local_transityvity2014_stake = transitivity(stake, type = c("local"), vids = NULL, weights = NULL, isolates = c("zero"))
#In-degree and out-degree
indegree2011 = graph.strength(b2011, vids = V(b2011), mode = c("in"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
indegree2014 = graph.strength(b2014, vids = V(b2014), mode = c("in"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
indegree2014_NE = graph.strength(b2014_NE, vids = V(b2014_NE), mode = c("in"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
indegree2014_ees = graph.strength(ees, vids = V(ees), mode = c("in"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
indegree2014_actors = graph.strength(actors, vids = V(actors), mode = c("in"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
indegree2014_stake = graph.strength(stake, vids = V(stake), mode = c("in"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
outdegree2011 = graph.strength(b2011, vids = V(b2011), mode = c("out"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
outdegree2014 = graph.strength(b2014, vids = V(b2014), mode = c("out"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
outdegree2014_NE = graph.strength(b2014_NE, vids = V(b2014_NE), mode = c("out"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
outdegree2014_ees = graph.strength(ees, vids = V(ees), mode = c("out"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
outdegree2014_actors = graph.strength(actors, vids = V(actors), mode = c("out"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
outdegree2014_stake = graph.strength(stake, vids = V(stake), mode = c("out"), loops = FALSE, weights = NULL)
#Hubs and Autority scaled
hub2011 = hub.score (b2011, scale = NULL, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
hub2014 = hub.score (b2014, scale = TRUE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
hub2014_NE = hub.score (b2014_NE, scale = TRUE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
hub2014_ees = hub.score (ees, scale = TRUE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
hub2014_actors = hub.score (actors, scale = TRUE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
hub2014_stake = hub.score (stake, scale = TRUE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
authority2011 = authority.score (b2011, scale = TRUE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
authority2014 = authority.score (b2014, scale = TRUE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
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authority2014_NE = authority.score (b2014_NE, scale = TRUE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
authority2014_ees = authority.score (ees, scale = FALSE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
authority2014_actors = authority.score (actors, scale = FALSE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
authority2014_stake = authority.score (stake, scale = FALSE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
#Authority unscaled
authority2011_ns = authority.score (b2011, scale = FALSE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
hub2011_ns = hub.score (b2011, scale = FALSE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
authority2014_ns = authority.score (b2014, scale = FALSE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
hub2014_ns = hub.score (b2014, scale = FALSE, weights=NULL, options = igraph.arpack.default)$vector
#Closeness centrality normalized
closeness2011 =  closeness(b2011, weights = NULL, normalized = TRUE)
closeness2014 = closeness(b2014, weights = NULL, normalized = TRUE)
closeness2014_NE = closeness(b2014_NE, weights = NULL, normalized = TRUE)
closeness2014_ees = closeness(ees, weights = NULL, normalized = TRUE)
closeness2014_actors = closeness(actors, weights = NULL, normalized = TRUE)
closeness2014_stake = closeness(stake, weights = NULL, normalized = TRUE)
#Raw closeness centrality
closeness_NN_2011 =  closeness(b2011, weights = NULL, normalized = FALSE)
closeness_NN_2014 = closeness(b2014, weights = NULL, normalized = FALSE)
closeness_NN_2014_NE = closeness(b2014_NE, weights = NULL, normalized = FALSE)
#Structural holes
constraint2011= constraint(b2011, nodes=V(b2011))
constraint2014= constraint(b2014, nodes=V(b2014))
constraint2014_NE= constraint(b2014_NE, nodes=V(b2014_NE))
constraint2014_ees= constraint(ees, nodes=V(ees))
constraint2014_actors= constraint(actors, nodes=V(actors))
constraint2014_stake= constraint(stake, nodes=V(stake))
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#Community analysis - louvain community detection
louvain2011 = cluster_louvain(ms2011, weights = E(ms2011)$weight)
louvain2014 = cluster_louvain(ms2014, weights = E(ms2014)$weight)
louvain2014_NE = cluster_louvain(ms2014_NE, weights = E(ms2014_NE)$weight)
l_ees= cluster_louvain(ms2014_ees, weights = E(ms2014_ees)$weight)
l_actors= cluster_louvain(ms2014_actors, weights = E(ms2014_actors)$weight)
l_stake = cluster_louvain(ms2014_stake, weights = E(ms2014_stake)$weight)
sizes(louvain2011)
sizes(louvain2014)
sizes(louvain2014_NE)
sizes(l_ees)
sizes(l_actors)
sizes(l_stake)
V(b2011)$community = membership(louvain2011)
V(b2014)$community = membership(louvain2014)
V(b2014_NE)$community = membership(louvain2014_NE)
#Modularity of original network according to information communities
modularity(b2011, membership(louvain2011))
modularity(b2014, membership(louvain2014))
modularity(b2014_NE, membership(louvain2014))
modularity(ees, membership(l_ees))
modularity(actors, membership(l_actors))
modularity(stake, membership(l_stake))
#ERGM
b2014 = asNetwork(b2014_igraph)
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#Model A
b2model.A = ergm(b2014~edges+nodemix('collaborative2',  base=1),  control = control.ergm(MCMLE.maxit  ='50',  drop =
TRUE, MCMC.prop.weights="TNT", MCMC.burnin =10000, MCMC.interval = 5000, seed = 800), verbose = FALSE)
summary(b2model.A)
#Model B
b2model.B  =  ergm(b2014~edges+nodemix('collaborative2',  base=1)+nodematch('community'),  control  =
control.ergm(MCMLE.maxit ='50', drop = TRUE, MCMC.prop.weights="TNT", MCMC.burnin =10000, MCMC.interval =
5000, seed = 800), verbose = FALSE)
summary(b2model.B)
#Model C
b2model.C  =  ergm(b2014~edges+nodemix('collaborative2',  base=1)+nodematch('community')+mutual,  control  =
control.ergm(MCMLE.maxit ='50', drop = TRUE, MCMC.prop.weights="TNT", MCMC.burnin =10000, MCMC.interval =
5000, seed = 800), verbose = FALSE)
summary(b2model.C)
#Model D
b2model.D  =  ergm(b2014~edges+nodemix('collaborative2',  base=1)+nodematch('community')+mutual+gwesp(0,
fixed=TRUE),  control  =  control.ergm(MCMLE.maxit  ='50',  drop = TRUE, MCMC.prop.weights="TNT",  MCMC.burnin
=10000, MCMC.interval = 5000, seed = 800), verbose = FALSE)
summary(b2model.best)
#Model E
b2model.E  =  ergm(b2014~edges+nodemix('collaborative2',  base=1)+nodematch('community')+mutual+gwesp(0,
fixed=TRUE)+istar(2),  control  =  control.ergm(MCMLE.maxit  ='50',  drop  =  TRUE,  MCMC.prop.weights="TNT",
MCMC.burnin =10000, MCMC.interval = 5000, seed = 800), verbose = FALSE)
summary(b2model.best)
#Model E diagnostic
mcmc.diagnostics(b2model.best)
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#Model E GOF
gof.b2model.best = gof.ergm(b2model.best)
plot(gof.b2model.best)
summary(gof.b2model.best)
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